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I. Introduction and Executive Sum m ary
The Independence Standards Board (the "ISB") was established in May 1997 with the mission o f developing "a 
conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of public entities which will serve as the foundation for the 
development o f principles-based independence standards." This White Paper is submitted to the ISB on behalf o f the 
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA") in response to Chairman Allen's request for 
educational materials bearing on the conceptual framework for protecting and enhancing auditor independence.
The conclusions o f this White Paper are guided by one overarching imperative - serving the public interest in 
assuring auditor independence. Auditor independence is o f critical importance to the efficient functioning of our capital
markets, which depend on a continuous flow of reliable financial information. Moreover, independence is one o f the 
most deeply ingrained values o f the accounting profession. No one has a greater interest in upholding the independence 
o f auditors o f public entities than members o f the profession, as the reputation of all professionals engaged in auditing 
public entities depends on it. Indeed, the issue is not whether independence standards and policies should be 
"strengthened" or "relaxed," but rather what approach best advances the public interest in the highest quality of 
independent audits o f public entities.
It is particularly timely that the ISB has been formed now to consider this issue. Dramatic changes in the world 
economy, in combination with astonishing breakthroughs in information technology, are redefining the audit function, 
placing new demands on auditors and permanently altering the relationships between accounting firms and their clients. 
These dynamics suggest a need to replace the existing command and control regulatory system with a more responsive, 
principles-based model.
Building on the profession's long experience of self-regulation, the new paradigm for auditor independence 
should embrace the enforced self-regulation model that has now become a key element o f regulatory reform. In place of 
the current system o f rigid "one-size fits all" rules and micro-management, the new model would have the ISB establish 
core principles of independence, identify appropriate safeguards, and challenge firms to design effective independence 
codes. To assure transparency and foster conformity with the core principles, the codes would be filed with the ISB, 
subject to ISB review. Since the codes would be available to the public, investors and others who rely on audited 
financial information would be informed about each firm 's independence policies and practices. Compliance with the 
independence codes would further be assured by the peer review process. In addition, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the "SEC" or "Commission"), AICPA, and state boards o f accountancy would retain their oversight and 
enforcement authority. This new model should better serve the public interest by enabling firms to adapt to market 
transformations, while at the same more fully protecting auditor independence. 
A Fresh  L ook  at  Indepen d en c e  fo r  a  Ch a ng ing  W orld
A fresh look at auditor independence standards is necessitated by the forces o f globalization, enterprise 
transformation and rapid and continuous technological change that are reshaping the business community. As discussed 
in Section IE, the information revolution is likely to change the very nature o f the audit function, as well as the role of 
the auditor. While the precise impact o f these changes cannot be predicted, it is certain that auditors will be called upon 
in the future to (i) possess even greater skills and expertise in information technology, (ii) develop the knowledge
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necessary for a sophisticated understanding o f their clients' increasingly complex financial and organizational affairs and 
(iii) bring to bear a wide range of expertise in conducting audits. These imperatives place a premium on diversification 
in terms of the range o f skills and technology that auditors must develop or access within their firms. Efforts to impede 
the establishment of multidisciplinary professional service firms (which offer both audit and non-audit services), based 
upon conjecture that a broad range o f services impairs independence, thus, are detrimental to the goal o f achieving the 
highest quality audits.
In recent years, the accelerating pace o f technology-driven change has also led to the emergence o f an 
increasing variety o f business relationships between professional services firms and other entities seeking to respond 
flexibly to the demands o f the intensely competitive global market. These relationships take many forms, the common 
denominator being an alliance in which the special skills and expertise of one entity are combined with the different 
competencies o f another to bring to the market a range of diverse services with maximum efficiency. For example, an 
accounting firm and a computer software company may decide to develop jointly an electronic tax return filing system 
for the Internal Revenue Service or contract to install a system for a commercial client. These business ventures capture 
important efficiencies by sharing costs and risks, drawing upon complementary knowledge bases, combining 
competencies, reaching a global market and bringing the service to market in the shortest time. The new conceptual 
framework proposed herein would adopt a pragmatic approach that allows such business relationships with audit clients - 
provided adequate safeguards exist to protect auditor independence.
In designing a new paradigm for the regulation of auditor independence, the ISB should consider the economic 
and other determinants of auditor independence, as well as the key elements of successful regulatory strategy. As 
explained in Section EI, the overwhelming economic interest o f accounting firms in their reputational capital provides a 
powerful incentive to safeguard independence. Non-audit services increase the firm 's investment in reputational capital, 
contribute importantly to the quality o f audit services and provide other benefits to clients and the public. An 
enlightened regulatory and standards-setting approach would take advantage o f this incentive structure and enlist the 
firms in an effective regulatory partnership with the ISB and the SEC.
The economic analysis set forth in Section III also recognizes the need to consider individuals, as well as firms, 
in designing effective safeguards to mitigate threats to independence. The interests of audit firms and their members are 
closely aligned through their common investment in reputational capital. While unlikely, it is possible that an individual 
prepared to advance his or her self interest at the expense o f the firm may engage in what economists call "free riding"
on the reputation o f the firm. This possibility is addressed in the present system through a variety of existing safeguards, 
including policies that encourage professionals to bring disagreements over audit issues to the attention o f the appropriate 
partners in the firm, second partner review, partner compensation and performance review policies that align the audit 
partners' interest with those of the firm, and other measures designed to assure that audit partners are accountable for 
their decisions. The proposed new framework for auditor independence should effectively address this potential "free 
rider" issue as well.
Also relevant to the design o f an effective regulatory system is the fact that exposure to legal liability provides a 
powerful deterrent to compromising independence. Indeed, because severe sanctions may be imposed on individual 
partners as well as firms, they represent a particularly significant constraint. These sanctions include (i) common law 
civil liability, (ii) federal securities law civil and criminal liability, (iii) civil liability under state securities law, (iv) loss of 
state license to practice, (v) suspension o f the right to practice before the SEC, and (vi) other professional sanctions, such 
as suspension o f AICPA membership.
As explained in Section ID, liability is no theoretical risk. In recent years, the costs associated with actual or 
threatened litigation have reached staggering levels for accounting firms. While often found to have no basis, aggregate 
legal claims against the six largest accounting firms (the "Big Six") exceeded $30 billion at the end of 1992. Similarly, 
auditors who have compromised their independence have been the subject o f disciplinary action by the SEC, the AICPA 
and state regulators. The economic incentives and liability deterrents are reinforced by the psychological and ethical 
determinants o f the behavior of audit firms and auditors. Shaped by a culture that fosters the internalization o f ethical 
norms and rewards compliance with firm policies, the pervasive value o f professionalism provides organizational 
support for independent auditor behavior.
Section EI enumerates the important economic efficiencies benefiting the audit captured by multi-disciplinary 
professional service firms o f all sizes. In particular, these firms are able to lower the relative cost of audit services 
because the fixed costs associated with the technological, organizational and physical infrastructure of such entities are 
spread over a larger base than would be possible in audit-only firms, or firms precluded from providing non-audit 
services to audit clients. Further, transactional costs are reduced when clients are able to receive multiple services from 
the same firm, because o f the significant economies associated with the development o f a body of knowledge specific to 
a client. Similarly, the potential exists for substantial economies associated with a professional service firm providing 
multiple services in regard to complex transactions with which it is already familiar. These gains are recognized by the
market, which increasingly looks to accounting firms in the interest o f cost effectiveness and an integrated understanding 
o f the client's business, for a range of non-audit services and business relationships. 
A M ore  Respo nsive  M odel Based  on E nfo r c ed  Self-Reg ulatio n
As discussed in Section IV, in recent years an extraordinary consensus in favor of regulatory reform has led to 
replacing "command and control" micro-regulation with "enforced self-regulation." The new approach assigns 
regulators the responsibility of defining the desired regulatory goals, providing appropriate guidance, directing the 
regulated industry or profession to adopt a compliance program, monitoring performance and sanctioning offensive 
behavior.
This model offers manifold advantages as compared with the command and control regulation of auditor 
independence:
informational efficiency, since the participants in the regulated profession possess detailed 
knowledge not available to the regulators and standards-setters;
a dynamic response to changing market realities;
an effective means o f harnessing the motivation o f the regulated entities in support of 
relevant and necessary regulation;
a basis for a pragmatic balancing o f risks and benefits in the public interest;
a greater commitment to the achievement o f clear goals which commend themselves to those
being regulated; and
solutions tailored to the needs o f the particular entity (rather than a "one-size fits all"
approach).
This philosophy of enforced self-regulation has been applied successfully by agencies as diverse as the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the SEC. Indeed, the SEC has required investment companies and investment advisers to 
implement their own, individually-tailored personal trading rules to detect and prevent conduct the SEC has determined 
to be detrimental to the public interest. The same approach should also be applied to the regulation of auditor 
independence, reinforcing existing economic and other determinants o f independence. Further, enforced self-regulation 
would build on the profession's extensive experience o f self-regulation described in Section II. 
The N ew  Co nceptual  Fram ew ork
The new conceptual framework proposed in Section V is based on the enforced self-regulation model discussed 
in Section IV and reflects the economic and other determinants o f auditor independence discussed in Section III. For 
purposes o f the new framework, independence would be defined as an absence o f interests that create an unacceptable
risk of bias with respect to the quality or context of information that is the subject of an audit engagement. Consistent 
with this definition, the ISB would adopt core principles of independence, promulgate guidelines on how those principles 
would be applied to situations that raise a threat to independence, identify appropriate types of safeguards and require 
firms to draft independence codes implementing the system, subject to ISB review. The SEC, the AICPA and state 
boards of accountancy would retain appropriate oversight and enforcement roles. The relationship of the SEC, ISB, 
AICPA, state boards and firms envisioned by the new conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Section V suggests that the ISB adopt the following core principles, which reflect a broad consensus of views 
within the profession regarding the primary considerations bearing on auditor independence:
•Auditors and firms should not be financially dependent upon an audit client;
•Auditors and firms should not have conflicting interests that would impair their objectivity with regard to 
matters affecting the financial statements; and,
•Auditors and firms should not have relationships with, or engage in activities for, clients that would entail 
making managerial decisions or otherwise serve to impair an auditor's objectivity.
Recognizing that risks or threats to the core principles of auditor independence may be averted or mitigated in 
many instances by compensating controls, the ISB guidelines would identify the types of safeguards considered most 
effective with respect to particular threats to independence. Further, the guidelines would recognize the importance of 
materiality as a threshold consideration in applying the core principles. By identifying the specific risks or threats that 
firms should address in implementing the core principles of independence, the guidelines would challenge firms to 
develop safeguards designed to counteract or mitigate whatever threat to independence the particular activity may 
present. If the threat cannot be overcome in this way, the practice would be proscribed, unless overridden by important 
public interest benefits as determined by the ISB.
A principal advantage o f the proposed independence codes is that they will allow each firm to craft a 
compliance regime that reflects its culture, organizational structure, compensation system, practice priorities, quality 
controls and personnel policies. Each firm would be required to address aggressively the major threats to auditor 
independence - by crafting and implementing safeguards to protect and enhance the independence o f the firm and the 
audit partner. Thus, the codes would be developed by the institutions best positioned to recognize the risks and threats, 
and which also possess incentives to achieve an appropriate solution.
The codes would be filed with the ISB, thus ensuring "transparency" and fostering compliance with ISB 
guidelines. The codes, which would take effect upon filing, would be subject to review and possible disapproval by the 
ISB. Filing with the ISB would enable investors and others who rely on audited financial information to inform 
themselves about each firm 's independence policies and practices. Moreover, public availability of the codes would 
further public understanding of what accounting firms are doing to protect auditor independence and spur firms to adopt 
and implement best practices. That objective would be furthered by a periodic review o f firm codes by the Independence 
Issues Committee (the "IIC") in order to develop a set o f best practices that might be incorporated in the guidelines 
issued by the ISB. An important supplemental element o f this self-regulatory model is the testing o f compliance with the 
codes through the peer review process.
Anticipating that many small and mid-sized firms may want assistance in drafting independence codes, the IIC 
would produce a drafting guide for their use. For the same reason, it is proposed that a transition period o f up to three 
years be established to enable firms to take the steps needed to come under the new system.
The proposed new system o f principles, guidelines and independence codes is depicted in Figure 1.2.
In a d eq u a c y  o f  the  Cu r rent  System
The proposed framework responds to widespread concern that the current regulatory approach does not serve 
the public interest as well as it might. As detailed in Section II o f this White Paper, former officials o f the SEC, a 
variety o f panels and committees, expert commentators and members of the profession have identified a range of 
shortcomings with the current system, as well as unresolved issues. Indeed, the SEC on more than one occasion has 
indicated that it planned to conduct a comprehensive review of the present system of independence rules, standards and 
requirements relating to public entities. The creation o f the ISB is a decisive and promising response to this shared 
dissatisfaction.
The problems with, the present system are readily apparent. As is made clear in Sections II and III, however, 
these problems do not relate to audit quality or a lack o f independence on the part o f auditors. Indeed, there is no 
evidence that audit failure has been caused by a lack o f independence. The concern, rather, is that the current approach
fails to serve the public interest because it is inefficient, inflexible and imposes social costs without compensating 
benefits.
As explained in Section II, since the federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930's, the independence rules 
have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, and now encompass a large body o f miscellaneous interpretations. There are more 
than 200 pages of published interpretations and "no-action" letters by the staff o f the SEC (the "Staff'), supplementing 
more than 50 pages of rules, plus interpretations and ethics rulings of the AICPA, and a few additional independence- 
related requirements imposed by the AICPA's SEC Practice Section on its member firms that audit public entities. 
Detached from their ethical moorings, these interpretations and rulings tend to foster compliance with specific 
requirements or proscriptions, rather than assist auditors to focus on the purpose o f independence - to ensure that audits 
in fact are conducted in an objective and bias-free manner.
Further, many of these requirements are based on outmoded assumptions relating to the types of services clients 
customarily look to accounting firms to provide, the manner in which companies generate financial data and financial 
statements and the size and internal organization o f accounting firms, while disregarding the growing involvement of 
spouses and other family members in the workplace and recent developments, such as the prevalence o f teaming 
arrangements in the economy.
As discussed in Section II, the bulk of requirements focus on situations that are perceived by the Staff to impair 
the appearance of independence. But these perceptions embody assumptions that are highly subjective, lack any 
empirical foundation (although research by academics and practitioners suggests that investors and other stakeholders 
perceive non-audit services to have, at most, minimal effects on auditor independence) and result in arbitrary and unduly 
restrictive regulation.
Moreover, detailed appearance-based regulations may be seen as at odds with Congress' original intent. As is 
made clear in Section II, auditors have always provided non-audit services to their audit clients. In enacting the federal 
securities laws, Congress was aware that independent auditors were selected and paid by audit clients in return for their 
auditing services, and expressed no concern about audit firms providing non-audit services to audit clients or the 
appearance o f independence. Thus, Congress did not entertain some abstract notion o f "perfect" independence but, 
rather, envisioned that auditors should maintain the highest level o f actual independence that was realistically attainable.
In addition, the actual behavior of shareholders demonstrates that knowledge regarding the non-audit fees paid 
to audit firms was o f limited interest to them. Indeed, the mandate to disclose such information imposed in 1978 by the
SEC's Accounting Series Release ("ASR") No. 250 was withdrawn in 1982 because the Commission concluded it was 
"not generally o f sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation." Subsequent studies have found that the required 
disclosure had no discernible effect on auditor retention rates or decisions by audit clients (in the aggregate) to procure 
non-audit services from audit firms, despite the SEC's strong admonition (set forth in ASR No. 264) to boards of 
directors and audit committees to exercise special care in making such decisions. If  key users of audited financial 
information had actually perceived a threat to auditor independence resulting from the provision of non-audit services, 
surely the outcome during this period would have been different.
Similarly, the behavior o f an industry which has a major economic stake in auditor liability - the insurance 
industry - refutes the theory that non-audit services are perceived to impair independence. Insurers do not perceive that 
non-audit services provided to audit clients increase the risk o f audit failure. This view is consistent with the fact that 
few claims against accounting firm s even allege audit failure resulting from a breach of independence. Since there is no 
empirical basis for suggesting a connection between non-audit services and the impairment o f independence, there is no 
reason to continue to focus on this issue. 
Ex per t  O pinio ns
We have submitted as appendices to this White Paper the views o f leading experts on issues relevant to auditor 
independence. These experts, whose views are reflected in the White Paper, have addressed the economic, behavioral, 
methodological and ethical contexts o f auditor independence. In particular:
Gary Orren, Professor o f Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School o f Management, Harvard University, 
and a nationally recognized analyst o f public opinion research engaged in a methodological analysis o f prior empirical 
work on auditor independence and set out a methodology for future research;
Oliver E. Williamson, David J. Teece, Rick Antle and Paul A. Griffin provided an economic analysis o f auditor 
independence, all under the auspices o f the Law and Economics Consulting Group, Inc. Oliver E. Williamson is 
Professor of Law and Economics at University of California, Berkeley, and is an eminent economist. David J. Teece is 
Professor of Business Administration at the Walter A. Haas School o f Business, University o f California, Berkeley, and 
has written numerous articles on the impact o f technological innovation on firms, competitive markets, and regulatory 
policy. Rick Antle is Professor o f Accounting at the Yale School o f Management, and has written extensively on 
accounting and auditing issues. Paul A. Griffin is Professor o f Management at the University o f California, Davis, holds 
a Ph.D. in Accounting and has written extensively on accounting and auditing issues;
W. Warner Burke, Chair o f the Department of Organization and Leadership, and Professor of Psychology and 
Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and a leading authority on behavioral science, analyzed the 
behavioral determinants o f auditor independence; and
Gary Edwards, founder and President o f Meritas Consulting, Inc., and former chief executive o f the Ethics 
Resource Center in Washington, D.C., addressed the ethical context of auditor independence.
Detailed biographical information about each o f these experts is provided in the relevant appendix. Their 
reports are attached as Appendices A through D, respectively.
II. H istorical and Institutional Fram ework
A. Overview
Historically, the concept of auditor independence has been defined as the ability o f the auditor to act 
with integrity and objectivity1 - that is, an independence in mental attitude.2 Early American practitioners believed that 
independence could not successfully be reduced to rules, but rather constituted an habitual state o f mind.3 More 
recently, the focus has been on appearance in relation to independence. While the appearance o f auditor independence
l
See C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  601.01, 7  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73 ,2 5 1, at 62,881 
(1997). The concepts of integrity and objectivity are closely intertwined with the concept o f independence. Integrity 
essentially describes the "trustworthiness" or "honesty" o f the auditor the idea that the auditor will put the quality o f the 
audit before any possible self-interest. See Robert K. Elliott & Peter D. Jacobson, Audit Independence: Concept and 
Application, CPA J. 35, 38 (Mar. 1992). Objectivity refers to the absence o f bias in performing an audit, meaning that the 
auditor does not, in fact, have any interest in the audit other than its reliability. Id. at 35; see also, John L. Carey, 
Professional Ethics o f  Public Accounting, New York: American Institute o f Accountants, 1946, at 7.
2
One o f the most widely quoted formulations o f the concept, by former AICPA Executive Director John Carey, 
noted that:
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to apply either generally or in its peculiar application 
e certified public accountant. Essentially it is a state o f mind. It is partly synonymous with honesty, integrity, courage, [and] 
cter. It means, in simplest terms, that the certified public accountant will tell the truth as he sees it and will permit no influence, 
al or sentimental, to turn him  from that course.
Carey, supra note 1, at 7.
3
See Gary John Previts, T h e  s c o p e  o f  CPA s e r v ic e s  43 (John Wiley & Sons ed. 1985).
plays an important role in fostering public confidence in the integrity of financial markets, any regulation on the basis of 
appearance must be grounded in an empirically-based determination o f the actual perceptions o f financial statement 
users.
For purposes of this White Paper, independence is defined as an absence o f interests that create an unacceptable 
risk o f bias with respect to the quality or context o f information that is the subject o f an audit engagement.4 In 
operational terms, independence ensures that those who perform an audit or other assurance engagement will be mentally 
objective when obtaining, examining, and reporting on information. Independence, therefore, constitutes one of the 
cornerstones o f the accounting profession.
Auditors serve the public interest by reporting on the reliability of financial statements issued by public 
companies. Financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") 
and reported upon in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"), which require that "[i]n all 
matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors."5
The responsibility for maintaining independence rests with individual auditors, their firms, and the accounting 
profession as a whole. Independence is a hallmark of the accounting professional, who continually evaluates his 
objectivity as he provides audit services to a client. The auditor's firm also has a critical interest in preserving 
independence, because its reputation for integrity is its most important asset.6 Moreover, the profession as a whole,
4
This formulation is consistent with the broader definition adopted by the AICPA Special Committee on Assurance 
Services (the "Elliott Committee") with respect to all types o f assurance services. See Special Committee on Assurance 
Services, Report o f  the Special Committee on Assurance Services (visited Aug. 8, 1997) 
<http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/comstud/assind/index.htm>. The Elliott Committee was created by the AICPA to 
"analyze and report on the current state and future of the audit/assurance function" and to examine "trends shaping the 
audit/assurance environment." In addition, the committee was charged with investigating, among other things, "the 
implications o f potential changes in the audit/assurance function for independence, professional skills, and professional 
education." Id. at <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/about/charge. htm>.
5
General Standard No. 2, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, AU 150.02.
6
For a discussion o f the importance o f reputation to accounting firms, see infra Section III.
recognizing independence as the mainstay o f its existence, remains dedicated to the enhancement and protection of 
auditor independence. Because individual auditors and their firms address independence issues on a day-to-day basis, 
they must exercise, with guidance from the profession, front-line responsibility for interpreting independence 
requirements.
However, the framework within which auditors address independence issues needs improvement. The 
accounting profession and representatives o f the SEC have acknowledged the need for a more principled approach - one 
that responds to the real-world experience and incentives of accounting firms and individual accountants. For years, 
leaders o f the profession have advocated a new system in which individual firms would establish policies consistent with 
broad principles o f independence.7 The SEC Staff has acknowledged the perception of shortcomings in the current 
system and indicated its intent to re-examine independence issues. In 1990, Jim Doty, the SEC-s then-General Counsel, 
observed that:
[tjhe Commission's standards o f independence * * * now are perceived by the accountants as either too 
vague to be o f any use, or too detailed and specific to be workable in today's business climate. I would expect that a 
concept release, addressing the difficult question o f "Accountants' Independence," might be issued in the near 
term.8
7
AICPA, s c o p e  o f  S e r v ic e s  b y  CPA  F ir m s , Report of the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, 
Division for CPA Firms, Mar. 1979; Elliott, supra note 1, at 38-39 (Mar. 1992); Robert Mednick, Independence: Let's Get 
Back to Basics, J. o f  a c c t . 86 (Jan. 1990). Mednick argued that:
when rules and regulations grow more minute and arbitrary, individuals and organizations find it easier to 
making ethical judgments the "tough calls" that rules may not cover. We merely comply or fail to comply with the rule, 
les, in the final analysis, are hollow rituals unless they have the underpinning of known and accepted rationale.
Id. at 93.
8
Remarks o f General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission, James R. Doty, ABA Federal Regulation of 
Securities Comm., Annual Fall Meeting (Nov. 9, 1990). Similarly, in a 1990 letter to Arthur Andersen & Co. in which the 
SEC's Office o f the Chief Accountant ("OCA") indicated that it would not object on independence grounds to the formation 
o f business relationships between Andersen Consulting and Arthur Andersen attest clients, the OCA stated that:
OCA's position is based upon the Commission's current independence interpretations. As you 
the staff is in the process o f reviewing those interpretations. This study may include a general review o f the effects o f 
 structures on the classification o f direct versus indirect business relationships, and on other relationships with audit
Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. July 9, 1990).
While the SEC's Office o f the Chief Accountant ("OCA") concluded in 1994 that fundamental changes in 
the Commission's regulations were not necessary,9 former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman recently voiced 
concerns about the current approach to independence questions, concluding that it "fails in a number o f respects and 
may well be contrary to the public interest."10 Wallman stated that "the framework for resolving independence 
issues that has arisen is, in many instances, not obviously apparent"11 and that " the lack o f  a clear framework 
undercuts the foundation fo r  analysis and calls into question the validity o f  the rules themselves "12 These 
acknowledgments o f the deficiencies o f the current system underscore that the SEC and the profession have a 
common interest in the success of the ISB 's efforts to develop a principles-based approach to independence issues.
B. Early Development of the Concept of Independence
From the inception o f the accounting profession in the United States in the late nineteenth 
century, accountants have offered a wide array of audit and non-audit services.13 Early practitioners were 
frequently retained by promoters o f corporate mergers to investigate companies under consideration.14 Accountants
9
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office o f the Chief Accountant, St a f f  R e p o r t  o n  A u d it o r  
In d e p e n d e n c e  55 (1994).
10
Steven M .H . Wallman, The Future o f  Accounting, Part III: Reliability and Auditor Independence, a c c t . 
H o r iz o n s , Dec. 1996, at 77.
11
Id. at 85.
12
Id. (emphasis added). Former Commissioner Wallman further noted that the lack o f conceptual clarity "causes a 
misperception on the part o f the public as to whether independence exists in situations where there may be little reason fo r  
concern.'' Id. (emphasis added).
13
See Previts, supra note 3, at 34  (noting that from the outset o f the profession, "consulting and acting as a business 
advisor was considered a typical activity for public accountants"); John L. Carey, The Independence Concept Revisited, 
O h io  CPA J. 5, 8 (Spring 1985) ("[f]rom the time the profession first organized in the United States, * * * CPAs have been 
advising and assisting clients in matters other than auditing, financial reporting and tax work").
14
See Previts, supra note 3, at 35. I n  1912, Robert Montgomery described such investigations as follows:
commonly advised audit clients on subjects such as financial management, cost controls, inventory control and 
credit management.15 Indeed, the first accountants depended heavily on consulting work for their economic 
livelihood.16 Contemporaneous professional literature often noted the diversity o f services provided by accountants, 
whose broad knowledge of business practices and expertise in accounting and auditing suited them naturally to the 
role o f management adviser.17 From the very founding o f the profession, therefore, public accountants fulfilled 
multiple roles.
As evidenced by the broad scope o f services performed, early practitioners did not view the provision of 
non-audit services as incompatible with audit independence. Indeed, the very concept o f independence arose at a 
time when accountants already were performing a broad range of non-audit services for clients.18 Accountants 
endeavored to exercise independent judgment with respect both to audit services and  non-audit services. Thus, 
Charles Waldo Haskins and Elijah Watt Sells, the original American-born partners o f a prominent public accounting 
firm, wrote in 1895 that "in making independent audits, in revising accounts, or investigating corporate affairs" 
public accountants should exhibit "integrity, appreciation o f the gravity and confidential character of the
Investigations are usually undertaken in connection with the sale o f a business to a corporation or other 
ser for the purpose of obtaining special information relative to finances or general affairs or with respect to alleged fraudulent 
actions or into the profits derived from the manufacture o f infringing articles, etc.
Id. at 49-50.
15
See Carey, supra note 1, at 8.
16
See Previts, supra note 3, at 34.
17
Frederick Cleveland, an early observer o f the accounting profession, noted in 1905 that accountants were 
particularly competent to advise business clients on matters relating to the "efficient and economic control and management 
of the work force." Frederick a . Cleveland, The Scope o f  the Profession o f  Accountancy, J. o f  a c c t . 53, 56 (Nov. 1905). 
Similarly, Herbert Stockwell described the scope o f the accounting profession in 1912 as "bounded only when we reach the 
legitimate realm o f the lawyer on one side and the engineer on the other." Herbert G. Stockwell, The Broader Field fo r  
Certified Public Accountants, J. o f  a c c t . 21, 23 (Jan. 1912).
18
See Previts, supra note 3, at 41 ("[i]n the midst o f all the discussion over services to be offered, the business 
community had not only focused on the special expertise o f the accountant, it had focused on another and more important 
difference - the accountant's impartial posture").
responsibility * * * and strength o f purpose, in order that the results o f their work would be properly and fearlessly 
stated."19
There was no fixed notion of the types of non-audit services that accountants should provide. Instead, 
accountants performed different types of services at different times, depending on business and technological 
developments and the evolving needs o f clients.20 Through the period prior to enactment o f the federal securities 
laws, there was relatively little concern that the development o f new non-audit services might impair the 
accountant's ability to perform audits with integrity and objectivity. Public accountants vigorously pursued a wide 
range o f services and expressed confidence in their ability to preserve independence.21
Significantly, Congress, when it enacted the securities laws in the 1930s, saw no reason for concern that 
the performance o f non-audit services by public accountants on behalf o f audit clients might impair auditors'
19
Id. Sells remarked further in 1908 that "[t]he position o f the public accountant in respect to corporations and their 
management is always an independent one." Id. at 42.
20
Recognizing the effect o f market forces on the young profession, W.C. Heaton wrote in 1925 that "the accountant 
cannot always limit completely the character o f work he does." Id. Similarly, Arthur Andersen, a pioneer o f the profession, 
commented in 1925 that:
In the experience o f the past 10 years the businessman has found that advice from an 
nting viewpoint may have high cash value in the form o f taxes saved or refunded, war contracts liquidated, in 
italizations and refinancings effected advantageously. . . . The present-day accountant who is alert will grasp every 
opportunity to foster this attitude by increasing the constructive value of all normal work and seeking newer and broader 
o f service to business management.
Id. at 45.
21
As stated by Frederick Hurdman in 1931:
There can be no disputing the fact that in relations with clients the accountant should 
tain his independence, and yet some of our best clients are those who depend upon us to a very large extent for 
nee in the conduct o f their business. It requires a very fine sense of balance at all times to preserve that independence 
till maintain the closest o f business and perhaps social relationships.
Id. at 43.
independence.22 Simply stated, advisory and other non-audit services were widely recognized both as within the 
professional competence o f public accountants and consistent with the principle of independence.
C. The Concept of Independence in the Securities Laws
In connection with the passage of the federal securities laws, Congress considered imposing a 
requirement that audits o f public companies be performed by a corps o f government auditors 23 Ultimately, 
Congress rejected this proposal in favor of a requirement that "independent" public accountants conduct the 
audits 24 Congress was made aware that independent accountants would be selected and paid by clients, but did not
22
The record preceding the adoption o f the federal securities laws demonstrates that Congress understood the role 
then played by independent public accountants. For example, Colonel A.H. Carter, President o f the New York State 
Society o f Certified Public Accountants, in explaining the benefit o f having independent public accountants rather than 
government employees conduct audits o f public companies, stated, "[w]e know the conditions of the accounts; we know the 
ramifications o f the business; we know the pitfalls o f the accounting structure that the company maintains." Securities Act: 
Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1933) (hereinafter 
"Hearings on S. 875"). Similarly, Congress was informed that:
The method o f audited accounts which involves in the first instance the preparation o f 
nts by the officers o f the company who are m ost familiar with its operations, and the examination thereof by qualified 
indent accountants possessing a wide general knowledge o f business and able to take a disinterested and objective 
of  the position is, I believe, now generally recognized as the best combination that has been evolved for producing 
satif ctory accounts.
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. 2693 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 
~ss. 7184-85 (1934) (written statement o f George O. May, Price Waterhouse).
23
Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 57-60.
24
For example, registration statements under the Securities Act o f 1933 (the "Securities Act") must be accompanied 
by financial statements certified by an independent public accountant or certified accountant. See 25 and 26 o f 
Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. 77aa(25) and (26) (1994). In addition, Sections 12(b) and 13(a) o f the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. 781(b) and 78m(a) (1994), provide that the Commission may require registrants 
by rule or regulation to file financial statements and annual reports certified by independent public accountants. References 
to independent public accountants also occur elsewhere throughout the federal securities laws. See Section 314 of the Trust 
Indenture Act o f 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77nnn (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require indenture obligors to file annual 
reports certified by independent public accountants); Section 15C o f the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o-5 (1994) (directing 
the Department o f the Treasury to adopt rules requiring government securities brokers and dealers to file with the agency 
financial statements certified by independent public accountants); Section 17(e) o f the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78qe 
(1994) (requiring registered brokers and dealers to file annually with the Commission financial statements certified by 
independent public accountants); Section 11 o f the Securities Investor Protection Act o f 1970, 15 U.S.C. 78ggg (1994) 
(requiring the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to submit annual reports to the Commission containing financial 
statements examined by independent public accountants); Section 5 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (the
view this arrangement as impairing the accountants' integrity or objectivity.25 Congress understood auditor 
independence in this context.
At the time the federal securities laws were adopted, the term "independent public accountant" was 
understood to refer to an accountant who acted with integrity and objectivity - and was therefore independent "in 
fact" - but did not encompass the added notion o f the appearance of independence. The American Institute o f 
Accountants, a predecessor of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), for example, had 
not adopted formal rules on independence before the adoption of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act because 
independence was considered a state o f mind incapable o f reduction to rules.26 Similarly, when Colonel A.H. 
Carter, President o f the New York State Society o f Certified Public Accountants, testified before Congress in 1933 
regarding the function o f public accountants, he explained in response to questioning that accountants were guided 
in their work by "[their] conscience."27 In comparison, when Congress has enacted statutes with the intent of 
requiring both the fact and the appearance of independence, it has included express language to that effect.28
"PUHCA", 15 U.S.C. 79(e) (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require public utility holding companies to file 
registration statements containing financial statements certified by independent public accountants); Section 10 o f the 
PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 79j (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require persons applying for approval to acquire securities 
or utility assets to file financial statements certified by independent public accountants); Section 14 o f the PUHCA, 15 
U.S.C. 79n (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require registered holding companies to file annual and other periodic 
reports certified by independent public accountants); Section 17 o f the Investment Company Act o f 1940 (the "ICA"), 15 
U.S.C. 80a-17 (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require periodic inspections o f the securities and investments of 
registered management companies by independent public accountants); Section 30 o f the ICA, 15 U.S.C. 80a-29 (1994) 
(authorizing the Commission to require investment companies to file annual reports certified by independent public 
accountants); Section 32 o f the ICA, 15 U.S.C. 80a-31 (1994) (establishing a procedure for the selection and approval by 
stockholders o f independent public accountants certifying financial statements o f a registered management company); and 
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act o f 1940 (the "LAA"), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3 (1994) (authorizing the Commission 
to require investment advisers to file financial statements certified by independent public accountants).
25
Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 57-60.
26
See Previts, supra note 3, at 43 (noting that practitioners in the early 1900s "felt that to condemn all who 
participated in activities which were described as potentially compromising would be as foolhardy as concluding that those 
who simply followed the rules were, in fact, independent").
27
Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 58 (1933).
28
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 455 (1994) (requiring a federal judge or magistrate to disqualify him self "in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
Congress did not define the attributes of an "independent" public accountant; rather, it authorized the SEC 
to define "accounting, technical and trade" terms used in the federal securities laws.29 The Exchange Act and its 
legislative history suggest that Congress granted the Commission broad, but not unlimited, definitional authority. In 
particular, Congress recognized that legislative intent would serve as an inherent limit on the Commission's 
authority.30
While it has never defined the term "independence," the Commission has adopted Rule 2-01 of Regulation 
S-X, which provides that "[t]he Commission will not recognize any certified accountant or public accountant as 
independent who is not in fa c t independent."31 By its express terms, this rule, first adopted in the m id-1930s, has 
always required independence "in fact," a standard similar to the requirement under GAAS that an auditor maintain 
his "independence in mental attitude." Indeed, the SEC's adoption o f Rule 2-01 shortly after Congress enacted the 
federal securities laws in the 1930s suggests the Commission understood that the basic standard established for 
"independent public accountants" under the federal securities laws was, as noted above, independence "in fact."
29
Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78c(b) (1994), Section 20(a) o f the PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 
37(a) (1994), grant the SEC authority to define "accounting,
77s(a) (1994), Section 3(b) o f the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
79t(a) (1994), and Section 38(a) o f the ICA, 15 U.S.C. 80a- 
technical and trade terms" used in each Act.
30
Section 3(b) o f the Exchange Act requires that the SEC exercise its definitional authority "consistently with the 
provisions and purposes o f  this title." 15 U.S.C. 78c(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Conference Report 
and the record o f debate reflect Congress' expectation that courts would recognize legislative intent as a limit on the 
Commission's definitional and rule-making power. For example, the Conference Committee observed that "courts 
commonly give the force of law to administrative interpretations o f statutory terms, unless clearly inconsistent with the 
legislative intent." H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934), reprinted in 1 f e d e r a l  s e c u r it ie s  La w s  
L e g is l a t iv e  H is t o r y  1933 1982 1169, 1198 (1983) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Sam Rayburn, then- 
Chairman o f the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in addressing the concern that the Commission 
might use its rulemaking authority to impose proxy requirements that Congress itself had considered and rejected, stated his 
belief that courts interpreting the Commission's power "would certainly take into consideration the proposition that the 
committee considered those very sections and struck them out and wrote other sections in their stead." 78 c o n g . R e c . 
7920,7924 (May 2,1934), reprinted in 1 F e d e r a l  Se c u r it ie s  La w s  L e g is l a t iv e  H is t o r y  1933 1982 861,865 (1983).
31
17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(a) (1997) (emphasis added). Rule 2-01 is the only rule formally adopted by the 
Commission which establishes qualifications for accountants practicing before the Commission or addresses the 
independence required of public accountants.
Rule 2-01 identifies two situations in which the Commission will deem an accountant not independent in 
fact. The Commission will not consider an accountant to be independent from a client if the accountant (i) has a 
direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest in the client, or (ii) acts as a promoter, underwriter, 
voting trustee, director, officer, or employee of the client.32 Rule 2-01 also provides that, "[i]n determining whether 
an accountant may in fact be not independent with respect to a particular person, the Commission will give 
appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances."33 According to former SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell, this 
language was intended to underscore that "independence was a question of fact, to be determined after examining all 
the evidence that might bear upon the existence or non-existence of that fact."34
Consistent with the legislative and regulatory framework established under the federal securities laws and 
Rule 2-01, the SEC for many years issued interpretations and administrative rulings that reflected attempts to 
determine whether a particular set o f circumstances involving an accounting firm and its audit client would impair 
the firm 's independence in fact. Specifically, the Commission generally took the position that advisory and other 
relationships between an accountant and an audit client should be taken into account in assessing whether an 
accountant was in fact independent, but that such relationships did not necessarily impair independence. For 
example, the Commission observed in a 1941 proceeding that evidence of various business relationships between an 
accountant and the principal officers o f an audit client "taken by itself, has little probative value, but * * * must be 
considered together with the facts heretofore discussed."35
See 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b) (1997).
33
17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c) (1997).
34
Ganson Purcell, Cooperation Between SEC and Public Accountants, J. OF ACCT. 155-56 (Aug. 1943).
35
A. Hollander & Son, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 586, 616 (1941).
In the 1970s, however, the SEC began to issue releases that increasingly focused on the appearance of 
independence.36 The Staff, too, has issued detailed interpretations and "no-action" letters setting forth its views as 
to a wide variety o f situations involving auditors and their clients that might compromise the appearance of 
independence. The S ta ff 's guidance has "mushroomed," and the independence requirements now encompass a 
large and complex body o f miscellaneous rules and interpretations. Indeed, the S ta ff's published guidance alone 
now takes up more than 200 pages o f one prominent loose-leaf service.
D. Self-Regulation by the Profession
The SEC, however, is not the sole source o f regulatory measures designed to protect auditor 
independence. In fact, accounting has long been a self-regulated profession. Since accounting's inception, the 
profession and individual firms have recognized the fundamental importance o f independence to audit quality and 
have employed a broad array o f measures to counteract threats to such independence. These self-regulatory 
measures, designed to protect and enhance audit quality, form the backdrop for the profession's recommendations 
set forth in Section V for a new conceptual framework o f enforced self-regulation for auditor independence. The 
profession's self-regulatory measures have evolved over time, as have the institutions responsible for formulating 
relevant professional standards for auditors. From the standpoint of the profession, the creation of the ISB and its 
development o f principles-based independence guidance represents the next logical step in the evolution of a 
coherent system o f self-regulation with respect to auditor independence.
1. Early Developm ent: 1880-1945
36
See, e.g., Accounting Series Release No. 126, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,148, at 
62,305 (July 5, 1972) (setting forth "guidelines and illustrations" of "typical situations which have involved loss of 
independence, whether in appearance or in fact,"  in order to place a practitioner on notice "o f these and similar potential 
threats to his independence") (emphasis added). In issuing ASR No. 126, the SEC did not purport to exercise its formal 
ru lemaking authority under the federal securities laws. Instead, the SEC characterized ASR No. 126 as an "interpretive 
release" that merely "set forth presently existing guidelines employed by the Commission in resolving the various 
independence questions that come before it." Id. at 62,305. In practice, however, the SEC Staff treats the "guidelines" set 
forth in ASR No. 126 and similar releases, many o f which were subsequently "codified" as Section 600 o f the 
Commission's c o d if ic a t io n  o f  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s , as strict requirements, rather than informal guidelines to 
be employed by auditors o f public companies in resolving independence issues.
Accounting established itself as a profession during the latter part of the 
1800s, when the need for accountancy education was recognized37 and the American Association o f Public 
Accountants, predecessor o f the AICPA, was created.38 In 1896, the first statute to regulate the profession o f public 
accountancy was enacted in New York, and, during the same year, the first CPA examination was given.39 Thus, 
by the turn o f the century, the foundations o f the profession were in place.
In those early years, public accountants operated largely without the benefit of professional 
guidelines.40 During that time, examinations o f corporate accounts were conducted without a set of professional 
standards, and corporate accounting and reporting practices were virtually unrestricted.41 Given this lack o f 
standards, audit quality control was, at best, uncertain.42 Accounting's early leaders recognized that unless the 
profession took an active role in developing a conceptual framework of auditing standards, audit quality would 
suffer, and the profession's reputation, and thus its very existence, would be at risk.
By 1916, the American Institute of Accountants ("AIA") had become the focal point for the 
profession's standards-setting efforts. The AIA initiated a program to raise the quality o f practice by establishing an 
extensive professional library, publishing a bibliography (the "Accountant's Index") and developing its own 
uniform CPA examination, which it offered for use by any state licensing board.43 Conflicts within the membership
37
See Lee J. Seideler and D .R . Caimichael, a c c o u n t a n t s  H a n d b o o k  3-4  (6th ed. 1981).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See John C. Burton, Russell E. Palmer and Robert S. Kay, H a n d b o o k  o f  a c c o u n t in g  a n d  A u d it in g  39-4
(1981).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
of the AIA, however, led to a splintering of that body in 1921, when a group o f CPAs formed the American Society 
o f CPAs.44 The break-up o f the AIA created serious problems for the profession, "because it created confusion in 
the public mind about whose authority prevailed in accounting matters."45 Moreover, following the 1929 stock 
market crash and a major financial fraud in the 1930s,46 public pressure to assure the quality o f audits intensified.
In 1936, following the enactment of the federal securities laws, the AIA and the American 
Society of CPAs merged. The recombining o f these rival bodies led to the SEC's acceptance o f the AIA 
(subsequently, the AICPA) as the promulgator o f standards for financial accounting and auditing.47 This 
acceptance "reflected the government's willingness to accept a degree of professional self-governance, provided the 
public interest was protected."48 In 1939, following an initiative to formulate uniform accounting policies, the 
AICPA established the Committee on Auditing Procedure, which issued pronouncements relating to audit quality 
that served as the nucleus o f subsequent statements on auditing procedure.
2. The M aturing Profession: 1945-1980
After World War II, auditing began a period of sustained change. The 
profession was enriched by the introduction in 1948 o f the first of 13 specialized industry audit guides 49 When the
Dale L. Flesher, Paul J. Miranti and Gary John Previts, The First Century o f  the CPA, J. OF ACCT. 51 (Oct. 1996).
44
Id. at 52.
45
Id. at 52-53.
46
Id. at 53.
47
The AIA changed its name to the AICPA in 1957. For ease o f reference, all subsequent discussion of the AIA 
between 1936 and 1957 will refer to it as the AICPA.
48
Flesher et al., supra note 43 , at 53.
49
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") came into existence as an organization independent of the AICPA 
in the early 1970s, the AICPA created the Auditing Standards Division.50 In 1972, the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee ("AudSEC") took over the work o f the Committee on Auditing Procedure. Turning its 
attention from  procedures to standards, AudSEC and its successor, the Auditing Standards Board ("ASB"), have 
issued 82 Statements on Auditing Standards ("SASs") since 1973.51
This period also witnessed a rising sensitivity to the need for effective practice management in the 
delivery of high-quality professional accounting services. In 1974, the AICPA officially codified a definition of 
"preventive control" to reduce proactively the risk of defective final products. The basic quality controls codified in 
1974, which have subsequently been modified, related to:
•hiring;
professional development (training);
advancement;
acceptance and continuance o f clients;
independence;
assigning personnel to engagements;
consultation;
supervision (including review); and
•inspection (monitoring the design and implementation o f the other quality controls)52
In 1974, the AICPA appointed an independent study group, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
(the "Cohen Commission") to consider whether there was any "gap" between what the public expected of auditors 
and what auditors reasonably could accomplish. Chaired by former SEC Chairman Manuel E. Cohen, the Cohen
Id. at 55.
50
H a n d b o o k  o f  A c c o u n t in g  a n d  A u d it in g , supra note 40, at 11-3.
51
See Larry P. Bailey, 1997 m il l e r  GAAS g u id e  (1997).
52
See A IC PA  St a t e m e n t  o n  Q u a l it y  Co n t r o l  St a n d a r d s  N o . 1 (1974).
Commission found that such an expectations gap in fact existed.53 The Cohen Commission recommended, among 
other things, that AudSEC be replaced by a smaller standards-setting committee, and that participation in the setting 
of auditing standards by people outside the profession should be encouraged.54 Responding to the 
recommendations of the Cohen Commission, the AICPA created the ASB to replace AudSEC and established an 
advisory council appointed from the ranks o f financial analysts, corporate managers, bankers, academics, 
government employees and accountants in public practice.55
In 1977, the AICPA established the SEC Practice Section ("SECPS" or "Section") as a voluntary 
membership organization within the AICPA with the objective of improving the quality of practice by CPA firms 
before the SEC. Member firms are required to participate in (i) peer review, through which SECPS members every 
three years review the quality control policies and procedures o f other SECPS members,56 and (ii) quality control 
inquiries, which review allegations of audit failure in litigation involving publicly traded clients and certain other 
entities to determine if  the firm 's quality control systems require revision or if  stricter compliance with the firm 's 
quality control policies and procedures and/or the SECPS' membership requirements is needed. The activities of 
the SECPS are overseen by the Public Oversight Board ("POB").57
53
The Cohen Commission also found that no prohibition of non-audit services was warranted. See Section II.H, 
infra. Indeed, the Cohen Commission recommended that professional standards should require that public accounting firms 
establish policies and procedures to assure that knowledge gained from other services is made available to the partner in 
charge of the audit so that the partner can consider its implication for the audit function. Consistent with auditors' strong 
incentive to protect and enhance their reputational capital, the profession adopted this recommendation. Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 22 includes as an audit planning procedure a discussion o f matters that may affect the audit with 
firm personnel responsible for the provision o f non-audit services to the client. In addition, an interpretation, AU
931 1 .01-.03, addresses that subject.
54
Ha n d b o o k  o f  A c c o u n t in g  a n d  A u d it in g , supra note 40, at 11-3.
55
Ha n d b o o k  o f  A c c o u n t in g  a n d  A u d it in g , supra note 40, at 11-3 - 4.
56
Since 1990, the AICPA has required that all o f its member firms that audit public companies join its peer review
program.
57
The POB's primary responsibility is to represent the public interest when (i) the SECPS sets, revises or enforces 
standards, membership requirements, rules or procedures, and (ii) SECPS committees consider the results o f individual peer
Peer review was arguably "the single most important element of the accounting profession's response to 
the various recommendations for self-initiated reform made by the Congress, the Commission and others."58 
During the peer review process, a review team (comprised o f individuals either appointed by the Peer Review 
Committee59 or selected from another member firm engaged to conduct the review) evaluates whether (i) the 
reviewed firm 's quality control system is appropriate, (ii) the firm 's policies and procedures are adequately 
documented and communicated to its personnel, (iii) the firm is complying with such procedures so as to provide 
reasonable assurance o f conformity with professional standards, and (iv) the firm is in compliance with the 
membership requirements o f the Section.60 At the completion o f the peer review, the review team provides the 
reviewed firm with a formal report and, if applicable, a letter of comments on matters that may require action by the 
firm.61
With respect to SECPS member firms, a procedure has been established to enable the SEC to evaluate the 
adequacy o f the peer review process and the POB's oversight o f that process.62 This procedure permits the SEC 
access, during a period following the issuance of the peer review report, to certain of the peer review working
reviews or the possible quality control implications o f litigation alleging audit failure. The POB also reports annually on 
whether the public interest is being protected. See AICPA Online, <http://www.aicpa.org>.
58
Securities Act Release No. 6695, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,122, at 88,638 (Apr. 1, 
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papers.63 After its review of the working papers, the SEC's representatives discuss with representatives of the POB 
and the Peer Review Committee any matters that they believe the Committee should consider.
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC") determines whether allegations o f audit failure against 
SECPS member firms involving SEC registrants indicate a need for those firms to take corrective actions to 
strengthen their quality control systems or address personnel deficiencies.64 This quality control inquiry process 
complements the peer review process. The QCIC's work may also raise questions that suggest the need to 
reconsider or interpret professional standards or identify audit practice issues where practical guidance would 
benefit practitioners. The QCIC refers such matters to those bodies responsible for issuing professional guidance.65
In 1979, the AICPA's Quality Control Standards Committee ("QCSC") - the senior technical committee of 
the AICPA designated to issue pronouncements on quality control standards - issued its first Statement on Quality 
Control Standards ("SQCS"), SQCS No. 1, which superseded SAS No. 4. SQCS No. 1, now itself superseded, set 
forth the nine elements of quality control listed above, and required firms to consider each of them, to the extent 
applicable to their practices, in establishing quality control practices and procedures.
3. 1980-Present
During the 1980s, a series o f highly publicized financial frauds led to increased 
public pressure to review the system o f financial reporting.66 One of the profession's responses was the creation of 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the "Treadway Commission"), which was charged
63
Id.
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See AICPA Online, <http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/report/quality.htm>.
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See Previts, supra note 3, at 142.
with investigating the cause o f fraudulent financial reporting.67 Although the Treadway Commission report, issued 
in 1987, made a number o f recommendations to reduce the potential for such frauds, one o f its main conclusions 
was that corporate audit committees should play a more active role in the audit process 68 Since that time, the 
AICPA has indicated that SEC registrants and other publicly accountable entities should be required to have 
independent audit committees whenever practicable.69 Such committees reinforce auditor independence by 
overseeing the activities o f the auditors and protecting them from management influence 70
In 1994, the POB appointed the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, chaired by Donald J. 
Kirk, a POB member and former Chairman o f the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "Kirk Panel"), to 
determine whether "the SECPS, the accounting profession or the SEC should take steps to better assure the 
independence of auditors and the integrity and objectivity of their judgments."71 Among other things, the Panel 
recommended that independence would be enhanced if public entities established stronger, more accountable boards 
of directors. The Kirk Panel also proposed that the SEC and the profession develop a more cooperative relationship,
67
The Treadway Commission was a private sector initiative jointly sponsored by the AICPA, the American 
Accounting Association, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute o f Internal Auditors and the National Association of 
Accountants. Report o f  the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Oct. 1987.
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Flesher, supra note 43, at 56. After the Treadway Commission issued its report, the SEC wrote to the national 
securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), encouraging them to review their audit 
committee requirements. The Accounting Profession: Major Issues: Progress and Concerns, GAO Report to the Ranking 
Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House o f Representatives (Sept. 1996) (hereinafter "1996 GAO Report"), at 
32. The SEC did not write to the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), as its listing requirements already mandated 
independent audit committees as o f the time o f the Treadway Commission's recommendations. In response, the NASD 
strengthened its prior recommendation that all national market system companies have audit committees with a majority of 
independent directors, transforming it into a requirement, and the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") adopted a similar 
requirement. Id.
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independent audit committees for large banks and savings and loans, and sets audit committee membership requirements for 
the largest o f the institutions. 1996 GAO Report supra note 68, at Appendix I, at 55.
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since both share the objective o f providing the public with relevant and reliable information.72 In this regard, the 
development o f the ISB is the logical extension o f the SEC's and the profession's ongoing efforts to develop a 
comprehensive and effective means o f safeguarding auditor independence and a more cooperative regulatory 
approach.73
In large measure, the effectiveness o f the profession's efforts to assure audit quality, including 
auditor independence, are grounded in the profession's commitment to objectivity and integrity. The AICPA's 
Code of Professional Ethics begins by stating that "[a] distinguishing mark of a professional is his acceptance of 
responsibility to the public."74 CPAs are expected to strive for standards o f conduct beyond the prescribed 
mínimums:
The principles call for an unswerving commitment to honorable behavior, even at the 
sacrifice of personal advantage 75
As professionals, auditors dedicate themselves to these principles, and strive to ensure that the firms with which they are 
associated maintain a strong culture of professionalism. In this regard, firms have implemented, and continue to develop, 
increasingly comprehensive measures to realize these principles.
Firms employ a variety o f safeguards to address their various professional and risk management goals. One 
category of safeguards is directed at instilling values in all employees and maintaining a culture o f professionalism. Other 
categories focus on managing independence and other professional risks and ensuring that concerns relating to independence 
are communicated and appropriately addressed during an engagement. Another category o f safeguards assures that auditors
72
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CPA J. 18 (Feb. 1995).
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are accountable to their partners for their decisions. A final category provides for external review of the firm 's quality 
controls. Within these categories, firms tailor specific safeguards to meet their particular needs and concerns. Examples of 
internal safeguards presently in place at all or some of the major auditing firms are set forth in the table below.
Types of Safeguards Employed by 
Big Six  Firms
Category Safeguard
Instilling Professional Values as Part o f •Training
Firm Culture Firm Policies on Independence
Annual Confirmation o f
Compliance with Firm Independence
Policies
Firm-Wide Partner
Compensation Methods
M onitoring Investm ents
Risk M anagement •Client Acceptance and Continuance
•New Service Line Acceptance
Policies
Independence List (Client
Securities)
Communication ■Consultation Requirements
•Audit Team Disagreement
Resolution Process
Separate National Consultation
Function
Internal Accountability •Partner Rotation
Second Partner Review
•Internal Inspection Programs
Audit Quality Review
Analysis o f Litigation
Experience
Internal Disciplinary Actions
External Review •Peer Review
QCIC Review (A udit Failures)
These safeguards, which reflect firm s' efforts to implement and expand upon independence standards set by the 
profession, enable firms to manage effectively any independence risks that may arise. The general success of these firm-level 
safeguards in protecting and enhancing auditor independence is demonstrated by the fact that QCIC inquiries in connection 
with alleged audit failures have identified no cases where independence was compromised, and that peer reviews rarely, if 
ever, identify significant independence concerns.
The profession, through the AICPA, has also developed a body of independence guidelines that apply to audits (of 
both public and non-public entities) performed by members. In so doing, the AICPA has stated that public confidence in the 
independence o f auditors would be "impaired by evidence that independence was actually lacking," and might also be 
impaired "by the existence o f circumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence independence."76 The 
AICPA's independence guidelines comprise over 50 pages o f rules, interpretations and ethics rulings. In addition, since 
1990, AICPA member firms that audit public entities must belong to the AICPA's SEC Practice Section, which imposes 
quality control requirements that, among other things, protect independence. In general, the restrictions set forth in the 
AICPA's guidelines are less stringent than the Commission's.77 Auditors of public companies, however, must comply with 
both SEC and AICPA requirements and, therefore, are held to the most restrictive standard.
E. Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Today's Approach
The approach to assuring independence which has arisen over the past few decades is characterized by a 
proliferation o f miscellaneous, detailed interpretations reflecting the views o f the SEC, the SEC Staff, and the AICPA. This 
"rule-oriented" approach to independence provides two benefits. First, it gives clear guidance in some situations. For
76
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For example, Section 602.02.g o f the C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  Po l ic ie s , 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 73,272, at 62,905 (1997), states that auditors of public companies should not enter into "[d]irect and material 
indirect business relationships" with their clients or their affiliates. The SEC has interpreted this rule as precluding an 
accounting firm from entering into a prime/subcontractor arrangement with an audit client (or vice versa) to provide 
services to unrelated third parties, regardless o f the materiality o f the arrangement to the firm or its client. See, e.g., Letter 
from Clarence H. Staubs, A ss't Chief Accountant, Securities & Exchange Commission to A. Clayton Ostlund, Touche Ross 
& Co. (May 18, 1981). In comparison, AICPA guidelines prohibit a member from entering into a "cooperative 
arrangement" with a client only if it is "material to the member's firm or to the client." See Interpretation 101-12 under the 
AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct, ET 101.14.
example, extensive guidance is provided on direct and material indirect financial interests in audit clients, and on permissible 
activities for retired partners o f accounting firms.78 Some practitioners, therefore, may take comfort in their ability to rely on 
the detailed guidelines that exist in these areas. Second, as described above, today's approach has fostered the adoption by 
accounting firms o f numerous safeguards designed to ensure independence. Recognizing the advantages of today's system, 
the OCA concluded in 1994 that additional rules were not necessary to protect independence 79 Nevertheless, the current 
system has a number o f shortcomings and needs improvement.
First, current requirements are not clearly derived from any underlying set o f established principles considered 
necessary to protect the public interest in reliable financial statements. Rather, they represent an assortment of interpretations 
issued since the 1930s. The absence o f any clear, consistent rationale undermines the current rules and, in many respects, 
renders them arbitrary.
Second, current requirements are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in scope. They are under-inclusive insofar 
as they tend to foster compliance with specific rules, rather than adherence to an underlying set of core independence 
principles. They are over-inclusive insofar as they proscribe more activity than reasonably necessary to ensure that audits are 
in fact performed with integrity and objectivity.80
Third, current requirements are based on assumptions that, in many cases, are now outdated.81 Examples of such 
assumptions include those relating to (i) the types of services that corporate clients "customarily" look to professional service
78
See C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  602 .02 .b (financial interests), 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C C H )
73,258, at 62,886 (1997), and 602.02.f (retired partners), 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,271, at 62,903 (1997).
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55 (1994).
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For example, prohibiting a firm from auditing a public entity in which any member o f the firm has any direct 
interest material or immaterial proscribes significantly more activity than necessary to ensure independence in fact.
81
While all independence standards rest upon assumptions as to whether an individual will act with sufficient 
objectivity in a particular situation, such assumptions should arise out of the profession's actual experience, as well as from 
study o f the incentives and disincentives that shape the behavior of auditors.
firms to provide;82 (ii) the manner in which companies generate financial data and prepare financial statements;83 (iii) the 
size and internal organization o f accounting firms, which today can range from sole practitioners to firms with thousands of 
widely dispersed personnel;84 (iv) family relationships, including certain assumptions reflecting a gender-based bias 
concerning the participation of women in the workplace;85 and (v) the idea that geographic separation (i.e., physical distance 
alone) between an accountant and a relative connected with an audit client is a significant factor in determining whether the 
relative could exert an improper influence over the accountant86 These assumptions, which no longer reflect the reality of
82
For example, 602.02.c.i o f the C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s , 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C C H ) 
73,263, at 62,890 (1997), notes that independent public accountants "often advise management and offer professional 
advice on matters dealing with financial operations," but asserts that an accountant may lack independence when a client 
appears to be "substantially dependent upon the accountant's skill and judgment in its financial operations," rather than 
"reliant only to the extent o f the customary type o f  consultation or advice" (emphasis added). As a result, when accounting 
firms are requested to provide non-audit services in connection with new business or technological developments that affect 
their clients, questions may arise as to whether the services represent a "customary" type o f consultation or advice.
83
Companies today rely upon increasingly sophisticated, state-of-the-art computer and data processing systems to 
generate financial data and prepare financial statements. The Commission's independence requirements that bear upon the 
scope o f an accountant's permissible assistance with clients' computer and data processing systems and operations, 
however, are derived from a 1972 release that dealt primarily with "bookkeeping" services and addresses such issues as 
whether an auditor's independence would be impaired if  he or she transmitted computer tapes to a "service bureau" on 
behalf o f a client for processing. See 602.02 .c o f the c o d if ic a t io n  o f  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  p o l ic ie s , 7 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 73,263, at 62,890 (1997).
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Under current AICPA requirements and the laws of many states, accounting firms may establish subsidiaries or 
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however, does not acknowledge that accounting firms may have affiliates or subsidiaries that engage in activities different 
from those o f the accounting firms, nor does Rule 2-01 expressly indicate whether the Commission's independence 
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85
For example, the SEC's independence requirements on "family relationships" provide that the Commission's 
"restrictions * * * against [an accountant's] holding official positions and associations with the client * * * are also 
applicable to relatives of the accountant in varying degrees depending on the closeness o f the relationship" and that the 
"relationships o f an accountant's immediate family or other dependent relatives with an audit client generally would be 
ascribed to the accountant and would accordingly impair his or his firm 's  independence with respect to that client." 
C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  602.02.h, 7 Fed. Sec. L . Rep. (CCH) 73,273, at 62,908 (1997) 
(emphasis added). These requirements date back decades and were drafted at a time when women only infrequently held 
senior positions at accounting firms or client organizations. This situation no longer exists, as a result o f which the SEC's 
requirements may serve to limit the career opportunities of both m en and women whose spouses hold positions of 
responsibility at an accounting firm or a firm client, even i f  the spouse employed by the accounting firm  plays no role in the 
audit o f  the other spouse's company.
86
The SEC's requirements addressing family relationships provide that "[t]here would be a presumption of 
impairment o f independence when * * * close relatives o f the accountant [not in the accountant's immediate family] * * * 
hold important positions with a client," but that the impairment could be mitigated "where there is adequate geographical
increasing organizational sophistication and current technology in the areas o f management information systems, 
communications and travel, hinder effective responses to market demand for increased professional services.
Fourth, the existence of separate SEC and AICPA independence requirements, all of which apply to auditors o f 
public companies, is burdensome and confusing, and raises compliance costs. For example, the distinctions between AICPA 
and SEC requirements may create hardships where, in the years immediately before a company first issues shares to the 
public, its auditors have also provided services - such as data processing assistance - that are permissible under AICPA 
standards but not under SEC requirements.87 In this situation, the company might not be able to continue its relationship with 
its auditors when it goes public. If  the SEC Staff challenges the audit firm 's independence, the company may be required to 
retain a new firm to "re-audit" its prior financial statements.
Fifth, the existence of detailed independence requirements in the United States exacerbates the conflicts that exist 
between U.S. and foreign independence standards, at a time when auditors' reports are increasingly used in cross-border 
transactions.88 The multitude o f rules makes it difficult to harmonize U.S. independence requirements with those of other
separation o f the accountant from the relative and the audit engagement to preclude the possibility o f contacts and influence 
that could cause a conclusion that the accountant's or his firm 's independence appeared to be impaired." Id. As discussed 
in Section IV, this restriction is no longer meaningful in today's world in which geographical separation has so little impact 
on an accountant's ability to communicate with relatives and other persons.
87
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nations.89 The SEC has recognized that differing auditor independence standards create an impediment to multi- 
jurisdictional offerings and international capital formation, 90 and is currently participating in the efforts o f the International 
Federation of Accountants ("IFAC") and the International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") to harmonize 
international accounting, auditing, and independence requirements. 91 A more principled approach to independence would 
facilitate these harmonization efforts.92
Sixth, the SEC's independence requirements fail to respond to the accelerating pace of technological change and the 
corresponding emergence of a variety o f business relationships between business entities. These relationships involve 
alliances in which the special skills and expertise o f one entity are combined with complementary skills or resources of 
another to bring to the market a range o f professional services. Current SEC requirements permit such relationships between 
accounting firms and audit clients only if  they are "indirect" and "immaterial."93 Yet many direct business relationships pose
89
Nevertheless, the SEC applies its independence requirements to auditors o f all SEC registrants, even though audits 
o f large multinational clients and the growing number o f non-U.S. registrants may be performed by many different foreign 
firms in addition to U.S.-based firms.
90
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Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,341 at 89,576, 89,578 (Nov. 14, 1988) ("Differences in auditing standards and auditor 
independence standards also present obstacles to achieving a mutually acceptable worldwide disclosure regime.").
The SEC has also made numerous statements recognizing the importance o f harmonization o f accounting and 
auditing standards generally. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission, Office o f the Chief Accountant, s t a f f  r e p o r t  o n  a u d it o r  
indep e n d e n c e , at 47 (1994); Remarks o f the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, "The Accountant's Critical Eye," 
Annual National Conference on SEC Developments, American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 
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In its recent Green Paper on the role of the statutory auditor, the European Commission noted that "agreement on a 
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little, if  any, threat to independence, particularly in light o f the safeguards described above.94 As discussed further in Section 
III, the indiscriminate proscription o f such relationships prevents accounting firms and their clients from achieving important 
efficiencies and responding to market demands for integrated services.
Finally, tibe current system reflects a proliferation of independence interpretations based in large part upon concerns 
regarding the need to maintain the appearance o f independence.95 While the accounting profession itself recognizes the 
importance o f avoiding "relationships that may appear to impair [an auditor's] objectivity,"96 the proliferation of 
"appearance-based" standards has many shortcomings. These include apparent broadening o f the original focus in Rule 2-01 
on independence in fact, susceptibility to subjective application, and the difficulty of discerning the perceptions of financial 
statement users.97 These drawbacks are described below.
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of interest with his client which would differ only in degree, but not in kind, from that o f an employee") 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 73,263, at 62,890 (1997) (emphasis added); Section 602.02.e.i o f the Co d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  Re p o r t in g  
Po l ic ie s  (stating that accountants may not engage in other occupations in addition to public accounting where "the 
relationships and activities customarily associated with [the] occupation are not compatible with the auditor's appearance of 
complete objectivity") 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,267, at 62,903 (1997) (emphasis added); Section 604.01 o f the 
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More fundamentally, appearance-based regulation is limited by the notorious inaccuracy o f perceptions. By 
perception alone, for example, it was hardly unreasonable for the ancients to suppose that the sun revolved around the earth. 
Only when armed with sophisticated instruments could scientists refute this perception. See Gary Orren, The Appearance 
Standard fo r  Auditor Independence: What We Know and Should Know, Oct. 20, 1997, at 2-3 (hereinafter "O r r e n  
R e p o r t "), attached as Appendix A.
F . The Problem  of Appearance-Based Regulation
The present approach to appearance-based regulation o f auditor independence creates a number of 
difficulties. As an initial matter, the promulgation of appearance-based standards arguably is inconsistent with the SEC's 
only substantive rule on independence, Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, which establishes as its standard only independence "in 
fact." Having purported to exercise its statutory rulemaking authority when it adopted and subsequently amended Rule 2-01, 
the Commission (and its Staff) may not issue appearance-based "interpretations" of Rule 2-01 that effectively redefine, rather 
than simply interpret, the rule, without at least undertaking rulemaking procedures. Even then, questions would arise as to the 
Commission's legal authority to propose an appearance-based standard under the federal securities laws, since the legislative 
history of those laws suggests that Congress understood the concept of "independence" to refer to independence "in fact" 
when they were adopted.98
Another widely acknowledged problem with all appearance-based standards is their susceptibility to subjective 
application. For example, the American Bar Association feared that an "appearance o f impropriety" standard would cause 
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys to degenerate "from the determination o f the fact issues specified by the rule into a 
determination on an instinctive, ad hoc, or even ad hominem basis."99 Accordingly, the ABA declined to adopt the 
appearance of impropriety standard in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, considering it too vague and subjective to 
serve as the express test o f lawyer misconduct.100 The ease with which nebulous allegations o f appearance-based violations 
can be made may ultimately breed cynicism and distrust, costs that far exceed any reasonably anticipatable benefits.101
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101
appearance must reflect the dynamic impact o f a continuous flow of information about financial statements, the role o f audit 
firms and actual experience.
The intersection o f these four methodologies would yield an accurate picture o f public perceptions o f auditor 
independence. This research design, therefore, would enable regulators to assess the need for appearance-based regulation. It 
would also provide, if  appropriate, proper underpinnings for such regulation.
H. The Misplaced Regulatory Focus on the Perform ance of Non-Audit Services
One area where the existing approach to independence has created serious difficulties for both the profession and 
those who utilize its services is the area o f non-audit services.105 The SEC has declined to propose rules "to proscribe 
particular [management advisory] services,"106 and has "expressly recognized" that the benefits resulting from the 
performance o f management advisory services ("MAS") by accountants for audit clients "could be significant in many 
cases."107 Nevertheless, other statements included in SEC independence requirements raise questions as to whether the 
performance o f certain types of MAS complies with the Commission's requirements. For example, some o f the language in 
Section 602.02.C o f the Codification may invite questions as to whether an accountant is providing a "customary" type of 
consulting service, assuming managerial responsibilities, or exercising decision-making responsibility.108 Moreover, SEC
105
Certain types o f traditional non-audit services, in particular tax services, have not been the focus o f independence- 
related concerns. For this reason, this White Paper normally will address non-tax non-audit services when dealing with the 
topic o f "non-audit services."
106
Co d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  604.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,295, at 62,921 
(1997). See also, Securities & Exchange Commission Report to Congress, The Accounting Profession and the 
Commission's Oversight Role (Aug. 1980) at 12 (stating that "the Commission * * * consciously determined not to 
proscribe particular types o f MAS engagements").
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Co d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  604.02, 7 Fed. Sec. L . Rep. (CCH ) 73 ,2 9 6 , at 62 ,922
(1997).
108
C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  Re p o r t in g  Po l ic ie s  602.02.c.i provides in part that:
[M]anagerial and decision-making functions are the responsibility o f the client and not of the independent 
acountant. * * * [M]anagerial responsibility begins when the accountant becomes, or appears to become, so identified with the client's
 
representatives have made speeches in recent years raising questions as to the propriety o f the performance o f non-audit 
services for audit clients.109 Yet empirical research, history and current experience all suggest that such questions create 
confusion and unnecessary uncertainty as to the permissibility of the services that firms can offer.
1. There is No Evidence that the Performance o f  Non-Audit Services by 
Accounting Firms for Audit Clients Impairs Independence in Fact.
Study groups including the Cohen Commission, the POB, the major accounting firms, the AICPA's 
Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants (the "Anderson Committee"), the 
Treadway Commission and the SEC Staff have examined the potential effect on the auditor-client relationship o f accounting 
firms' performance o f non-audit services for audit clients.110 According to the United States General Accounting Office
mangement as to be indistinguishable from it. In making a determination of whether this degree o f identification has been reached, the 
consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears to be (i) substantially dependent upon the accountant's skill and 
ent in its financial operations, or (ii) reliant only to the extent o f the customary type o f consultation or advice.
602.02.c.i., 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,263, at 62,890 (1997). This restriction is based on the 
Commission's view that "[i]f the independent accountant were to perform functions o f this nature, he would develop, or appear to 
develop, a mutuality o f interest with his client which would differ only in degree, but not in kind, from that of an employee," in 
which case "it may be logically inferred that the accountant's professional judgm ent toward the particular client might be prejudiced 
in that he would, in effect, be auditing the results o f his own work." Id.
109
See Remarks of the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, "The Accountant's Critical 
Eye," 24th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1996) ("[t]wo recent private sector studies expressed concern that auditing firms 
are becoming more focused on consulting and other services, at the expense o f the audit function. I share those concerns. 
The auditing function should be the very soul o f the public accounting profession not a loss-leader retained as a foot in 
the door for higher-fee consulting services"); Remarks o f the Director, Securities & Exchange Commission Division of 
Enforcement, W illiam R. McLucas, "Self Regulation, Consulting Services and Auditor Independence," 24th Annual 
National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Washington, D.C. 
(Dec. 10, 1996) ("because accounting as a discipline embodies so much judgment, the seduction o f the accounting 
profession to lean ', if  not bow ' to the pressure of the clients and, indeed, the firm 's own economic interests, will 
escalate dramatically. That is why the complex o f entanglements with the clients poses such a subtle, but clear, threat"); 
Remarks o f the Chief Accountant, Securities & Exchange Commission, Michael H. Sutton, "Auditor Independence: The 
Challenge o f Fact and Appearance," Meeting o f the American Accounting Association (Aug. 14, 1996) ("[a]t what point 
does the auditor become so involved in the success o f the company and its management as a consultant or an advisor or a 
provider o f a variety of newer services that there is a risk that private interests m ight be placed ahead o f those of 
investors, or that the public will perceive it that way?"); Remarks o f the Chief Accountant, Securities & Exchange 
Commission, Michael H. Sutton, 1996 AICPA Conference on Current SEC Developments, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 
1996) ("[a]uditor independence issues continue to receive a lot o f attention, particularly issues relating to perceptions about 
auditor independence as the result o f providing certain non-audit services to audit clients, and the impacts on auditor 
independence o f certain business relationships, financial arrangements, organizational structures, and so on").
110
("GAO"), "[n]one o f these studies reported any conclusive evidence o f diminished audit quality or harm to the public interest, 
or any actual impairment o f auditor independence, as a consequence of public accounting firms providing advisory or 
consulting services to their audit clients."111 Similarly, former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman recently observed that 
"a prohibitive approach focusing on the provision o f non-audit services to audit clients * * * appears to be wholly without any 
empirical support indicating any lack o f objectivity in fact resulting from the provision o f non-audit services to audit 
clients."112 Given this lack o f evidence, one reasonably can question the continued utility o f many of the current, 
appearance-based requirements. As Wallman has said, "[i]f we keep saying that we must guard against appearances being 
tainted even though there is no tainting in fact, then we confuse the public and * * * promote bad public policy."113
2. ASR No. 250 and ASR No. 264 Indicate an  Absence of Investor Concern Over Non-Audit
Services.
The SEC adopted two releases in 1978 and 1979 which raised questions about public 
companies' engagement o f auditors to provide non-audit services. The first o f these releases, Accounting Series Release No. 
250 ("ASR No. 250"), generally required public companies to disclose in their proxy statements: (i) the percentage of fees 
for non-audit services in relation to the audit fee, (ii) whether the board o f directors or its audit committee had approved such
See AICPA, t h e  c o m m is s io n  o n  a u d it o r s '  r e s p o n s ib il it ie s : r e p o r t , c o n c l u s io n s  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  (Cohen Commission), 1978; AICPA, Sc o p e  o f  S e r v ic e s  b y  CPA F ir m s , Report o f the Public 
Oversight Board o f the SEC Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, Mar. 1979; t h e  F u t u r e  R e l e v a n c e , R e l ia b il it y , 
a n d  C r e d ib il it y  o f  F in a n c ia l  In f o r m a t io n , Recommendations to the AICPA Board o f Directors by Seven Major 
Accounting Firms, Apr. 1986; AICPA  R e s t r u c t u r in g  P r o f e s s io n a l  St a n d a r d s  t o  A c h ie v e  P r o f e s s io n a l  
E x c e l l e n c e  in  a  C h a n g in g  En v ir o n m e n t , Report o f the Special Committee on Standards o f Professional Conduct for 
Certified Public Accountants (Anderson Committee), Apr. 1986; and R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  (Treadway Commission), Oct. 1987; Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of 
the Chief Accountant, St a f f  R e p o r t  o n  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e  (1994).
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1996 GAO Report, supra note 6824 E rror! Bookm ark not defined.68, at 41-42. Consistent with the GAO report 
is the statement of POB Chairman A.A. Sommer, Jr. in 1986 that there is no known "instance in which it can be 
demonstrated that the provision o f [management advisory services] to an audit client interfered with independence in 
performing the audit function." Public Perceptions o f  Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms fo r  Audit 
Clients, Report prepared for Public Oversight Board, SEC Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, AICPA, by Audits & 
Surveys, Inc., 1986.
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Wallman, supra note 10, at 92. Moreover, Wallman observed that, given all the attention focused on 
"nontraditional activities" and the appearance of independence, "there should have been  some data to support this concern if 
it is to continue to be held out as a significant issue." Id. at 79 n.5 (emphasis in original).
113
Id. at 79.
non-audit services, and (iii) in instances where the percentage for a particular non-audit service exceeded 3% of the audit fee, 
the percentage for that specific service.114 The subsequent release, Accounting Series Release No. 264 ("ASR No. 264"), 
cautioned that "the impact on auditor independence of potential MAS engagements should be o f direct concern to the issuer 
and especially its independent audit committee."115 In addition, ASR No. 264 set out four general factors to guide auditors in 
determining whether their independence would be impaired by providing a non-audit service, and indicated that an auditor 
should provide such service only if "none o f the factors tilts strongly against performance o f the non-audit work involved."116
The net effect o f these two releases was to impose an additional cost upon those public companies that had to assess 
and report the relative significance o f non-audit fees,117 and, especially after ASR No. 264 urged managements and audit 
committees "to give careful attention to the performance of non-audit services for audit clients,"118 to put public companies 
on notice that the SEC viewed non-audit engagements as potentially impairing auditor independence. However, less than 
four years after the adoption o f the disclosure requirements mandated by ASR No. 250, the Commission withdrew them.119 
Concurrent with its proposal to withdraw the disclosure requirements, the Commission rescinded ASR No. 264.120
114
Accounting Series Release No. 250, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,272, at 62,739 
(June 20,1978) (item 8(g) in proxy statement).
115
Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 885. Audit committees, boards o f directors, and 
managements were encouraged to consider criteria for potential non-tax non-audit engagements in four areas: (i) the degree 
o f economic benefit from the provision o f non-tax non-audit services, (ii) the need to avoid having the auditor supplant 
management's role, (iii) the need to avoid self-review by the auditor, and (iv) the auditor's financial dependence upon 
management advisory fees. Id. at 885-886.
116
Id. at 884. Auditors were to consider the following four factors, many o f which are similar to the criteria that 
clients were to consider: (i) the auditor's financial dependence upon management advisory fees, (ii) the need to avoid 
having the auditor supplant management's role, (iii) the need to avoid self-review, and (iv) impact upon an audit's quality. 
Id. at 881-883. Again, this release did not apply to tax-related non-audit services.
117
See comment letters to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission re: supporting rescission on 
grounds of cost from Astrid Pfeiffer, Florida Power & Light Company (Oct. 22, 1981); from J.K. Ramsey, The Timken 
Company (Nov. 16, 1981); and from Richard Koch, Whirlpool Corporation (Nov. 24, 1981).
118
Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 880.
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As noted by Gary Edwards in his report appended as Appendix D:
Not only is it difficult to assess how particular conduct will be viewed by an individual 
or group, but even the logically prior question o f identifying the relevant community o f observers poses a 
formidable challenge. Whose opinion should count? Even more to the point, whose opinion counts so 
heavily that society should tolerate the cost o f "false positives," that is, o f barring situations that might 
appear to be ethical problems but in fact are not?
Even in the context of government service, where the need to 
maintain public confidence presumably is at its peak, commentators have criticized too 
great a focus upon appearances and noted the need to appropriately limit the use of 
appearance-based ethics rules for past and present government employees. Thus, for 
example, when the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) promulgated Standards of 
Ethical Conduct for Employees o f the Executive Branch in 1992, it explicitly chose to 
adopt a "reasonable person" test.102
In short, appearance-based regulation o f auditor independence requires a regulator to substitute his own judgment as 
to the appearance o f particular types o f relationships and services for that o f fully informed, reasonable users of financial 
statements, or, alternatively, to engage in the difficult task of attempting to discern what such users perceive. While 
researchers have attempted to identify the types o f relationships and services that create appearance issues in the eyes of some 
survey participants, most o f the empirical studies on the perceptions of financial statement users conclude that the 
performance o f non-audit services by accounting firms for audit clients has minimal impact on users' perceptions o f auditor 
independence.103 If  regulation is to continue on the basis of appearance, it will be necessary to determine the actual 
perceptions o f reasonable users of financial statements on a basis that utilizes relevant professional methodologies.
G. Proposed Research M ethodology
In a recent book, the authors argue that the reigning ethical standard - the appearance o f impropriety - results in 
public cynicism in spite o f seemingly obsessive attention to proper conduct. See Peter W . M organ and Glenn H . Reynolds, 
T h e  A p p e a r a n c e  o f  Im p r o p r ie t y  in  A m e r ic a : H o w  t h e  E t h ic s  W a r s  H a v e  U n d e r m in e d  Am e r ic a n  G o v e r n m e n t , 
B u s in e s s , a n d  So c ie t y  (1997).
102
See Gary Edwards, Auditor Independence Through Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics, Oct. 20 , 1997, at 23- 
24  (hereinafter "E d w a r d s  R e p o r t "), attached as Appendix D  (citations omitted). See also, O r r e n  Re p o r t , supra note 97, 
at 12.
103
See O r r e n  R e p o r t , supra note 97, at 2.
As described more fully in Appendix A to this White Paper,104 a sophisticated research methodology 
intended to capture perceptions of auditor independence might provide a principled basis for making regulatory judgments 
regarding the appearance o f independence. Such a design must recognize that public opinion on any issue cannot reliably be 
captured in a single question. Rather, the determination o f public perceptions requires a multifaceted approach - a variety o f 
questions asked in different ways at various times.
First, the methodology should incorporate several means o f data collection, including (i) traditional surveys such as 
mail questionnaires and telephone surveys, (ii) experimental designs that isolate the effects of various factors, (iii) focus 
groups to uncover nuances that elude mass surveys, and (iv) aggregate data studies that focus on individuals' behavior rather 
than perceptions.
Second, the methodology should feature several "dependent" and "independent" variables. The dependent 
variables, or key questions, would examine (i) confidence in the independence o f auditors generally and auditors who provide 
non-audit services, specifically, (ii) perceptions o f financial statement accuracy and reliability, and (iii) discretionary 
decision-making by financial statement users. Independent variables, or background factors, would help explain how users of 
financial statements arrive at their perceptions. Factors such as the type of non-audit service, the materiality of the non-audit 
engagement or relationship, and the period o f association between the accounting firm and the audit client would be included.
Third, a diverse sample o f financial statement users should be surveyed, including financial analysts, lenders, 
insurers, fund managers, shareholders, and audit firm clients. Particularly important would be the opinions of sophisticated 
market participants who depend on financial information to make real-world decisions.
Finally, data should be collected at regular intervals. This feature would ensure that research results reflect the 
evolving experience o f accountants, clients and third parties. Perception is not static; any realistic system of determining
104
See O r r e n  R e p o r t , supra note 97.
The experience regarding the disclosure o f non-audit services in the wake o f these releases is noteworthy because it 
demonstrates the actual degree to which relevant communities of real stakeholders (e.g., investors, audit committees, 
company management) reacted to information regarding the provision o f non-audit services to audit clients. With regard to 
investors, for example, an empirical investigation o f shareholder reaction to the proxy disclosure mandated by ASR No. 250 
found that auditor approval ratios were unaffected by the availability o f information regarding auditors' provision o f non- 
audit services.121 This finding confirms the widespread anecdotal evidence which led the SEC to conclude that detailed 
information regarding non-audit services was "not generally of sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation o f the 
disclosure requirement."122
It is also significant that, after three proxy seasons, over two-thirds of those who commented on the SEC's 
subsequent proposal to eliminate the ASR No. 250 disclosure supported its elimination. Not only were most of the comments 
supporting rescission received from public companies, but various comments by these corporations specifically noted the lack 
o f investor interest in information regarding auditor provision of non-audit services.123 By contrast, almost all o f the
See Accounting Series Release No. 304, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,326 (Jan. 28, 
1982); see also, Accounting Series Release No. 296, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,318, at 
62,934 (Aug. 20, 1981) (inviting comments on whether the disclosure rule should be withdrawn).
120
See Accounting Series Release No. 297, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,319, at 
62,941 (Aug. 20, 1981).
121
See G. William Glezen and James A. Millar, An Empirical Investigation o f  Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures 
Required by ASR No. 250, 23 J. a c c t . r e s e a r c h  859 (1985). As an absolute matter, auditor approval ratios are always 
high, but relative changes can be statistically significant. No statistically significant relationship was found between non-tax 
non-audit services and declining auditor approval ratios. Id. at 869. See also, Letter from Charles Schwartz, United States 
Steel Corporation to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission (Oct. 13, 1981). Indeed, the direction of 
change over the proxy seasons studied, though statistically insignificant, was toward higher rates o f shareholder approval o f 
auditor renewals. See Glezen and Millar, at 869.
122
Accounting Series Release No. 304, supra note 119, at 62,985; see also, Accounting Series Release No. 296, supra
note 119.
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See, e.g., Letters to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission, from Michael F. Mee, Monsanto 
(Nov. 25, 1981); from D.E. Rose, New England Electric (Nov. 30, 1981); from P. Blaine Clemens, Lukens Steel Company 
(Nov. 25, 1981); and from C. J. Lause, Mobil Corporation (Nov. 13, 1981). Monsanto, for example, noted in 1981 that it 
"has not received a single question from analysts or investors about our disclosures." Certain accounting firms also noted
comments supporting ASR No. 250 were from commercial competitors o f the accounting firms, such as management and 
data processing consultants. The SEC found that those competitors' "claims of shareholder interest in the non-audit service 
disclosure [were] outweighed by the absence of evidence that investors want or use the disclosure."124 Thus, experience 
suggests not only that investors were not concerned about the provision o f non-audit services by auditors, but also that the 
perception that investors consider non-audit services inconsistent with auditor independence is not well-grounded.125
It is also revealing that managements and audit committees o f public companies did not, in the aggregate, change 
significantly the mix and volume o f non-audit services provided by their auditors, even in the face o f ASR No. 250 and ASR 
No. 264 (and even though incurring an additional, albeit minor, cost in connection with preparation o f their proxy 
statements). For example, one study concluded that, based on the 1979 and 1980 proxy seasons, "[f]or total non-audit 
services and most specific non-audit services the major public accounting firms did not significantly reduce the quantities 
provided to clients between years."126 Thus, while ASR No. 264 created confusion in the marketplace, and in some instances 
may have discouraged individual registrants from retaining their auditors to perform useful non-audit services, its overall 
impact was muted.127 The fact that the extent to which auditors were asked to provide non-audit services did not change 
significantly not only confirms the lack o f pressure from investors (regarding appearance-based concerns), but also
the clear lack o f investor interest in this area; for example, KMG Main Hurdman stated that "nothing has come to our 
attention which would indicate that the information required to be set forth * * * has been used effectively by investors, 
analysts, or other interested parties." Letter from Main Hurdman to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange 
Commission (Oct. 12, 1981).
124
Accounting Series Release No. 304, supra note 119, at 62,987.
125
While it is true that this evidence relating to Accounting Series Release No. 250 is now almost twenty years old, 
almost all o f the studies that suggest there might be some investor concern regarding non-audit services are at least as old. 
See Orren, supra, note 97, at 5 n.9. More recent studies suggest that the investing public and other market participants do 
not view the provision o f non-audit services as damaging to the appearance of auditor independence, perhaps because the 
later studies applied improved methodologies and/or because market participants may have become more informed about, 
and comfortable with, these non-audit services. Id. at 8.
126
James H. Scheiner, An Empirical Assessment o f the Impact o f  SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure Requirements on 
Independent Auditors and Their Clients, 22 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 789, 794 (Autum n 1984).
127
See Accounting Series Release No. 297, supra note 120, at 62,941.
underscores the economic benefits that managers and directors perceive to exist in connection with the auditors' provision of 
non-audit services128 (as discussed more fully in Section ID below).
3. Insurers Today Perceive No Independence Problem  Associated with Non-Audit Services.
There currently is no reason to believe that non-audit services being performed today 
raise different issues or pose a greater risk to independence than the types o f services performed by auditors in the past. 
Significantly, neither insurance brokers nor insurance companies - entities with particular interest in potential liability issues - 
associate increased liability risk with accounting firms that perform non-audit services for audit clients.129 If the performance 
o f such additional services were believed to, or did, impair independence, one would expect as a result flawed audits, 
increased litigation exposure and higher insurance premiums, none of which has occurred.
Data on insurance claims made by the six largest U.S. accounting firms confirm the absence of any 
increased liability exposure associated with the provision o f non-audit services to audit clients. The insurance broker for the 
six largest firms130 maintains a risk management database that includes, among other things, information on 610 claims made 
by the firms.131 The information is obtained from reports prepared by representatives o f professional liability underwriters 
insuring the firms.132 In only 24 o f the 610 claims did underwriters' representatives note that an accounting firm provided
128
Letter from Frank Garnevicus, MidLantic Banks, Inc. to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange 
Commission (Nov. 19, 1981).
129
See Letter from Peter S. Christie, Vice Chairman, Aon Group Inc., to David E. Birenbaum, Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver & Jacobson (Oct. 9, 1997).
130
Minet, Inc. ("Minet") is one of the top insurance brokers to the professional services industry worldwide, and, in 
particular, places professional liability coverage for the Big Six accounting firms. Minet recently was acquired by Aon 
Group, Inc.
131
These 610 claims comprise all claims o f $1 million or more and certain other claims for which sufficient 
information has been provided to permit analysis. See Letter from Barry A. Mathews, Senior Executive Director, Minet, 
Inc., to David E. Birenbaum, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (Oct. 10,1997).
132
The information is subject to some interpretation and is not independently verified by the firms. Id.
management advisory services in addition to audit services.133 This suggests that in the vast majority o f cases, plaintiffs and 
underwriters' representatives viewed management advisory services as unimportant or tangential to the alleged audit failure. 
Plaintiffs appear to have alleged lack o f independence in only five o f the 24 cases in which management advisory services 
were noted, and they asserted that such services contributed to the alleged breach o f independence in only three of those five 
cases.134 Thus, the data reflect extremely few instances in which plaintiffs alleged lack o f independence resulting from the 
provision of non-audit services. Moreover, this leading insurance broker is aware o f no instance in which the provision of 
such services was acknowledged as contributing to a loss.135
Ironically, the federal government itself has not seen any need to restrict the type o f non-audit services that 
accounting firms provide when they also provide auditing and accounting services to the federal government. In this regard, 
the 1977 report by the Metcalf Committee Staff recommended that the federal government retain accounting firms that act as 
independent auditors only to perform auditing and accounting services, and not to perform MAS or other consulting 
services.136 The federal government, however, took no action in response to this recommendation.137
4. Regulatory Focus on the Perform ance of Non-Audit Services Obscures Independence 
Issues and Disserves the Public Interest.
Ultimately, criticism o f the performance o f non-audit services by accounting firms may 
divert attention from more significant independence issues. As then-SEC Commissioner Wallman recently noted, 
"significant attention is [already] focused on the impact that non-audit services may have on auditor independence," whereas
133
Id. at 2.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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See 1996 GAO Report, supra note 68, Appendix II, at 17.
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Id.
less attention is directed to the more direct independence implications that might arise if  individual partners or officers o f a 
firm were to receive a material portion o f their revenues, or derive their status within the firm, from a single audit client.138
Moreover, limitations on the ability of accounting firms to perform non-audit services, or even lingering 
concerns as to the permissibility of providing such services, may have consequences that are both unintended and contrary to 
the public interest. One has to ask why independence policies should favor, or even tolerate, this result, when, as explained 
further in Section III:
•the performance o f a range of non-audit services aids the audit function by improving client knowledge, 
increasing access to technical, industry and general business skills, and enhancing the overall sophistication of the firm;
•the ability o f accounting firms to draw upon broader sources o f revenues should make the firms less dependent 
on any single client;
•forcing firms to choose between the performance o f audit and non-audit services might foster the development 
of an environment in which the bulk o f audit work is handled by firms that are more dependent on fees from individual audit 
clients and less equipped to perform complex audits; and
•as indicated, there is no empirical evidence that the performance of non-audit services for audit clients has any 
adverse effect on the quality o f audits.
As these points demonstrate, regulatory concern over non-audit services is, at best, unfounded. At worst, it is contrary to the 
public interest. A more principled framework that responds to the real-world experience and incentives of accounting firms 
and individual accountants is both needed and, as discussed in Sections IV and V of this White Paper, achievable.
III. Economic and Other Determ inants o f A uditor Independence
As demonstrated in this Section, accounting firms' stake in their reputational capital provides a powerful incentive 
to safeguard independence. Further, the synergies and other benefits derived from providing an array of non-audit services 
contribute importantly to audit quality. This analysis also recognizes the problem o f the "free rider" - the putative auditor
138
Wallman, supra note 10, at 85.
who may perceive an individual advantage in substandard conduct that risks the firm 's reputational captial. Other non- 
economic determinants o f auditor independence - organizational, professional and ethical influences - reinforce these 
economic incentives. On the other side o f the ledger, the consequences of compromising independence, including exposure 
to massive liability, and a host of other severe sanctions, provide real and effective constraints. A special economic study of 
auditor independence provided by the Law and Economics Consulting Group and located in Appendix B should be read in 
conjunction with this Section.139
A. The Economic Interest of Accounting Firm s in Their R eputational Capital Provides a Powerful 
Incentive to Safeguard Independence
Establishing the auditor-client relationship entails substantial start-up costs.140 This results in what 
economists refer to as a "bilateral" relationship - a situation where a single buyer deals with a single seller.141 While the 
market for providing accounting services is intensely competitive, once an auditor-client relationship has been established, the 
incumbent firm has a significant advantage over other firms that lack the client-specific knowledge developed in the course of 
the audit engagement.142 Reflecting that reality, an audit firm can expect to receive a return on its investment in client- 
specific knowledge over the life of the stream of engagements.143 Economists refer to these returns as client-specific quasi- 
rents.144
139
Law and Economics Consulting Group, An Economic Analysis o f  Auditor Independence fo r  a Multi-client, Multi­
service Public Accounting Firm  (hereinafter "A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e " or "LECG  R e p o r t "), 
Appendix B.
140
In exercising due professional care in the performance o f an audit and the preparation o f the audit report, the 
auditor must learn a great deal about the client's business. This, o f course, is very costly.
141
Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, ECONOMICS 644 (12th ed. 1985) (hereinafter "ECONOMICS").
142
To be sure, the market for renewals remains competitive, albeit tempered by the initial auditor's advantage. See, 
e.g., Daniel A . Levinthal and Mark Fichman, Dynamics o f  Interorganizational Attachments: Auditor-Client Relationships 
(hereinafter "A u d it o r -C l ie n t  R e l a t io n s h ip s ") 33 ADMIN. s c i . Q. 345, 346 (1988) (client-specific investments in 
auditor-client relationships "tend not to be so great that they effectively ensure the continuation o f the relationship.")
143
See, e.g., id. at 345-69 (consistent with notions that assets specific to the auditor-client relationship develop over 
time, the termination rate decreases both with measured audit complexity and time.)
144
Client-specific knowledge constitutes productive capital for the auditor, the returns from which are captured through 
the provision o f future audit and non-audit services.145 In the context o f an auditor with a single major client, part o f the 
auditor's capital may be said to be held "hostage" to the relationship.146 This introduces the possibility o f bias on the part of 
the auditor - or improper influence on the part o f the client147 - given the potential for losing the quasi-rents associated with 
this relationship. This model is applicable, however, only in the context of an auditor who is financially dependent on a 
single client.
In the multi-client context, it is precisely the auditor's drive to maintain relationships with many clients - and thus to 
protect the multiple sources o f its quasi-rents - that enhances and reinforces its independence. Each and every one of these 
relationships represents an expected flow of quasi-rents to the firm, all o f which would be put at risk by compromising audit 
integrity in the hope o f preserving any particular audit client relationship. Whatever benefit may be thought to flow from 
such substandard conduct would pale in comparison with the potential loss of quasi-rents from other audit clients.148
See, e.g., Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 183-189 (1981).
145
Initial competition among potential auditors to secure a relationship with a client may take the form of below-cost 
pricing for the initial audit, a practice known as "lowballing." Competition in the market for initial audits results in 
lowballing, because the competitive price o f the initial audit reflects not only the cost o f the initial audit, but also the value 
o f future quasi-rents associated with the engagement. By discounting the initial audit price, auditors are merely bidding for 
the future quasi-rents. See Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, "Low Balling," and Disclosure Regulation, 3 
J. ACCT. &  ECON. 113 (1981) at 113-15 (" low  balling' [on initial audit engagements] does not itself impair auditor 
independence").
146
This is an economic term o f art and is not intended to have negative connotations. In some economic contexts, the 
term "hostage" may refer to mechanisms employed to ensure integrity within an exchange and safeguard against quality 
shading. See, e.g., Oliver e . Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchanges, 83 AM. e c o n . 
REV. 519 (1983) (hereinafter " c r e d ib l e  C o m m it m e n t s"). As is shown below, setting aside audit firms dependent on a 
single client, that is exactly the role client-specific knowledge serves here. See also, Oliver E . Williamson, T h e  E c o n o m ic  
In s t it u t io n s  o f  C a p it a l is m : F ir m s , M a r k e t s , R e l a t io n a l  C o n t r a c t in g  180-82 (1985) (hereinafter "Ec o n o m ic  
In s t it u t io n s ").
147
Other things being equal, the greater the cost to the client o f terminating the relationship, the less power the client 
can wield over the auditor.
148
See A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 16 ("[e]ngaging in an 
institutional-level abrogation o f independence would put the firm 's entire stream of audit revenues at risk.").
In short, the very factor which may be thought to provide a threat to auditor independence in the single client 
context - i.e., the existence o f quasi-rents tied to the client - reinforces independence in the multi-client context.149 The 
auditor confronts a certain economic predicament with respect to each client - that while client-specific knowledge constitutes 
part o f the auditor's productive capital, the auditor cannot obtain a return on that capital without that client. In a multi-client 
context, however, the significance o f this fact is reversed, because the firm 's aggregate expected returns are not captive to a 
single client, but rather to all its clients.150 In other words, total expected return is tied to the firm 's reputation among a 
multitude of clients (actual and potential). To protect its collective client-specific quasi-rents, the firm must protect its 
reputation.
Clients have an obvious interest in hiring an audit firm with a solid reputation, which serves to lower their cost of 
capital.151 From an economic perspective, an auditor acts as a reputational intermediary, in essence "lending" its reputation 
to the client for this limited purpose.152 If  an audit firm fails to maintain a reputation for independent attest services, it
149
See D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, CPA Performance o f Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients: Effects on 
Financial Statement Users' Perceptions and Decisions, 14 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 35 (Fall 1995) ("auditors, 
particularly those from large firms (i.e., Big Six firms), may be constrained not to compromise their independence on a 
given client so as not to forfeit their quasi-rents from numerous other audit clients.") Id.
150
See, e.g., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note  139, A ppendix  B , at 16 ("an 
abrogation o f  independence w ith one client threatens the revenue stream derived from  the entire client pool").
151
It should be noted, in  this connection, that fu lly  94%  o f  the com panies traded on  N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange had 
audited financial statem ents before the enactm ent o f  the federal securities law s requiring that they do so. See Arthur 
A ndersen & C o., et al., THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: MEETING THE NEEDS OF a  CHANGING WORLD 3 (Jan. 
1991). See also, Christine A . B otoson, Disclosure Level and the Cost o f  Equity Capital, 72 ACCT. R e v . 323 (July 1997). 
The cost o f  capital is low ered through a reduction in  "information risk," w hich  is the risk to investors that inform ation about 
the com pany is incorrect. A s the authors o f  MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING explain:
Reducing the information risk in financial information reduces the risk premium that must be paid by 
enterprise. This lowers the audited enterprise's cost of capital, thereby promoting the efficient allocation o f scarce economic resources 
g competing uses.
M o n t g o m e r y ' s a u d it in g , supra note 59, at 13. See also, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
e lem e n t  o f  F in a n c ia l  A c c o u n t in g  C o n c e p t s  NO. 1, Objectives o f  Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises 1011 (Nov. 1978) 
dependent auditors commonly examine or review financial statements * * * those who use that information often view an independent 
audito r's  opinion as enhancing [its] reliability or credibility."
See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Symposium on the Law Firm as a Social Institution: Sharing Among 
the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 St a n . L.
devalues one o f its most valuable assets.153 Indeed, an auditor can protect its full array o f client-specific quasi-rents only by 
being a tough watchdog and carefully guarding its reputation for quality.
Some argue that accounting firms have an economic incentive to develop a reputation as an advocate of client 
management even at the expense o f objectivity and integrity. There are a number o f reasons why this is not the case.
First, and foremost, as discussed above, an accounting firm that compromises independence in order to 
curry favor with management puts at risk its reputation for integrity and objectivity, and is apt to suffer vis-á-vis other actual 
and potential clients as a consequence. Second, whatever information managements can discover about a firm 's reputation 
will also be available to the investing public. Hence, if an accounting firm did establish a reputation for "co-optability," any 
company that retained the firm would pay a price in terms o f its cost o f capital. Very few companies are apt to want to do 
this. Simply put, there is no market in third-party attestation services for known prevaricators.154 Third, boards of directors 
and audit committees oversee the process of auditor selection and have an incentive to hire an auditor with a sound 
reputation. Fourth, the market sets executive compensation in light o f the monitoring problems that shareholders confront 
with respect to management and the intrinsic conflicts of interest that may exist. Because executives share in these "agency
R e v . 313 (1985) (hereinafter " e c o n o m ic  in q u ir y ") (lawyers as reputational intermediaries). Cfi Srikant M . Datar, Gerald 
a . Feltham, and John S. Hughes, The Role o f  Audits and Audit Quality in Valuing New Issues, 14 J. o f  a c c t . &  e c o n . 3 
(1991) (in context o f initial offerings, the value o f an audit increases as a function o f audit quality while the demand for 
higher-quality audits increases with firm-specific risk.)
153
Clients retain accounting firms for a broad array o f services based on their reputations for objectivity, 
professionalism and probity. While a reputation takes years to build, it can be lost very quickly. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen 
& Co., et al., T h e  P u b l ic  A c c o u n t in g  P r o f e s s io n : M e e t in g  t h e  N e e d s  o f  a  C h a n g in g  W o r l d  13 (Jan. 1991) ("All 
services delivered under the umbrella o f a public accounting firm are subject to the same high professional standards of 
objectivity, integrity, competence and due professional care required o f audit services * * * Managements have come to 
expect this standard o f quality, and all service providers are increasingly held to the same high standard"); Stanley R. Klion, 
MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?, J. a c c t . 72, 73 (June 1978) ("There is nothing sinister or devious in a 
businessman's seeking [MAS] from his CPA * * * [the CPA's] reputation and livelihood depend on his ability to advise 
clients in confidence and with competence"); Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., Management Services: A Challenge to Audit 
Independence?, a c c t . R e v . 721, 724  (Oct. 1966).
154
Indeed, in an empirical study o f qualified audit opinions and auditor switching, "it was not found that firms that 
have received qualified opinions switch systematically to audit firms with a history o f rendering proportionally fewer 
qualified opinions;" moreover, there was support for the proposition that "qualified firms which switch auditors do not tend 
subsequently to receive more clean opinions." Chee W. Chow and Steven J. Rice, Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor 
Switching, 57 a c c t . R ev. 326 (Apr. 1982).
costs," they have an incentive to minimize them by choosing a quality auditor. Thus, even though management ultimately 
selects the external auditor, its choice is directed by expected investor reactions.155 Finally, it is costly for companies to 
change auditors, both because o f the signal this may send to markets and because they m ay have to absorb some of the start­
up cost incurred by a new auditor. This creates an incentive for management to have a durable relationship with a credible 
auditor.156 Indeed, the very fact that public companies are "credibly committed" by these cost structures to their auditors - 
who, in turn, have an incentive to protect their own reputations for integrity and objectivity - permits the companies to send a 
stronger message to markets about the soundness o f their financial statements.157
To the extent that other services, such as consulting, benefit from a firm 's reputation as a provider o f high quality 
audit services, the incentive to protect that reputation through the maintenance of high audit quality is enhanced.158 Indeed, 
the greater the average quasi-rents associated with the auditor's client base, the greater the incentive to maintain 
independence. It follows that, in the context o f multiple clients, the provision to audit clients o f non-audit services increases 
auditor independence, precisely because it increases average quasi-rents.
Arguments to the contrary fall victim to the classic fallacy o f composition. As is explained in introductory 
economics textbooks:
155
See Chee W. Chow, The Demand fo r  External Auditing: Size, Debt and Ownership Influences, a c c t . Re v . 272, 
274 (Apr. 1982). See also, A n  e c o n o m ic  a n a l y s is  o f  a u d it o r  in d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B, at 3. C f 
Michael c. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory o f  the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. F in . E c o n . 305, 323 (1976) (discussing the role o f monitoring and bonding activities in reducing agency 
costs.)
156
See, e.g., A u d it o r -C l ie n t  R e l a t io n s h ip s , supra note 142.
157
See, e.g., C r e d ib l e  C o m m it m e n t s  and E c o n o m ic  In s t it u t io n s , supra note 146.
158
Partners engaged in providing non-audit services share with their audit partners a common interest in enhancing 
the reputational capital represented by the accounting firm 's "brand" name. For example, the market may read a quality 
audit service as evidencing a predisposition toward quality control, competency, expertise and integrity in non-attest service 
lines. While accounting firms have an incentive to maintain quality standards in all service lines, this is especially so with 
respect to auditing. Audit failures, because they may involve numerous stockholder and class-action suits, tend to generate 
a great deal of negative publicity. The potential o f audit failure to damage all lines of the firm 's business, thus, reinforces its 
already-strong incentive to maintain and protect quality.
This is the fallacy o f contending that "what is true for the individual or part is necessarily also true for the 
group or whole." * * * The validity of a particular generalization for an individual or part does not necessarily ensure 
its accuracy for the group or whole.159
For example, if an individual suddenly stands up at a football game, the view is improved for that individual. But the same 
does not hold for the group.160 An excessively narrow focus on the auditor-client relationship, taken in isolation, results in a 
similar fallacy. If an auditor has a single audit client that commands a large proportion of its resources, the provision o f non- 
audit services to that client may have ramifications for independence by increasing the auditor's dependence on that client. 
But the same does not hold in a multi-client context. Far from impeding auditor independence, in the multi-client context, 
non-audit services strengthen the incentive for firms to safeguard their reputations for integrity, objectivity and overall 
professionalism.
The evidence supports this view. Accounting firms, since the inception o f the profession, have combined non-audit 
with audit services.161 Yet, as previously discussed, numerous studies have concurred that there is no known instance in 
which it can be demonstrated that the provision o f non-audit services to an audit client impaired independence in performing 
the audit function.162 This conclusion is especially impressive in light o f the continued growth in non-audit services in recent 
years,163 which has not been accompanied by a surge in claims of impairment o f independence, let alone findings to that 
effect.164 It is particularly noteworthy in this regard that the insurance industry does not appear to consider the issue of 
whether non-audit services are provided to either audit or non-audit clients relevant to the development o f risk profiles for 
accounting firms.165 Moreover, as LECG observed:
159
Campbell R. McConnell, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 14 (6th ed. 1975).
160
Id.
161
See Section II at 17.
162
See Section II at 50.
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See A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 20.
164
Indeed, L E C G 's  analysis indicated that "consulting fees have been going up while the number of claims and/or 
suits has been declining." A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B  at 24.
165
[T]he growth in the consulting revenues o f the Big Six firms has not been the result of a 
disproportionate growth in the consulting services consumed by their SEC clients. This suggests that the 
growth in consulting revenues has been driven by the value of those services in the market, and not by 
increasing attempts to undermine the independence of auditors by tying lucrative consulting contracts to 
audit outcomes.166
B. Firm s Have Economic Incentive to Address The "Free R ider" Issue
While a multi-disciplinary professional service firm has a strong economic incentive to uphold its 
independence and protect its reputation, accomplishing these tasks presents a classic "common goods" problem. A common 
good is a good that benefits all, while not allowing for the exclusion o f those who do not contribute to it.167 A firm 's 
reputation constitutes such a common good for the firm 's partners. A principal function o f the firm is to solve these kinds of 
collective action problems.168 While it is in the partners' collective interest to protect the firm 's reputation by maintaining 
impeccable standards, the same does not necessarily hold for each individual partner, some o f whom may have clients that 
loom much larger to them than to the firm as a whole.169 As a consequence, some may be tempted to "free ride" on the
See Section II at 56. Moreover, as stated in the L E C G  report: "there are no known covenants in existing liability 
insurance contracts which restrict an [audit] firm 's ability to offer non-audit services." A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  
A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 25.
166
A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 20-21.
167
For example, defense o f a nation is a common good, in that once provided its benefits cannot be withheld from any 
citizen. As economic theorist Mancur Olson puts it:
[T]he achievement o f  any common goal or the satisfaction o f  any common interest means that a public or 
active good has been provided fo r  that group. The very fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the 
p is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.
Mancur Olson, T h e  L o g ic  o f  C o l l e c t iv e  A c t io n : P u b l ic  G o o d s  a n d  t h e  T h e o r y  o f  G r o u p s  15 (1971).
168
As Mancur Olson observes:
[T]he essence o f an organization [is] that it provides an inseparable, generalized benefit. It follows that 
provision o f public or collective goods is the fundamental function of organizations generally.
Id.
169
See A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 8-10  (discussion of
auditors' incentives).
firm 's reputation by pursuing their self-interest, narrowly perceived, in maintaining client relationships even at the expense of 
compromising audit integrity.
The best way to protect a firm 's reputation, o f course, is to make certain that it is based in reality. To this end, 
accounting firms employ a variety o f safeguards (discussed in Section II) designed to deter free riding.170 In addition, there 
are a variety o f other checks on the free-riding partner. For example, compensation can be structured to align the individual 
partner's interest with those o f the firm in protecting its reputation. Also, the audit team itself - when combined with policies 
that encourage junior ranking professionals to take differences of professional opinion to senior firm personnel not on the 
audit team - constitutes a safeguard. Each and every member o f an audit team - not just the partner - has a responsibility to be 
satisfied with the integrity o f the audit. The provision o f non-audit services to audit clients acts as a similar check on the 
potential rogue partner, since personnel in addition to the audit partner and his or her team will be involved. Clients also 
provide a check on free riding. Boards o f directors and audit committees may review all aspects of an accounting firm 's 
relationship with a company. Finally, free-riding partners face a host of penalties, including in-firm sanctions, regulatory 
action, litigation, and loss o f reputation.171 These help explain why there is such wide compliance with independence 
standards.
C. A Broad Scope of Practice Enhances Audit Quality
The optimal regulatory framework must focus on the underlying purpose o f the audit - to minimize the risk 
to investors that information about the company is incorrect.172 To that end, enlightened regulation should strive to improve 
audit quality through enhanced audit sophistication, a goal advanced by the performance o f non-audit services for audit
170
See id. at 9-10.
171
See Section EI. H.
172
As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated in a recent speech:
I have valued the information provided by financial statements; and I have used those statements as the 
for my investment decisions. I place a premium on information that has been audited because, like so many millions of 
ors, I have had confidence in the independence and professionalism o f auditors.
Remarks of the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, "The Accountant's Critical Eye," 
Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute O f Certified Public Accountants, Washington, D.C. 
. 10, 1996).
clients.173 The performance o f non-audit services improves audit quality by providing the audit team with a deeper 
understanding o f significant business issues. The greater an auditor's insight into a client's operation, the more likely it is that 
key audit risks will be identified and business complexities and transactions fully understood.174 Where the non-audit 
services are provided by other partners, similar benefits are obtained through a variety of techniques175 designed to 
communicate relevant information concerning the client.176 Either way, "smarter" auditing is the consequence.
173
As the Cohen Commission noted in 1978:
An audit requires considerable knowledge about a company, its operations and its industry. Providing 
mangement advisory services for an audit client may increase the auditor's understanding and knowledge and prove advantageous 
conducting the audit.
AICPA, The Commission on A uditors' Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations 95 (1978).
Similarly, in Accounting Series Release No. 264, the SEC observed:
The broader base o f knowledge about, and a greater understanding of, the [client's] business, which often 
ts from the performance o f non-audit services may improve the efficiency and thoroughness o f the audit. This broader 
ef ctive on the audit is healthy and desirable.
Scope o f  Services by Independent Accountants, Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 883 (June 14,
174
This also lessens the likelihood that auditors will be deceived by clients. O f the 106 SEC enforcement actions 
between 1972 and 1989 citing violations o f GAAS, 20 involved client deception o f the independent auditor. See David R. 
Campbell and Larry M. Parker, SEC Communications to the Independent Auditors: An Analysis o f  Enforcement Actions, 11
J. o f  A c c t . &  P u b . P o l ' y . 297,309 (1992) (hereinafter "A n  A n a l y s is  o f  E n f o r c e m e n t  A c t io n s ").
175
When separate teams provide audit and non-audit services to a client, there are normally channels for 
communication to the audit engagement team  of information relevant to the conduct o f the audit work. For example, it is 
standard practice for the audit partner and manager to maintain contact with the tax or consulting team to facilitate 
knowledge transfer. Some accounting firms accomplish this through joint client service planning, or through client service 
teams that meet periodically and include not only audit and tax engagement personnel, but also those responsible for the 
performance o f any non-audit services to the audit client. In some accounting firms, a partner may be charged with 
coordinating the services rendered to a particular client. In this role, the partner would monitor the execution and delivery 
o f all services to that client. To the extent that this involves additional individuals, it further reduces the likelihood of 
eroded independence. The growth and deployment o f ever richer knowledge sharing tools is widely predicted.
176
The accounting profession has recognized the desirability o f communication between personnel providing audit 
and non-audit services in GAAS. Under AU 311.04, the auditor should consider "[d]iscussing matters that may affect the 
audit with firm  personnel responsible for non-audit services to the entity." AICPA Professional Standards, Planning and 
Supervision, AU 311.04. To further assure that this communication occurs, some firms have a policy that requires the 
audit team, in the planning of the audit, to inquire of any non-audit client activities during the year. This may include a 
review of the consulting reports issued and the supporting work product.
For example:
•Having audited a client's warranty reserves, an audit team might be asked to contribute to a project to improve 
the client's process for obtaining, analyzing and distributing product quality information. Through such work, the audit team 
would arrive at a deeper understanding o f the determinants of product quality as well as o f the client's mechanisms for 
identification and reporting on product quality issues. This, in turn, would inform subsequent audit testing regarding the 
adequacy o f warranty reserves as well as supplement a broader understanding o f the business.
•An important focus for many high-tech companies is to optimize their "sales channel," which involves the 
various enterprises and other means employed to transfer merchandise from the producer to the end user. Consulting services 
on sales channel optimization may inform an audit firm 's judgments about inventory valuation, return reserves, and account 
balances with distributors.
•Modem information technology systems tend to be complex and have control aspects different from systems 
being replaced. Such systems require new audit approaches and must be fully grasped by the auditors. Moreover, with 
respect to the implementation o f such systems, interaction between an audit team and a consulting team is particularly 
important.
Economists refer to any cost advantages gained by producing different products in a single firm - such as the kind of 
synergies that exist in combining the production of audit and non-audit services, either for a single client or more generally - 
as "economies of scope."177 A professional service firm may enjoy such economies with respect to: (i) physical 
infrastructure; (ii) technological infrastructure, including shared hardware, software and telecommunications standards; (iii) 
organizational infrastructure, including methodologies, shared standards and other work processes; (iv) informational 
infrastructure, including client-specific and industry-specific knowledge as well as special expertise; (v) training; and (vi) 
reputational capital.178 Economies o f scope are available to professional service firms o f all sizes.179 They lower costs for 
both attest and non-attest services, which should make it possible for an ever larger number and range of clients to obtain 
such services.
177
For example, a firm producing cars and trucks has a cost advantage in producing buses and tanks. This is because 
specialized knowledge and machinery is shared across different products. See e c o n o m ic s , supra note 141, at 522. See 
also A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , at 1 ("[t]he economic success of 
accounting firms in supplying non-audit services is testimony to the value created by offering multiple lines o f service.")
178
Id. at 21-23. (Discussion o f economies o f scope.)
179
Cf. Rick Telberg, Top 100 Firms Propel Consulting Past Tax, A&A, (hereinafter "TOP 100") a c c t . To d a y ,
(Mar. 17, 1997) (discussion o f growth in non-audit services by Accounting Today Top 100 Tax and Accounting Firms).
In today's dynamic business environment, audit teams draw on a broad range of skills and expertise to provide 
quality service to clients. The synergistic interaction among professionals with different skill sets can be as basic as a brief 
consultation with a knowledgeable specialist,180 or deployment as part of an audit team.181 Industry-specific knowledge may 
be made available to auditors through industry data bases that contain unique information obtained as part of the audit and 
non-audit services rendered by the firm, or through internal meetings organized along industry lines.182 Use of industry- 
specific knowledge in planning and performing audits results in higher audit quality by providing an increased ability to 
compare and analyze client operations and operating results against industry-based expectations.183
As discussed more extensively below, the potential for synergies among professional service lines has been greatly 
enhanced by the revolution in information technology. Providers of both audit and non-audit services learn more from each 
other than in the past, and draw more readily upon this knowledge to solve respective service problems. Databases capturing 
knowledge derived from particular engagements, as well as best practices, are now shared worldwide. Such advances result 
not only in more informed audits, but also add to the potential for providing clients with better information concerning 
emerging business risks.
180
See Statement o f Accounting Standards No. 73, Using the Work o f  a Specialist 336.05 which states:
During the audit * * * an auditor may encounter complex or subjective matters potentially material to 
financial statements. Such matters may require special skill or knowledge and in the auditor's judgment require using the work o f 
cialist to obtain competent evidential matter.
181
Accounting firms employ various mechanisms to spread the benefits o f in-house multidisciplinary expertise, 
including: (i) knowledge management and electronic communication systems; (ii) training programs; (iii) publication of 
directories o f issues experts; (iv) written policies, procedures, and work processes that leverage such knowledge; and (v) 
casual interactions among professionals.
182
Some firms have specialists who monitor industry trends and provide valuable information to auditors and other 
service lines.
183
Accounting firms employ various mechanisms to collect and disseminate industry knowledge, including surveying 
internal industry experts to learn about new trends and market developments, written communications by industry experts 
and more informal processes such as internal and external presentations. Some accounting firms develop industry-segment 
business models that are periodically updated and used to inform audit engagements.
Many o f these valuable synergies would be lost, if, as some have urged, accounting firms were constrained in the 
provision to audit clients o f non-audit services.184 Specifically, costs would be expected to rise for non-audit services, and 
demand reduced, as clients ration their use o f non-audit services in response to higher prices. On the supply-side, this implies 
that what one accounting firm loses in business, another would not necessarily gain. This is particularly the case with respect 
to consulting services, where the offerings o f the firms are more highly differentiated.185
On the demand-side, the consequence o f this policy would be what economists refer to as a "deadweight" economic 
loss - that is, a loss o f the benefits of the exchange.186 Clients would lose the numerous benefits associated with the 
provision o f multiple services by the same professional service firm - reduced start-up time and learning cost; cumulative 
knowledge to identify potential business solutions that address unique client-specific business problems; lower transaction 
costs associated with "one-stop shopping;" the enhanced comfort level that comes from dealing with a known service 
provider; a readily identifiable contact point responsible for the account relationship; and, most important, because of 
information-sharing within the audit firm, higher quality audits. Denying consumer choice, in short, is likely to result in real 
and serious social costs.187
184
This is not to suggest that there should be no constraints on the non-audit services provided to audit clients. For 
example, the profession has long acknowledged that it should not perform certain services for audit clients, such as 
underwriting client securities or acting in the capacity o f management. Moreover, new service lines are sure to arise in the 
future that the profession should not perform for audit clients. See Section V for further discussion.
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See A n  Ec o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B, at 22 ("[e]conomic 
welfare is enhanced when the most efficient supplier o f a good or service is allowed to fulfill the demand for that good or 
service.")
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More technically, a "deadweight loss" is a "loss of consumer surplus or producer surplus due to departures of 
prices from marginal costs." See e c o n o m ic s , supra note 141, at 902. It constitutes a loss for which there is no 
compensating gain by any other party.
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One o f the most important social costs of such a policy is reduced access to information by the auditors. 
Professionals who perform mostly non-audit services are more likely to communicate their client-specific knowledge to the 
client's auditors if the non-audit and audit professionals are members o f the same firm. Non-audit experts are motivated to 
assist in key audit work because of the incentive to sell their non-audit services to the audit client in follow-on work. 
Precluding non-audit professionals from performing non-audit work for an audit client would discourage them from 
providing their best assistance with audits. Conversely, auditors have a greater incentive to indicate to clients possibilities 
for business improvement through non-audit services if those non-audit services are likely to be rendered by the auditor's 
firm. See A n  e c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  a u d it o r  in d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B , (discussion of supply of 
non-audit services) at 18-23. See also, discussion o f Year 2000  problem in Section IV at p. 102.
D. A Broad Scope of Services Fosters Economies of Scale
Due to "economies o f scale," the capability to serve clients in multiple capacities lowers the cost o f all 
services. Economies o f scale occur when the average cost o f production declines as output is increased, as a result o f total 
production costs being spread over expanding output. In accounting, once a critical mass is achieved, costs per engagement 
fall because: (i) fixed costs are spread over a larger revenue base, and (ii) the learning curve for certain tasks that must be 
performed for each engagement is reduced, especially when there is knowledge sharing across attest and non-attest 
engagements.188 Examples include: lower per capita training costs (investments in training programs leveraged across a 
larger number o f professionals); lower per capita field support costs (spreading the costs for such field support services as 
market and professional practice research); and lower per capita information costs (due to the ability to allocate costs for 
developing and sharing technical and industry information over a broader base of professionals.) Because non-attest services 
often employ the same infrastructure (such as computer systems, office facilities and client-specific knowledge) as attest 
services, the cost is spread further, thereby reducing the firm 's average cost for each.
A globalized economy with a corresponding international structure for service providers dictates substantial 
investment by accounting firms in this market. Perhaps the most important economies o f scale are those associated with 
information sharing and assimilation. Clients demand that an accounting firm 's knowledge, skills and methods be uniformly 
consistent and reliable.189 Through the use o f information management tools and given sufficient scale, a firm can 
effectively shift from real to virtual deployment, whereby each client is benefited by the full range of the firm 's knowledge 
resources. While this entails heavy investment and necessitates taking advantage of scale economies, firms that have 
deployed well-coordinated information acquisition and assimilation infrastructures enjoy efficiencies that both reduce costs 
and result in more effective audits. To keep pace with client investments in information technology, professional service 
firms are increasingly capital-and technology-intensive. Accordingly, capturing economies o f scale in the provision of
188
See, e.g., Paul Danos and John W. Eichenseher, Audit Industry Dynamics: Factors Affecting Changes in Client- 
Industry M arket Shares, 20  J. o f  a c c t . R e s . 604 (1982).
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The large accounting firms tend to have well-established cultures of shared professional values and common 
worldwide policies, procedures and technologies.
professional services may be essential to a viable audit practice, particularly with respect to large and highly complex global 
enterprises, but also in focused market niches often involving non-Big Six firms.190
If a misguided regulatory approach to auditor independence thwarts these market forces, today's multidisciplinary 
firms will be driven to choose between two models - an audit practice with limited complementary offerings or a consulting 
firm that offers a range of professional services other than audit services. If  that were to happen, the likely consequence is 
greater concentration in both markets, since each service line would no longer enjoy the scale economies attributable to the 
bundling of these services under one roof. This could reduce competition, stifle innovation and increase costs. And, the 
economies o f scope discussed above191 would also be lost.
E. The Revolution in Inform ation Technology is Increasing the Im portance of Broad Scope of Services
Information technology has profoundly affected every aspect o f the creation, recording, processing,
storage, distribution, acquisition, analysis, and interpretation o f information. This revolution has opened the way for the
interconnection of economic agents into complex economic webs, compressing distance and time and making both
individuals and organizations more nimble, as well as interdependent. Indeed, out of the marriage of telecommunications and
computers, an economy is emerging in which information itself has begun to overtake other factors of production - such as
raw materials and labor - in its relative contribution to the value o f goods and services. As W alter Wriston has observed:
The perception of what constitutes an asset, and what it is that creates wealth is shifting 
dramatically. Intellectual capital is becoming relatively more important than physical capital. 
Indeed, the new source of wealth is not material, it is information, knowledge applied to work 
to create value. The pursuit o f wealth is now largely the pursuit o f information, and the 
application o f information to the means o f production.192
This development has profound implications for the accounting profession. In the past, much o f accountancy has 
occupied itself with compliance work of various sorts - ranging from the tax code to financial reporting. Although these
190
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Walter Wriston, T h e  T w il ig h t  o f  So v e r e ig n t y : H o w  t h e  In f o r m a t io n  R e v o l u t io n  Is T r a n s f o r m in g  O u r
W o r l d  xii (1992).
services undoubtedly will continue to constitute a large part of accounting practice, a substantial portion o f this work may 
prove to be programmable. Over time the traditional periodic audit may become less relevant to users o f financial statements, 
supplemented by an ever-expanding stream o f "on-line," "real-time" business information.193 In an instant-access world 
inundated with information, assurance services are apt to grow in importance.194
These dramatic shifts present auditors with an array of new challenges, risks, and opportunities, while spelling the 
demise of the so-called "commoditized" audit.195 The nature o f audit evidence has already changed significantly. Clients 
have electronic interfaces with their customers and suppliers, with transactions "approved" by systems protocols. There is 
greater reliance on input and process, and less on authorizations and signatures. While enhanced speed and accuracy have 
improved systems reliability, there is less human intervention and paper documentation. The predicted shift to financial 
reporting on a continuous basis will require auditors to develop a deeper understanding of the reliability o f the processes from 
which that information is generated, and necessitate substantial "audit" resources devoted to continuous monitoring.
193
As former SEC Commissioner W allman explained:
[S]hifting the focus of accounting from an aggregation concept premised on periodic reports to one 
ised on realtime access to disaggregated data also permits access to more timely information. Industry has increasingly been 
various forms of electronic data interchange (EDI) among suppliers and retailers for purposes o f inventory control. The 
advntages of sharing information on a real-time basis, such as permitting just-in-time inventory, are obvious and EDI continues to 
at a phenomenal annual rate. It is not too much o f an extension to envision preparers of financial information providing users 
access to select portions o f their management information systems for purposes o f financial reporting. Subject to appropriate 
ity measures, access made available through the Internet would * * * permit all investors and others to obtain that information 
relevant to their decision making. Real-time access to such information becomes even more important as we continue to 
tate more efficient and faster capital formation.
Steven M. H. Wallman, The Future o f  Accounting and Financial Reporting, Part IV: "Access" Accounting, 
. H o r iz o n s , June 1997, at 103.
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The Elliott Committee Report predicts the rapid growth o f market-driven assurance services. With instantaneous 
access to massive amounts o f information, users will demand assurance o f accuracy, in various degrees depending on the 
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See, Special Committee on Assurance Services, Report o f  the Special Committee on Assurance Services (visited June 26, 
1997) <http://www.aicpa.or.. ,e/sitemap/index.htm>.
195
See, e.g., Ross D. Spencer, Benefits Consulting Executives Reflect On Their Industry: Changes and Future 
Challenges, E m p l o y e e  B e n e f it  p l a n  R e v ., June 1996, at 24; Jeanne M. Liedtka, Collaborating Across Lines o f  Business 
fo r  Competitive Advantage, A c a d . o f  m g m t . e x e c u t iv e , May 1996, at 20.
Looking to the future, the path o f audit technology is likely to merge with integrated reporting systems, and the need 
for consultants, such as systems implementers, to work closely with auditors will increase. As the economy shifts further 
from an industrial to an informational base, the pace o f change in GAAP itself may accelerate with the growing need for 
measurements that reflect these changes. Auditing will become more technology-driven, requiring auditors to develop or 
have access to considerable expertise in information technology. Reflecting these technological and competitive forces, as 
well as their continued commitment to the audit practice, accounting firms in recent years have invested heavily in preparing 
their audit practices for the world o f the 21st century.196
The demands on the auditor of tomorrow will also require an increasingly robust knowledge base. Traditional audit 
skills must be supplemented by technological and business knowledge that includes the multi-disciplinary tools necessary for 
the identification and assessment o f business and audit risk in a fast changing world. In addition, the auditor must remain 
current on the global economy's adaptive behavior in order to make informed judgments about the recoverability o f a client's 
assets and the viability of its full business operation over the foreseeable future. These same forces are intensifying the 
demand for professional service firms to provide a range o f increasingly sophisticated informational services to their clients. 
All businesses - both large and small - confront a myriad o f information technology problems on a daily basis. The 
accounting profession may be among the best situated to help businesses address these problems and assure the highest value 
application of technology and knowledge.
F. The Revolution in Inform ation Technology Is Also Increasing the Im portance of Professional 
Service F irm s' Business Relationships
In today's rapidly changing world, despite the large investments in information infrastructure and human 
capital discussed above, no single firm is likely to have the resources to acquire, develop or produce all the competencies 
needed to meet its clients' demands. Thus, to stay competitive, firms enter into alliances. The information revolution 
simultaneously makes such alliances easier to establish and more necessary than ever before.
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For example, in the most recent fiscal year, four of the Big Six firms invested an aggregate in excess of $170 
million in audit technology and methodology, and over the last five years, two had an aggregate investment in excess of 
$0.5 billion. See A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s is  o f  A u d it o r  In d e p e n d e n c e , supra note 139, Appendix B, at 18. A  recent 
survey showed that in 1996, the Big Six firms invested $49,500 per partner in audit technology and $5,000 per audit 
professional per year on continuing education (not including the time cost o f trainees). See information provided to Fried, 
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson by Jeffrey Peck (May 22, 1997).
Emerging technologies are impacting the basic form and structure o f industries. Indeed, the economic determinants 
o f the organizational structure o f productive enterprises are closely tied to transaction costs.197 These, in turn, are highly 
dependent upon the cost of information, which is plummeting with the revolution in information technology. As a 
consequence, a dramatic re-alignment in the development and delivery o f information-intensive products and professional 
services is taking place.
At the heart o f this restructuring is a host of new business relationships. For professional service firms, remaining 
efficient and competitive requires that they be flexible enough to enter into business relationships with audit clients that 
complement the in-house resources even o f the largest organizations. From an economic perspective, the forces driving 
professional service firms to engage in a variety o f new business relationships are essentially identical to the forces behind the 
shift to a broader scope o f in-house services - namely, the need to deploy the resources and competencies demanded by the 
market. They reflect the m arket's dynamic search for the most efficient means of production and delivery o f information- 
intensive services - a process of fundamental importance to the economy.198 The economies that may be extracted through 
employing information technology to combine inter-organizational resources to address rapidly shifting market demands may 
be particularly important to small and medium size firms. Here, too, regulators should not thwart what the market is 
demanding unless the particular relationship impairs independence.199
G. A Broad Scope of Practice is Necessary to A ttract the Best Recruits
Professional service firms must attract highly skilled professionals, able to deal effectively with a complex 
business and auditing environment. For example, in today's environment, they must have the ability to:
•understand new financial instruments, including derivatives;
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evaluate complex computer systems; 
identify obsolete inventories;
evaluate the effects of intricate international agreements; 
evaluate complicated tax accruals;
recognize and judge the significance o f important industry trends;
evaluate the appropriate accounting treatment o f employee health and retirement plans; and
•assess what skills and knowledge are needed to deal with these issues. 
Historically, one reason auditors provided an array of professional services was simply to balance the highly 
concentrated audit season with year-round professional activity.200 Today, diversity o f practice remains important to 
practitioners for a variety o f other reasons as well:
•Multiple service lines provide opportunities to explore alternative career paths within an organization and 
expand professional capabilities in new directions.
M ulti-disciplinary firms offer greater professional security, both in terms o f ability to withstand the 
unpredictable vicissitudes o f long-term inter-disciplinary growth (or lack thereof) as well as to weather economic 
cycles.201
M ulti-disciplinary firms enjoy the economies o f scale and scope previously discussed. This redounds to the 
benefit o f the professionals working within them.
M ulti-disciplinary firms offer access to an existing client base for multiple services.
Involving audit professionals in the performance o f non-audit services facilitates the ability o f accounting firms 
to attract and retain the "best and the brightest" in audit practice.
•Quality professionals, who set high standards for themselves, perceive that interaction with professionals 
in complementary areas o f expertise enhances their "human capital" and ability to perform.
To continue to provide top quality service, accounting firms must attract and retain the most qualified 
individuals. Relatively few people know what they would like to do with their careers when they are at the entry-level stage. 
Within a multi-line professional service firm, new recruits enjoy a wide array of career potentials beyond their entry-level 
positions. Such diversity o f practice has proven to be critical in attracting individuals with the breadth of professional and 
business skills necessary for today's complex audits in an increasingly competitive recruiting environment.
H. Exposure to Liability and Professional Sanctions Provides a Com plem entary D eterrent to 
Compromising Independence
200 
201
Concentration occurred because many companies had calendar fiscal years.
See E c o n o m ic  In q u ir y , supra note 152, at 367.
Complementary to the economic incentive of accounting firms to safeguard independence is the deterrent 
posed by exposure to potentially massive liability. While a violation o f current independence requirements, without more, 
does not necessarily result in liability, the litigation experience of accounting firms is such that the prospect of liability acts as 
a significant and pervasive constraint.202
The threat of legal proceedings is all too real for accountants. Beginning in the late 1980s, the profession 
experienced a dramatic increase in litigation expenses. Between 1990 and 1993, the cost o f litigation to the accounting and 
audit practices o f the six largest firms increased 65%.203 Net practice protection costs204 rose from 7.7% of gross accounting 
and audit revenues in 1990 to 11.9% of gross accounting and audit revenues in 1993 205 By the end of 1992, legal claims 
against the six largest firms exceeded $30 billion, an amount more than 20 times the level of permanent capital available 
within the six firms and one that threatened the profession's continued existence.206 Partners o f the six largest firms have 
invested more than $3.5 billion o f their own capital in their respective firms.207 This substantial personal investment would 
be put at risk by compromising independence.
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Exposure to liability attributable to a lack o f independence could arise pursuant to federal securities law, state 
securities law or common law.208 For example, under certain circumstances, a lack o f independence could open an audit 
firm or auditor to claims or charges under the antifraud provisions o f the federal securities laws.209 Further, a statutory "due 
diligence" defense to claims arising under Section 11 o f the Securities Act, which subjects auditors to liability for material 
misrepresentations or omissions in audited financial statements contained in registration statements filed with the SEC, 
provides a strong incentive to undertake rigorous, independent audits before issuing audit reports 210 Moreover, the securities 
laws of almost every state211 include express civil liability provisions similar to those encountered under federal law.212 A 
breach o f independence could also result in common law actions for malpractice, alleging breach o f contract or 
negligence,213 or common law fraud.
Accountants who compromise their independence, moreover, risk more than the imposition o f liability under the 
common law and the federal and state securities laws; they risk their very careers. State licensing authorities, in compliance 
with applicable procedures, may suspend or revoke the license of an accountant who fails to meet the state's independence
208
For a summary o f enforcement releases, see Ehsan H. Feroz, Kyungjoo Park and Victor S. Pastena The Financial 
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A n  A n a l y s is  o f  E n f o r c e m e n t  A c t io n s , supra note 174, at 303.
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These provisions, which include Section 17(a) o f the Securities Act, Section 10(b) o f the Exchange Act and Rule 
10b-5 thereunder, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (relating to tender offers) and Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act 
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requirements. Further, the AICPA imposes sanctions for violations o f its Code o f Professional Conduct. The Executive 
Committee o f the AICPA's SEC Practice Section may sanction firms that are members, if  they fail to take corrective action 
after the Peer Review Committee finds violations of GAAS (or GAAP), or the Quality Control Inquiry Committee finds 
violations in connection with audits that are the subject o f litigation.214 Similarly, the Professional Ethics Division may 
sanction individual members of the AICPA for a wide variety o f violations of professional standards. State professional 
associations may also sanction members that fail to adhere to professional standards.215
Rule 102(e) o f the SEC's Rules of Practice authorizes the Commission to censure a professional (or firm) or to 
deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of practicing before it if  the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity 
for hearing, that the professional does not possess requisite qualifications to represent others, lacks character or integrity, 
engaged in unethical or unprofessional behavior, or willfully violated or aided and abetted violation of the securities laws 216 
A suspension or bar from practice before the Commission has severe effects on the accountants whose primary work involves 
public companies, whether undertaken as an internal or independent accountant or auditor, because that work may be 
construed as "practice before the Commission." Moreover, any sanction, whether a suspension, bar, censure, or other 
measure,217 often has significant collateral consequences, such as publicity that adversely affects the accountant's reputation.
214
Sanctions can include: (i) corrective measures by the firm, including measures involving personnel; (ii) additional 
continuing professional education; (iii) accelerated or special peer reviews; (iv) admonishments, censures, or reprimands; 
(v) suspension from membership in the Section; or (vi) expulsion from Section membership.
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professional independence standards for members in the practice o f public accounting. See T h e  CPA  L e t t e r  for that 
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The rule also provides that any person whose license to practice as an accountant has been revoked or suspended in 
any state shall be suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission.
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In addition to suspension, bar, or censure, the SEC has, for example, limited accountants from accepting new SEC 
clients and participating in audits of public companies, required improvements to accounting firm procedures, and mandated 
peer review by the SEC Practice Section o f the AICPA or a similar review body. See Paul R. Brown & Jeanne A. Calderón, 
The Increased Use o f  SEC  Disciplinary Proceedings Against Accountants in the 1990's, Apr. 1995, at 17.
The risk o f sanction under Rule 102(e) has increased significantly in the 1990s as the SEC has stepped up enforcement 
efforts.218 Rule 102(e) proceedings thus represent a significant disincentive to unprofessional conduct.
I. O ther Determ inants of Auditor Independence
In addition to the economic and legal parameters, social, psychological, ethical and professional influences 
are also important considerations in crafting a new conceptual framework.219 "Internalization" by practitioners o f the values 
of integrity, objectivity and independence provides the best possible assurance 220 As Dr. W. Warner Burke o f Columbia 
University notes, these values carry the auditing professional beyond compliance to commitment.221 They may also provide 
the most powerful deterrent to the problem of free riders discussed above 222 As Dr. Burke explains, while self-serving 
interests have the power to bias judgment, in the context o f auditing "the right culture in the firm" and the "right climate in 
the engagement team" will "bias [auditors] in favor o f maintaining objectivity and independence."223
Internalization of fundamental values such as integrity, objectivity and independence may be fostered through 
training, peer and group dynamics, "firm culture," and professionalism.224 Indeed, many of the independence safeguards 
developed by the profession may be as important for their contribution in this regard as for the extrinsic motivation they
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provide.225 Equally important is the involvement of professionals in the self-regulatory process. As Dr. Burke exhorts, 
"involvement leads to commitment."226
Gary Edwards, a well-known consultant on business and professional ethics, sounds this same theme in his report on 
the relationship o f professional ethics and self-regulation to auditor independence.227 He notes that the elements o f 
compliance with ethical standards are typically more sophisticated in the major professions than in a corporation or industrial 
group. 228 (Indeed, among the professions, auditors are perhaps unique in the separation they must maintain between 
themselves and their clients.) In this context, Edwards explains that maintaining the appearance o f auditor independence 
(bound as it must be to subjective perception) should be recognized as essentially aspirational in nature, rather than a 
regulatory requirement.229 Accordingly, he counsels that, in the absence o f credible objective evidence concerning the 
appearance o f a lack of auditor independence, enforceable appearance-based rules should be abandoned and regulatory 
attention refocused on crafting fundamental independence principles (which would then be implemented by the firms through 
self-devised mechanisms based on comparable existing best ethical compliance practices)230
J. Conclusion
As shown above, professional service firms have a strong economic interest in safeguarding independence, 
buttressed by complementary organizational, ethical and professional motivations and deterrents. As discussed in the next 
section, to achieve the most effective regulatory impact, policy-makers should seek to harness these incentives/deterrents by 
employing in combination the regulator's comparative advantage in setting goals in the public interest and the regulated 
entities' comparative advantage in determining how best to implement those objectives.
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IV. Regulatory Policy Considerations
Formulation of effective regulatory policy to assure auditor independence is not a choice between the free market 
and government regulation, or between "weak" and "strong" regulation. Instead, regulatory policy should be based on 
implementing the regulatory strategy that optimally safeguards auditor independence.231 A regulatory model that enlists the 
profession in the development and implementation o f a system of self-regulation focused on ISB standards reflecting an 
informed understanding both o f the real threats to auditor independence and effective safeguards designed to defuse those 
threats (whenever possible), presents the best opportunity for achieving this goal. Such a decentralized regulatory model 
(increasingly employed by the SEC and other federal agencies to achieve a variety o f regulatory goals) in which the 
regulator232 promulgates core principles, prescribes guidelines and then imposes on the regulated firms the responsibility of 
developing specific methods o f implementation, offers significant advantages over the detailed, rule-oriented approach that 
has developed in recent decades.
A. Com m and and C ontrol R egulation
Regulation o f the private sector during the last thirty years has increasingly taken the form of what is 
generally described as "command and control." In a command and control regime, rather than setting performance standards 
and allowing the regulated persons to determine how to meet them, the regulator establishes operating standards, issues rules 
that define the required practices or behaviors and the specific activities to which they apply, and imposes penalties on those 
who fail to comply. In recent years, the command and control approach has been the subject o f extensive bipartisan criticism
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The ISB is a private standards-setter, akin to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (hereinafter "FASB"), not 
a classic regulator. For example, the ISB lacks enforcement authority. (Enforcement o f independence standards is the 
responsibility of the SEC, the AICPA, and state boards o f accountancy.) However, the ISB is a primary element o f the new 
regulatory system governing auditor independence (as illustrated in Figure 1.1, supra) and, as such, should develop and 
implement the standards-setting process in accordance with sound regulatory policy.
and re-evaluation.233 Drawing on examples from the existing areas o f command and control regulation, its principal 
shortcomings are highlighted below.
1. Technical Compliance Instead of Achievement of Goals
One o f the key shortcomings o f command and control regulation is that it emphasizes technical 
compliance with particularized mies rather than the achievement of policy objectives or goals. A regulatory regime stressing 
compliance with detailed, specific rules, over time, will require additional rules, in order to address new developments, or 
close off loopholes in existing rules.234 In this way, regulations beget more regulations, leading to a regime of detailed rules, 
developed through accretion, that becomes increasingly tangential to the original purpose o f the regulations.
This accretion o f regulations often yields unintended results. For example, a compliant entity that meets (or 
exceeds) the goal o f the regulatory regime may still find itself subject to sanction for technical violations, regardless of its 
overall performance 235 Likewise, an entity that falls short o f the goal of the regulatory regime may nonetheless be
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In T h e  D e a t h  o f  C o m m o n  S e n s e , attorney and economist Philip Howard writes:
Our regulatory system has become an instruction manual. It tells us and bureaucrats 
ly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation 
akers and bureaucrats can think of.
Philip K. Howard, T h e  D e a t h  o f  C o m m o n  s e n s e  6 (1994) (hereinafter
com m o n  Se n s e ").
Vice President Albert Gore, in his book c o m m o n  s e n s e  g o v e r n m e n t , states: "in the pursuit of certainty we have 
ed a system that attempts to cover every eventuality, spelling everything out in excruciating detail." Albeit Gore, c o m m o n  s e n s e  
Gove r n m e n t  47 (1995) (hereinafter "G o v e r n m e n t ").
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C o m m o n  Se n s e  states:
Precise rules, most people believe, close off loopholes.' It happens to be the other 
around. Loopholes only exist because o f precise rules. The Constitution, a short document o f general principles, has 
lopholes. The tax law, all 36,000 pages o f it, is practically nothing but loopholes.
C o m m o n  S e n s e , supra note 233 at 43.
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See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System o f  Environmental Regulation: The Case fo r  an Industry Sector 
Approach, 26 E n v t l . L. 457, 465-66 (Summer 1996) (stating that EPA has observed o f its regulation o f hazardous waste 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that " [ i ] n  RCRA, as in other programs, a regulated 
hazardous waste handler literally m ust do hundreds o f things correctly to fully comply with the regulations, yet doing only
considered compliant, because it meets the regime's technical specifications. In the worst case, compliance with the 
regulations receives a higher priority than achieving the underlying policy objective.236
Examples abound o f the shortcomings of command and control regulation. Over the last twenty years, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") has developed over 4,000 detailed regulations, dictating 
particulars such as the length o f ladders and the required height of railings (42 inches) 237 Similarly, the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") has not only identified pollutants and required regulated entities to address the sources of these 
pollutants on their property, but also has issued detailed regulations specifying the exact combination of technologies to be 
applied by regulated entities to address the identified problems 238 For instance:
In spite of its excellent safety record, a brick manufacturer caught up in this regulatory 
maze was repeatedly cited by OSHA for having railings that were only 40  inches high.239
In the same vein, Vice President Gore described a case in which OSHA imposed a fine on a company 
"for failing to require its workers to don hard hats as they rushed to save a co-worker from a collapsed trench."240
The EPA adopted a rule in 1990 requiring that specific equipment be installed in wastewater pipes to 
filter out benzene. Amoco Oil spent $31 million to bring its Yorktown, Virginia refinery into compliance with the 
regulation. As it turned out, however, the plant was emitting significant amounts o f benzene - but not from its 
wastewater pipes. Instead, the pollution was emanating from leakage at the refinery's loading docks, an area not then 
subject to regulation for benzene emissions.
one thing wrong makes the handler a violator'") (quoting U .S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office o f Solid Waste & 
Emergency Response, T h e  N a t io n ' s H a z a r d o u s  W a s t e  P r o g r a m  a t  a  C r o s s r o a d s  36 (1990)).
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As Howard has written: "[W ]e seem to have achieved the worst o f both worlds: a system o f regulation that goes 
too far while it also does too little" (quoted approvingly in G o v e r n m e n t , supra note 233, at 35).
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See C o m m o n  Se n s e , supra note 233, at 12.
238
See D a v id  O sb o r n e  an d  T e d  G a b e ler , REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 299  (1992).
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See C o m m o n  Se n s e , supra note 233, at 13.
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See G o v e r n m e n t , supra note 233, at 46  (citing Dan Margolies and Bonar Menninger, "OSHA's Obsessions 
Trivialize Hazards," K a n . C it y  B u s . J. 2  (Dec. 1994)
Command and control regulation thus often produces rules that yield absurd outcomes, such as the hard hat case, or 
miss the mark and fail to address the real clangers, such as the EPA's regulation o f benzene emissions. As discussed in 
Section II o f this White Paper and illustrated below, the command and control approach to the regulation of auditor 
independence, characterized by the dozens of rulings, interpretations, enforcement proceedings and other SEC guidance 
concerning independence to which auditors are expected to conform their conduct, has produced the same shortcomings seen 
in other areas o f command and control regulation. As Philip Howard, who was retained by the SEC to advise the SEC's Task 
Force on Disclosure Simplification, reported to SEC Chairman Levitt last year:
Like all agencies * * * the SEC has suffered from the bureaucratic tendency to 
create ever thicker rulebooks. Each complication breeds another level o f complexity 
and, over time, the original regulatory goal becomes obscured amid thousands o f words 
o f detailed dictates. Some SEC rules, intended to guide market participants in daily 
decisions, have become a kind of Latin liturgy, comprehensible only to those of us who 
have devoted our professional lives to abstract regulatory nuances.241
Likewise, The Wall Street Journal reported that, during an interview on September 28, 1997, (on the eve of his return to his
private life), SEC Commissioner Wallman:
called for the [SEC] to redouble efforts to move away from a detail-driven "command 
and control" regulatory structure that he said is becoming increasingly anachronistic in 
an age when technological advances occur faster than the agency can regulate them. 
Instead, he urged the Commission to adopt broad central tenets of what it wants to 
achieve and leave it to those in the market to decide how it should be accomplished 242
There are numerous examples of such detailed dictates in the SEC's regulation o f auditor independence. For 
instance, the Codification o f  Financial Reporting Policies states that restrictions against holding official positions and 
associations with the client apply not only to an accountant, but also to relatives of the accountant "in varying degrees 
depending on the closeness o f the relationship."243 In one example, the SEC Staff advised a firm that it would not question
241
Re p o r t  o f  t h e  T a s k  F o r c e  o n  D is c l o s u r e  S im p l if ic a t io n  2 (Mar. 5, 1996) 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htmp>.
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Paul Beckett, SEC Commissioner Wallman, on the Eve o f His Departure, Seeks More Reforms, W a l l  St . J., Sept. 
29, 1997, at B9.
243
Co d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  Re p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s , 602.02.h., 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,273, at 62,908 
(1997). The SEC's policies state that the financial interests and business relationships of an "accountant's immediate family 
or other dependent relatives" generally would be ascribed to the accountant for independence purposes. They also provide
the firm 's independence if  the son-in-law of a firm partner was a branch manager of a bank that was a subsidiary o f a firm 
audit client, but that its independence might be impaired in the future i f  the son-in-law were promoted, even if the promotion 
did not entail the assumption o f responsibility for the client's financial statements.244
In a recent situation, the SEC Staff opined that a firm 's independence would be impaired if it admitted to partnership 
a manager whose father was a director of an audit client, even if the firm transferred the manager to an office that was not 
responsible for the audit engagement.245 The requirements thus presume a lack of independence even in instances where the 
family member may not have anything to do with the financial statements, and regardless o f whether the mere employment 
of relatives by a client poses any actual threat to the integrity of the client's financial statements. The benefit to investors is 
hard to fathom, although the damage done to families o f partners and employees of accounting firms is very real.
The SEC's detailed guidance further provides that auditors o f public companies should not enter into "direct and 
material indirect business relationships" with their clients or their affiliates.246 The SEC has interpreted this guidance as 
precluding a professional services firm from entering into a prime/subcontractor arrangement with an audit client (or vice 
versa) to provide services to unrelated third parties, regardless of the materiality o f the arrangement to the firm or its client.247 
No appearance-based concerns regarding the independence of the firm from the client would be raised, however, if the third 
party instead entered into separate contracts with the firm and the client. Moreover, as a factual matter, it is unclear how such
that, in determining whether an impairment o f independence exists, the Staff will consider "the positions occupied by the 
parties in their respective employment, as may make the related parties appear to have the opportunity to mold the shape o f 
the financial statements." Id.
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Yount, Hyde & Barbour, P.C., Securities & Exchange Commission No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,557, at 78,799 (Mar. 2, 1985).
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McGladrey & Pullen, Securities & Exchange Commission No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,918, at 78,653 (July 1, 1993).
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(1997).
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See, e.g., Letter to A. Clayton Ostlund, Touche Ross & Co., from Clarence A. Staubs, A ss't Chief Accountant, 
Securities & Exchange Commission (May 18, 1981).
a relationship, however structured, actually impairs the firm 's independence or otherwise presents a threat to the integrity of 
the client's financial statements. Nevertheless, the proscription remains in effect.
In a recent instance, an audit firm was informed by the SEC that its independence would be impaired if it purchased 
or held an immaterial equity investment o f less than five percent o f the shares o f a closely held entity, where a director o f one 
o f its publicly traded audit clients was also an equity shareholder o f that same closely held entity, no matter how immaterial 
to the director or how passive or small the director's investment might be to the closely held entity. In the view of the SEC 
Staff, this situation represents a "joint business venture" between the professional services firm and the audit client, 
prohibited under 602.02.g.
Elsewhere, the SEC's policies state that "an accounting firm cannot be deemed independent with regard to auditing 
financial statements o f a client if  it has participated closely, either manually or through its computer systems, in maintenance 
o f the basic accounting records and preparation o f the financial statements."248 Based on this policy, the SEC Staff has 
concluded that an accounting firm would lack independence with respect to a client that was a registered investment company 
merely because the firm retained custody o f the key to the client's safe deposit box 249 Such an audit firm could meticulously 
ensure its objectivity and integrity in the conduct o f its audits, but still run afoul o f the SEC's policies because it arguably had 
access to whatever the client chose to keep in its safe deposit box.
In sum, as these examples demonstrate, command and control regulation carries with it a substantial danger that 
compliance with detailed rules will become a substitute for achievement o f the intended policy objective. Moreover, there is 
a significant likelihood that such rules not only will fail to foster the intended policy goal, but will divert resources away from 
the real threats and toward those items which regulators, far removed from the situation, believe are the problems, and, in the
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C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  602.02.c, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C C H ) 73,263, at 62,890.
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Accounting Series Release No. 81, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,103, at 62,230 
(Dec. 11, 1958).
process, deflect attention from the underlying purpose o f the regulation. As a result, detailed regulations may not only be 
ineffective but actually counterproductive.250
2. Cost-Ineffective Regulation
As noted, the issue is not whether regulation itself is unnecessary or too costly. If safety is 
impaired because employees fall over railings, the height o f a railing is an appropriate subject for regulation; similarly, if the 
employment o f relatives of auditors by a client impairs independence and lowers audit quality, regulation is indicated. These 
examples, however, lead one to question whether regulation at such a level o f detail is the most effective way to expend 
scarce regulatory and private sector resources and ensure achievement o f the policy goal. Under a regulation that merely 
required regulated firms to reduce the rate of worker accidents, and noted, for instance, that railings must be high enough to 
prevent falls, individual firms could address whatever causes of accidents might be of concern at their particular facility 251 
The same point applies in respect o f family relationships. Under a regulation that required auditing firms to maintain their 
independence, and noted that firms should ensure that family relationships do not impair the firm 's independence, firms could 
develop particularized solutions 252 Thus, while regulators are well-suited to state general principles of broad applicability, 
they are often poorly equipped to determine what will be the most effective means for each entity to achieve the regulatory 
goal.253
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This is the rationale which supports the mandate o f the Clinton Administration's 1995 National Performance 
Review initiatives to "reward results, not red tape, by changing performance measurement systems to focus on ultimate 
goals (e.g., cleaner air and safer workplaces) rather than the number o f citations written and fines assessed." GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 233, at 270.
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See infra pp. 111-112 for a discussion o f the Maine 200 Program, under which OSHA implemented such a system 
on a trial basis. Vice President Gore described the success o f this program, stating that regulated firms' own workers are 
identifying - and fixing - 14 times more hazards" as the OSHA inspectors could have found, and that "injury rates dropped 
35 percent." GOVERNMENT, supra note 233, at 41.
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This is more fully discussed in Section V, see infra Section V.
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As Philip Howard noted:
Decision making must be transferred, from words on a page back to people on the spot, 
requires legal frameworks that are open, not open-and-shut.
a) Inform ational Efficiency
Related to this point is the efficiency with which a government regulator can collect and 
analyze the data necessary to formulate and implement regulations. Creating detailed, particularized regulations requires 
detailed, particularized information.254 The advantage o f the regulator, however, lies in obtaining a broad base o f knowledge 
about a particular industry that no single firm may have, compared with the detailed knowledge of each specific firm that 
only its partners or officers possess.255
b) Rigid Rules, Dynamic Reality
Legal obligations are designed to be stable and predictable, while regulated entities 
ideally are rapidly adaptable to changing commercial and technological environments.256 Universal rules cannot be altered
Law should articulate goals, award subsidies, allocate presumptions, 
provide mechanisms for resolving disagreements, but law should almost never provide the final 
er. Life is too complex. Our public goals are too complex. Hard rules only make sense when 
col . . .  is more important than getting something done. . . . Law can 't think, and so law must be 
sted to humans and they must take responsibility for their interpretation o f it.
Co m m o n  S e n s e , supra note 233 , at 186.
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As Justice Stephen Breyer observed when he was a professor o f law at Harvard University, "much o f the needed 
information is so detailed that only by replicating the industry's expertise could the agency obtain it." Stephen Breyer, 
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform. 92 H a r v . L. R e v . 549, 571 (June 
1979) (hereinafter "a n a l y z in g  r e g u l a t o r y  f a il u r e ").
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Because an adequate information base is frequently unavailable from other sources, such as the agency's own 
staff, outside experts or public interest groups, unless the regulator is prepared to grant the industry significant input in the 
formulation o f a standard, the regulator runs a substantial risk that the standard will be wide of the mark in terms o f 
preventing the harm. Such a result serves the interests o f no one not industry, not the regulator, and least o f all the public 
which the regulator is supposed to protect. As Vice President Gore puts it:
Ask industry how it should be regulated? Who else knows the problems, and the 
tial solutions, better? So long as the government establishes standards that protect the public, why not let industries 
other affected stakeholders help figure out how best to get there?
GOVERNMENT, supra note 233 , at 74. As a general principle, then, a regulated industry should have input into the 
poulation of policies and standards. It should be noted that the ISB 's composition - with representatives o f the profession playing key roles 
s this principle into account.
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Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, r e s p o n s iv e  r e g u l a t io n  110 (1992) (hereinafter "r e s p o n s iv e  r e g u l a t io n ").
quickly to reflect changing circumstances.257 The Delaney Clause o f the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic A ct258 whose 
nearly 40-year "reign of error" has now in large part come to an end,259 is a prime example. Under that clause, it was 
required that even a scintilla o f a substance thought to be a probable human or animal carcinogen be banned from U.S. food. 
Over the years following enactment of the Delaney Clause, science provided methodologies capable o f identifying quantities 
o f such substances in the food supply more minuscule than could have been imagined at the time o f enactment of the Delaney 
Clause. With no evidence o f their cancer-causing potential at such vanishingly low thresholds, a variety of pesticides and 
food additives thus were prohibited in the U.S., notwithstanding the fact that these products might also have provided 
significant health benefits (e.g., more abundant food supplies at lower cost, lower fat and cholesterol content, better control in 
diabetic diets). Benefits could not even be considered or balanced against the degree o f cancer risk - by statute, any such risk 
was too much 260
3. M otivations of Regulated Entities
Regulated entities have varied motivations and objectives, as do the sub-units and decision 
makers within them. An additional weakness o f command and control regulation is that it frequently is premised on the 
notion that "the typical corporation supposedly carefully calculates to disobey the law when the anticipated fine and the
257
As Philip Howard observes:
Compulsive devotion to uniformity in law can generally be achieved only by infidelity 
ness in life. Justice Cardozo understood our inclination toward universal rules, but cautioned that "uniformity of 
od will carry us upon the rocks" and that "the curse o f this fluidity, o f an ever-shifting approximation, is one that the 
ust bear," or "curses yet more dreadful will be invited in exchange." One o f the dreadful curses is that we are making 
ity illegal.
Co m m o n  Se n s e , supra note 233, at 38.
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21 U.S.C. 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
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Amendments in 1994 and 1996 effectively removed dietary supplements and pesticide residues from the 
prohibition o f the Delaney Clause.
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In its March 7, 1997 report, the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management stated that "[t]he Delaney Clause illustrates what can happen when Congress legislates scientific judgment, 
however well-intentioned, in a manner that cannot evolve with advances in scientific knowledge." 2 The 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Regulatory Decision Making, at 136 
(1997).
probability of being caught are seen as small in comparison to the profits to be gained through disobedience."261 The reality 
is that private firms are no more monolithic than the regulators themselves. As Vice President Gore observed,
People - in government or out - are, for the most part, neither crooked nor stupid. Most 
people want to do the right thing, so long as the right thing makes sense. Perhaps the 
most important thing about the reinvention initiative, and its regulatory reform work in 
particular, is that it is based on a new assumption: that people are honest and that if  you 
tell people what needs to be done, and let them get on with doing it, the chances are it 
will be done better - and more cheaply - than if you tell them how. Moreover, it values 
them as human beings.262
Consistent with this philosophy, an effective regulatory strategy not only must address the actions of 
purely economic actors, but also take advantage o f individuals' trust, honesty, professionalism and 
sense o f civic responsibility.
Even if individuals can be relied upon to comply with rules or principles, a command and control regime may 
become so burdensome and complex that no one, including those who seek to comply, can do so. For example, no facility or 
risk manager can be aware of, much less assure compliance with, four thousand OSHA regulations.263 Likewise, auditors are 
expected to know, understand, and comply with scores o f SEC and AICPA interpretations and guidelines regarding auditor 
independence that have accumulated over the years (and which have limited coherence as a whole).
Persons who cannot understand the rules, however, may take the position that they are not personally responsible for 
ensuring that the rules are followed. Instead, that responsibility may come to be viewed as the sole province of the firm 's 
"compliance" personnel. Thus, rather than fostering a culture o f compliance among all individuals subject to regulation, an 
overly complex regime encourages such individuals to consider compliance to be someone else's job 264 Worse still, if  the
261
Jay a . Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, in t e r a c t iv e  c o r p o r a t e  c o m p l ia n c e : a n  a l t e r n a t iv e  t o  r e g u l a t o r y  
C o m p u l s io n  119 (1988) (hereinafter "In t e r a c t iv e  C o r p o r a t e  C o m p l ia n c e ").
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G o v e r n m e n t , supra note 233, at 54.
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In all likelihood, neither can an OSHA inspector, so each inspector enforces the regulations he or she happens to 
know. See c o m m o n  s e n s e , supra note 233, at 30-34.
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detailed regulations bear only a tangential relationship to the policy objectives to be achieved (i.e., if  compliance becomes an 
end in itself), they will breed only cynicism and contempt.
4. The M yth of Elim inating All Risk
When regulation attempts to address every eventuality, it also seeks to eliminate all risk. Thus, as 
described by Howard, situations have arisen in which OSHA cited a firm  for failing to provide its employees with warning 
forms relating to the bottles o f Windex found on the premises, or required firms to label bricks as hazardous substances, 
because of the remote possibility that a worker might saw a brick and release dust containing a material that may cause 
cancer.265 Although bricks and Windex are not among the most important threats to worker safety, the drive to eliminate 
whatever danger these products might pose causes the regulator (and the regulated firms) to divert resources to such relatively 
minor concerns, to the exclusion o f any underlying systemic problem that may exist at a regulated business. As Justice 
Breyer pointed out (while he was a law professor at Harvard), "[e]fforts to cure every minor defect, to close every 
conceivable loophole, are ultimately counterproductive."266
In the context of the regulation of auditor independence, the quest to eliminate even attenuated risk has manifested 
itself in prohibitions on relationships that might give rise to an "appearance" o f a lack o f independence.267 At worst, these 
requirements prevent auditors from having any dealings with audit clients outside the scope of the audit that might 
conceivably cause any person to question the existence of independence, regardless of the materiality o f the relationship to
For example, while there may be no empirical research on how many pages of regulations the typical manager can 
assimilate, it is certain that a manager can remember more o f them if  he has played a role in their development and 
understands their relationship to the policy objective to be achieved. See B u r k e  R e p o r t , supra note 219, Appendix C, at 
11-12.
265
See c o m m o n  Se n s e , supra note 233, at 37-8. The justification given for a special warning on Windex use was the 
O SH A  inspector's concern that the Windex may be used "in higher concentrations" in the workplace than in the household. 
Id. at 38. See also, the discussion o f the Delaney Clause, supra p. 107.
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A n a l y z in g  R e g u l a t o r y  F a il u r e , supra note 254, at 586. Instead, Breyer recommended that "regulation should 
aim at worst cases, and in attacking such cases regulation should seek simple rules." Id.
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To a large extent, the examples o f particularized restrictions on auditor conduct discussed supra, are also examples 
of appearance-based regulation o f independence.
the auditing firm, the countervailing societal benefits o f the relationship,268 or the absence o f any empirical evidence that the 
auditor's independence was compromised, either in fact or appearance 269
A cogent, recent example o f this propensity to seek the elimination of all risk regardless of the costs involves the 
role o f accounting firms in addressing the so-called "Year 2000 Problem." A consequence o f software programs that record 
the year using only the last two digits,270 it has been estimated that the total, world-wide cost to correct the Year 2000 
Problem will be in the hundreds o f billions o f dollars 271 Companies concerned about the Year 2000 Problem may often call 
upon the services o f consultants skilled in identifying the company's exposure to the problem, and assisting companies in 
their remediation efforts. Because o f the potential scope of the problem, many companies, particularly large companies, 
require the services o f large consulting firms.
Accounting firms have taken a leading role in bringing Year 2000 Problems to the attention of their clients, 
including audit clients, and assisting them with the identification and correction of such problems. Nevertheless, the SEC 
Staff has indicated that it might question an accounting firm 's independence if the firm "designs or modifies [a client's 
computer] programs to correct the Year 2000 problem."272 In expressing its potential concern, the SEC Staff did not explain 
how the provision o f Year 2000 services might pose any threat to the integrity o f the client's financial statements or impair a
268
For a discussion o f the benefits o f relationships that may present only an "appearance" o f an impairment on 
independence, See Section III.
269
This is not to say that all appearance-based regulation should necessarily be precluded. See Section II at 44 for a 
thorough consideration o f appearance-based regulation. Any such regulation, however, must have an empirical basis.
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The Year 2000 Problem stems from decisions by programmers o f the 1960s to save memory space by using only 
the last two digits o f a year instead o f all four when referring to the date, a technique that programmers continued to use 
until very recently. But when "00" comes up for the year 2000, many computers will view it as 1900 instead, causing 
widespread problems.
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firm 's independence.273 Nor did the Staff acknowledge the enormous societal benefits to be gained (and costs avoided) by 
the provision o f such services by accounting firms that are both qualified and well-situated to assist their clients with their 
remediation efforts.
B. An Alternative A pproach Enforced Self-Regulation
Whether called "Enforced Self-Regulation," "Audited Self-Regulation," "Interactive Compliance," or 
"Cooperative Implementation," the alternative to the command and control approach calls for the regulator to promulgate 
rules of broad applicability, and then rely on the regulated entities to develop specific, individualized and enforceable 
implementation plans.274 Under this approach, the regulator's role is to articulate the policy objective, provide incentives for 
its achievement, assist in developing self-regulatory plans, and administer a credible program of detection and enforcement. 
Rather than prescribing a detailed set o f rules, enforced self-regulation seeks to achieve the policy objective by enlisting the 
regulated entities in developing an array of solutions tailored to the requirements of each participant.275
273
Indeed, prior SEC pronouncements support the conclusion that services provided by accounting firms to clients to 
identify and correct Year 2000 Problems should not be considered to impair the firms' independence. For example, the 
SEC stated years ago that systems-related services identical to those provided by accounting firms to assist clients with the 
correction of Year 2000 problems are "proper function[s] for the qualified public accountant" and that "[c]omputer 
programming is an aspect o f systems design." Accounting Series Release No. 126, supra note 36, at 62,307.
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See, e.g., r e s p o n s iv e  r e g u l a t io n , supra note 256, at 101-32; Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use o f  
Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 A d m in . L. R e v . 171 (Spring 1995) (hereinafter "a u d it e d  s e l f - 
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535. Professor M ichael described some o f the benefits o f this approach as follows:
Because cooperative implementation relies on rules developed by the regulated entities, the 
cy 's rules can be "transparent," stating only the outcome or result desired. These rules, known as performance or output 
irds, have long been recognized by researchers in administrative reform to have unique potential to be more flexible, 
inated and rational. In addition to benefiting the regulated entities and the intended beneficiaries o f the regulatory program, 
standards should benefit the agency as well. Not only can programs be improved, but the consequently simpler and more 
ne enforcement strategy can make the regulatory program less expensive and more efficient, either lowering altogether the 
nm ent's costs or allowing the agency to concentrate those resources on other problems.
C o o p e r a t iv e  Im p l e m e n t a t io n  at 554 (footnotes omitted). See also, Remarks of Commissioner, Securities & 
ange Commission, Steven M.H. Wallman, Institute o f International Bankers, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4, 1996) ("We must consider 
ing a new regulatory philosophy, one that is more goal oriented and less command-and-control oriented").
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See, e.g., c o o p e r a t iv e  Im p l e m e n t a t io n , supra note 73, at 598 ("The regulatory program that would be a good 
candidate for cooperative implementation is one in which complex regulations are applied to complex organizations in order 
to prevent harm from occurring, rather than merely to identify and punish violators"); John T. Scholz, Cooperation, 
Deterrence and the Ecology o f  Regulatory Enforcement," 18 L. & SOC' y  R e v . 179, 183 (1984) ("It is generally agreed that
A system o f enforced self-regulation of auditor independence offers a variety o f benefits. By establishing goals and 
requiring the firms to accomplish the goals, rules could be both simpler and more specific, and address circumstances at each 
firm that a centralized rule-maker may be unaware of, or unable to address.276 By placing the responsibility on individual 
firms to establish and enforce regulations, the system would provide the flexibility necessary for changes in services offered 
and other developments, and keep the regulatory regime in close touch with each firm 's circumstances. Commitment to self- 
generated rules would likely be strengthened and made more effective 277
For global professional services firms subject to the standards o f more than one country, performance standards will 
greatly facilitate compliance with independence rules both within and outside the United States 278 A system of self- 
generated rules would also permit the ISB to recognize the validity of different approaches developed internationally and in 
other countries to the safeguarding o f independence. This may foster the further interest in the development of international 
principles-based standards, without sacrificing the goals o f U.S. regulation.
C. Im plem entation of Enforced Self-Regulation
Many federal agencies, including the SEC itself, have adopted enforced self-regulatory models to achieve 
better adherence to statutory policies. Several examples are discussed below.
cooperative strategies are most important when the complexity o f compliance situations makes it impossible to specify in 
unambiguous legal rules the behavior required to achieve intended policy purposes.").
276
C o o p e r a t iv e  Im p l e m e n t a t io n  supra note 73, at 554 (observing that "[cooperative implementation has great 
potential to produce better regulation, and to produce it more efficiently, because the regulated entities themselves would be 
developing the regulations....[theoretically, this should result in better standards and greater compliance.").
277
Id. (noting that "[r]ules developed by the regulated entity itself should have the inherent advantage o f being 
perceived as reasonable by those who must comply.").
278
Several international organizations have already proposed auditor ethics codes that include discussion of auditor 
independence. Perhaps the most widely recognized o f these codes is the International Federation of Accountants' Code of 
Ethics for Public Accountants. See International Federation o f Accountants, c o d e  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  E t h ic s  f o r  
P r o f e s s io n a l  A c c o u n t a n t s  18 (1996). Other codes include the European Contact Group's Code o f Conduct. See 
European Contact Group, R e s p o n d in g  t o  M a r k e t  E x p e c t a t io n s : A n  A c t io n  P l a n  t o  R e d u c e  t h e  E x p e c t a t io n  G a p  
8 (July 1996).
1. Federal Securities Laws
In recent years, Congress has acknowledged the advantages o f enforced self-regulation under the 
federal securities laws. Pursuant to Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act o f 1940 (the "Advisers Act") 279 and 
Section 15(f) o f the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 (the "Exchange Act")280 Congress obligated regulated entities to 
implement their own, individually-tailored rules to detect and prevent conduct Congress determined to be detrimental to the 
public interest. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 17j-l281 under the Investment Company Act o f 1940,282 the SEC has adopted 
strategies o f enforced self-regulation. Each o f these examples demonstrates the viability of enforced self-regulation as 
applied to the objectives o f the securities laws.
a) Sections 204A and 15(f)
Multiservice securities firms may face internal conflicts of interest where, for example,
the investment banking group of a firm comes into possession of material, nonpublic information that could be of value to the
retail and institutional brokerage group. In spite o f the possibility of conflicts o f interest (and the risk of insider trading),
neither the SEC nor Congress has prohibited multiservice securities firms from providing particular services. Instead, in
1988, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act o f 1988, which added Section 15(f) to the
Exchange Act and Section 204A to the Advisers Act. In identical language, those provisions state that:
Every registered broker or dealer [or investment adviser] shall establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of such 
broker's or dealer's [investment adviser's] business, to prevent the misuse in violation o f this title, or the 
rules and regulations thereunder, o f material, nonpublic information by such broker or dealer [investment 
adviser] or any person associated with such broker or dealer [investment adviser].283
279
15 U.S.C. 80b 4a (1994).
280
15 U.S.C. 78o(f) (1994).
281
17 C.F.R. 270.17j-l (1997).
282
15 U.S.C. 80a 1 to 80a 64 (1994).
283
In other words, rather than try to "eliminate the risk" o f insider trading, Congress opted to require firms to adopt 
prophylactic measures to prevent the occurrence o f the evil being addressed. Congress thereby avoided regulatory 
overbreadth.
In March, 1990, the SEC Staff undertook a study o f broker-dealer efforts to develop such codes, which, in practice, 
have involved erecting so-called "Chinese Walls" to prevent the flow o f information between employees in different parts of 
a broker-dealer's business organization.284 The Staff "determined that the necessary improvements to the efficient operation 
of broker-dealer Chinese Walls would be best effectuated, not by Commission rulemaking, but by vigorous self-regulatory 
examination programs, supplemented by Commission oversight."285
b) Rule 17j-l
Rule 17j-l requires each investment company to adopt an individualized, firm-tailored, 
"code o f ethics" to regulate the personal securities trading of its employees, with a view to detecting and sanctioning 
employees who engage in personal securities transactions in a manner detrimental to firm clients 286 The SEC rejected a 
prohibition on personal securities trading by such firms' employees, recognizing that the benefits to the marketplace of 
permitting such trading outweighed the potential harm that it might cause.287 Instead, the SEC decentralized the regulation 
o f employee personal trading, relying on each regulated entity to determine the best means to address the problem (and 
providing strong incentives for the firms to do so). As the SEC observed:
284
See 8 Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, s e c u r it ie s  r e g u l a t io n  3621-23 (3d ed. 1991). While, in the broker-dealer 
context this flow of information can be detrimental to the public interest, in the very different context o f a multiservice 
auditing and consulting firm, the flow o f information between auditors and consultants enhances the audit function and 
furthers the public interest. See discussion in Section III, supra.
285
Broker Dealer Policies and Procedures Designed to Segment the Flow and Prevent the Misuse o f Material Non- 
Public Information, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520, at 80,629 (Mar. 1990).
286
Specifically, the codes are to be designed to "prevent . . . associated persons [of investment companies] from 
engaging in fraudulent practices or manipulative activities in connection with the purchase or sale by such persons of 
securities held or to be acquired by investment companies." See Personal Investment Activities o f Investment Company 
Personnel and Codes o f Ethics o f Investment Companies and their Investment Advisers and Principal Underwriters, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 21341, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,653, at 87,011 (Sept. 
8, 1995).
287
See R e p o r t  o f  SEC D iv is io n  o f  In v e s t m e n t  M a n a g e m e n t  o n  P e r s o n a l  In v e s t m e n t  A c t iv it ie s  o f  
In v e s t m e n t  C o m p a n y  P e r s o n n e l  27-28 (Sept. 1994).
The variety o f employment and institutional arrangements utilized by different 
investment companies renders impractical a rule designed to cover all conceivable possibilities. Moreover, 
as a matter o f policy the Commission believes the introduction and tailoring of ethical restraints on the 
behavior of persons associated with an investment company can best be left in the first instance to the 
directors of the investment company.288
Responding to this mandate, regulated entities have developed a wide variety o f codes tailored to their individual 
circumstances.289
2. Com m unity Reinvestm ent Act ("CRA") Perform ance-Based Standards
The CRA directs the bank regulatory agencies to publish regulations to carry out the purposes of 
the CRA, which was enacted to eliminate the practice of "redlining," or the denial o f credit on properties in the local 
community in which the bank is chartered wholly because o f their geographic location in areas perceived to have a high risk 
o f default.290 The CRA does not contain any substantive requirements regarding an institution's investment in its local 
community. Instead, using a variety of assessment factors, the institution's regulatory agency evaluates the extent to which 
the institution is meeting the credit needs o f its community, and provides each institution with a CRA "rating," based on the 
results of the assessment. Under the CRA regulations previously in effect (the "Procedure-Based Regulations"), the bank 
regulatory agencies considered twelve separate factors in determining a depository institution's CRA rating.291
288
Investment Company Act Release No. 11421, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,679, at 
83,735 (Oct. 31, 1980).
289
See In v e s t m e n t  C o m p a n y  In s t it u t e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A d v is o r y  G r o u p  o n  P e r s o n a l  In v e s t in g , Appendix II 
(May 9, 1994). Codes generally include pre-clearance requirements for personal securities transactions and restrictions on 
personal transactions during periods in which trades are executed with company funds.
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12 U.S.C. 2905 (1994). The recitation of congressional findings and statement o f purpose states that "regulated 
financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs o f the local communities in 
which they are chartered." 12 U.S.C. 290l(a)(3)(1994). The respective federal bank regulatory agencies' regulations are 
substantively parallel to one another. For a discussion o f the CRA, generally, see Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig, 
Alisa Babitz, et al., T h e  F a ir  L e n d in g  G u id e  8 .0 1  (1995) ("T h e  Fa ir  L e n d in g  G u id e ").
291
These factors focused on a depository institution's efforts to ascertain the credit needs o f its entire community, its
efforts to market its products to its entire community and its compliance with procedural requirements, including the
obligation to delineate the local communities that comprise the institution's entire community, prepare a CRA statement, 
post a CRA notice and maintain a CRA file. Id. at 8.03.
In July 1993, President Clinton asked the bank regulatory agencies to implement reforms to streamline and clarify 
the Procedure-Based Regulations, which were regularly criticized for emphasizing paperwork over results.292 After 
considering a number o f alternatives, in May 1995, the bank regulatory agencies adopted revised CRA regulations (the 
"Performance-Based Regulations") 293 Pursuant to the Performance-Based Regulations, the bank regulatory agencies now 
assess the performance o f institutions subject to the CRA by evaluating their performance measured by standards relating to 
lending, investment and service 294 The Performance-Based Regulations permit the regulators to tailor the assessment 
mechanism to the institution (e.g., small institutions are assessed pursuant to streamlined performance standards for small 
banks). In addition, an institution may request that a regulator evaluate its CRA performance under a strategic plan designed 
by the institution and approved by the regulator.
3. EPA 's Project XL
On March 16, 1995, President Clinton announced a number of reinvention initiatives' to be 
implemented by the EPA, as part of a strategy to improve public health and environmental protection at a more reasonable 
co st295 One o f these initiatives, called "Project XL," is a national pilot program to test new approaches for meeting
292
Remarks Announcing the Community Development Banking and Finance Initiative, 29 W e e k l y  C o m p . P r e s . 
D o c . 1339 (July 15, 1993). An historical treatment o f the criticism o f the Procedure-Based Regulations, as well as the 
response of Congress, regulators, and consumer and community groups to the President's directive, may be found in  T h e  
F a ir  L e n d in g  G u id e , supra note 290, at 8 .04[A]. Shortly after the President's remarks, the bank regulatory agencies 
proposed a revised approach to the CRA. Although the 1993 proposal was not adopted, the agencies' remarks regarding the 
CRA as it was then implemented, encapsulate the sentiments o f both regulated entities and those intended to benefit from 
the regulation:
Despite the CRA's notable successes, bank and thrift industry, community, consumer 
ther groups maintain that its full potential has not been realized, in large part, because compliance efforts have been 
ed on process at the expense o f performance.
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (Dec. 21,
)•
293
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (May 4, 1995).
294
T h e  Fa ir  L e n d in g  G u id e , supra note 290 , at 8 .04[8][C ].
295
Remarks on Regulatory Reform 31 w e e k l y  COMP. p r e s . Doc. 426 (Mar. 16, 1995).
27,282 (May 23, 1995).
See also, 60 Fed. Reg. at
environmental protection goals.296 The EPA views Project XL as part of a "quest for a more efficient and results-oriented 
regulatory system."297 According to the EPA, Project XL "offers good actors - environmental leaders and today's average 
performers alike - a tremendous opportunity to think outside the box' of our current system and to find solutions to 
obstacles that limit environmental performance."298
4. OSHA's M aine 200 Program
The Maine 200 Program started in 1993 after OSHA examined M aine's workers' compensation 
data and determined that enforcement efforts were not having an adequate impact on the firms registering the highest number 
o f worker compensation claims. The mismatch was particularly troubling to OSHA because o f M aine's relatively high 
incidence o f hazards, injuries, and illness. Notwithstanding OSHA's vigorous enforcement efforts in Maine, including 
"award-winning" numbers of citations and numerous fines, Maine continued to have a disproportionate number of worker 
injuries. In the most demonstrable way, command and control was not working.
Determined to reduce escalating injury and illness claims, OSHA selected the 200 Maine companies with the 
highest volume of worker injury claims.299 OSHA then offered each employer on the list two options. The employers could 
either (i) choose to work with OSHA by themselves identifying and correcting hazards and implementing comprehensive 
company-drafted safety and health programs to sustain the effort, or (ii) opt for an increase in OSHA inspections. All but two 
o f the firms decided to enter into a compliance partnership with OSHA.
296
This is to be achieved by a partnership arrangement in which the EPA,
working with the states, enables individual companies to develop their own ways to 
ove the environment. Partners will be allowed to replace current requirements with alternative, company-developed 
 so long as they perform better than current rules and regulations, permit citizens to examine assumptions and track 
ess, ensure worker safety and environmental justice, are supported by the community and are enforceable.
G o v e r n m e n t , supra note 233 , at 70.
297
Environmental Protection Agency, Notice of Modifications to Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg. 19872 (Apr. 23, 1997).
298
Id.
299
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  U .S . D e p a r t m e n t  o f  L a b o r , O c c u p a t io n a l  Sa f e t y  a n d  H e a l t h  A d m in is t r a t io n , M a in e  
T o p  200 P r o g r a m  : 1995 W in n e r : In n o v a t io n s  in  A m e r ic a n  G o v e r n m e n t  A w a r d  (1995).
The program has been a success for the regulator, the companies and the workers. Over the eight years before the 
program, OSHA identified some 37,000 hazards at 1,316 work sites. In the first three years o f the program, employers 
identified 180,000 workplace hazards and corrected 128,000 of them. More importantly, after two years o f the program, the 
participants' injury rate had fallen by 35%.300
OSHA is now introducing variations o f the Maine 200 Program nationwide, under the name "Cooperation 
Compliance Programs." After operating these programs in nine states, OSHA expects to implement them nationwide during 
October 1997.301
5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation o f Operator Testing and 
Plant Maintenance
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") has regulatory responsibility302 for assuring the 
protection of the public health and safety from radiological hazards at the more than 100 nuclear power reactors located at 
some 50 power plant sites throughout the U.S. These plants and reactors are remarkable in their diversity - in terms of power 
rating, design, number of reactors per plant, service area, the mix of nuclear and conventional facilities operated by the utility 
owner, and number o f owners. The NRC is responsible for assuring that each licensee operates its plants safely. By means 
of adopting a decentralized approach in certain aspects o f its regulation, the NRC does what it is best capable of doing - 
overseeing the performance of its facility licensees - and requires the licensees to fulfill their operational responsibilities 
through programs and plant-specific goals which each licensee has designed.
300
Id. The firms represented only about one percent o f the state's employers, but accounted for 45 percent o f the 
workplace injuries, illnesses and fatalities.
301
New OSHA Program, N a T'L . L. J . , Sept. 22, 1997, at A13.
302
As the NRC has repeatedly made clear, operational responsibility for the plants is with the facility licensees 
(typically, electric power utilities). The NRC views its job not as telling the licensee how to run its plant, but only assuring 
that the licensee does so safely in compliance with the law and regulations.
For example, the N RC's newly adopted nuclear plant maintenance rule303 sets broad standards304 (with licensee- 
established specific goals) and leaves it to the facility licensee, who is most familiar with the plant and its equipment, to 
devise the monitoring plan by which those goals and standards will be m et305 The NRC then reviews that monitoring plan 
for its adequacy 306
Likewise, rather than itself drafting, proctoring or grading the written tests for individuals who are nuclear reactor 
operators, the NRC (following a voluntary pilot testing program by some utilities) recently proposed to turn that 
responsibility over to the facility licensees.307 The NRC would not mandate the questions to be asked on the tests. Instead, it 
has described the required content o f the written examinations and operating tests in terms o f the regulatory goals to be 
achieved, identified the general subject areas and safety-related systems to be covered,308 and will review and approve future
303
10 C.F.R. 50.65 (1997).
304
10 C.F.R. 50.65(a)(1) begins as follows: "Each holder of a license to operate a nuclear power p lan t . . .  shall 
monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and components . . .  are capable o f fulfilling then- 
intended functions. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account 
industry-wide operating experience."
305
Similarly, the U.S. Department o f Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration ("BXA") has implemented a 
program called the Special Comprehensive License ("SCL") to streamline the licensing process for certain exports and 
export-related activities to certain countries. 15 C.F.R. 752 (1997). Because BXA controls may be imposed for national 
security, human rights, anti-terrorism, and a variety o f other reasons, exporters are frequently required to obtain multiple 
licenses for essentially repetitive transactions, often over an extended period. To avoid such multiple licensing, the SCL 
authorizes these exports and activities without resort to case-by-case review. A key element o f SCL application process is 
the development and implementation by the applicant o f an Internal Control Program designed to provide assurance that 
exports and re-exports will not be made in a manner contrary to what BXA would have permitted on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. at 752.11 BXA thus leaves the task o f creating a solution to the applicant, and considers only the adequacy o f the 
result in assessing the SCL application.
306
When a structure, system or component "does not meet established goals," the rule states that "appropriate 
corrective action shall be taken." 10 C.F.R. 50.65(a)(l)(1997).
307
62 Fed. Reg. 42,426-30 (Aug. 7, 1997), proposing to amend 10 C.F.R. Part 55, Subpart E (1997).
308
See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. 55.41(a), which states, in part:
examinations and operating tests. The NRC would provide a guidance document on preparing the examinations, and has 
enunciated broad norms for preserving the integrity o f the testing process.309 The agency requires its facility licensees to 
adopt their own means o f assuring integrity, in accordance with NRC guidance310 and imposes sanctions should they fail to 
implement effective mechanisms.311
D. Conclusion
In his 1979 article on regulatory reform, then-professor Stephen Breyer set forth three general principles 
for effective governmental regulation:
• aim at the worst cases, and in attacking these cases regulators should seek simple rules.
•  rely upon incentives and bargaining whenever possible to induce more acceptable behavior.
•  look at economic regulation through a procompetitive lens and adopt a "least restrictive alternative" 
approach.
Content. The written examination for an operator will contain a representative 
tion o f questions on the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform licensed operator duties. The knowledge, 
, and abilities will be identified, in part, from learning objectives derived from a systematic analysis o f licensed 
tor duties performed by each facility licensee and contained in its training program and from information [in various 
ty-specific reports filed by the facility licensee with the NRC.]
309
The regulations at 55 .49  provide that "[A]pplicants, licensees and facility licensees shall not engage in any 
activity that compromises the integrity o f any application, test, or examination required by this part." 10 C.F.R. 5 5 .49  
(1997).
310
See, N U R E G  1021: O p e r a t o r  L ic e n s in g  E x a m in a t io n  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  P o w e r  R e a c t o r s  Interim Rev. 8 
(Jan. 1997).
311
There are other examples o f such firm-centered compliance programs. For instance, in 1986, in response to 
concerns regarding the business ethics o f defense industry participants, executives from major defense contracting 
corporations formulated Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct ("DII"), a voluntary program for 
industry self-regulation. See C o n d u c t  a n d  R e s p o n s ib il it y : A  R e p o r t  t o  t h e  P r e s id e n t  (1986). Companies 
participating in DII must agree to adopt and implement "a set of principles o f business ethics and conduct that acknowledge 
and address their corporate responsibilities under federal procurement laws and to the public." Id. at 42. Among other 
things, a DII participant agrees to adopt a written code o f conduct, tailored to the company's own circumstances, and agrees 
to implement related training and communications programs. In this regard, the DII performs a role similar to the ISB 
guidelines, except that, as befits a profession, the ISB's approach will be mandatory and builds on an existing system of 
self-regulation that is deeply rooted in the accounting profession. Similarly, organizations have adopted codes in response 
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The codes are designed assure that the adopting organization has effectively ensured 
that it is in compliance with applicable federal laws.
Sixteen years later, President Clinton made the same point in setting forth what he expected of those in his 
Administration responsible for adopting and implementing regulations:
I am instructing all regulators to go over every single regulation and cut those regulations which 
are obsolete, to work toward results, not red tape, to get out of Washington and to go out into the 
country to create grass roots partnerships with the people who are subject to these regulations and
to negotiate rather than dictate wherever possible.
*  *  *
We should ask ourselves, Do we really need this regulation? Could private businesses
do this just as well with some accountability to us?
*  *  *
I want to convene immediately groups consisting of the frontline regulators and the 
people affected by their regulations . . .  Most people in business in this country know 
that there is a reason for these . . .  areas o f regulations. And most people would be more 
than happy to work to find a way that would reduce hassle and still achieve the public 
interest we seek to achieve.
*  *  *
. . .  I want to move from a process where lawyers write volumes to one where people 
create partnerships based on common objectives and common sense. I want each 
regulatory agency head to submit to the White House a list of pending procedures that 
can be converted into consensual negotiations.312
Section V of this White Paper describes a new conceptual framework for auditor independence that builds upon the 
enforced self-regulation model.
V. Proposal for a N ew  Conceptual Fram ew ork
This White Paper sets forth the following new conceptual framework for auditor independence. As discussed in 
Section IV, regulation of independence in the public interest can best achieve its goals not through "command and control" 
directives, but rather by building on the concept that auditing professionals and their firms have a fundamental obligation to 
establish and enforce policies that provide reasonable assurance to investors that those responsible for the performance of an 
audit are objective, act with integrity and therefore maintain their independence. These regulatory policy considerations are 
aligned with the economic, behavioral and ethical determinants of audit firm and auditor behavior described in Section III.
312
Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. D oc. 278, 280 (Feb. 21, 1995).
The new framework would call for the ISB to provide clear guidance regarding the core principles o f independence, and then 
require firms to implement those principles through their own compliance codes, subject to ISB oversight.
A. A  Principles-Based System
A primary objective o f the ISB is "the development o f principles-based independence standards."313 The 
accounting profession has strongly supported movement away from a regime of detailed independence rules to a set of 
principles-based codes. Accordingly, this White Paper suggests that the ISB should consider and adopt certain core 
principles as the basis for a new set of independence guidance replacing the detailed rules it has adopted provisionally. The 
independence principles articulated by the ISB should be broadly worded distillations of what common sense, professional 
history, and rigorous analysis o f the complete range of incentives shaping the auditor-client relationship tell us are the threats 
which must be counteracted or mitigated in order to protect and enhance the objectivity o f the auditor.
Based on a general consensus in the profession regarding the primary considerations affecting auditor 
independence,314 and as explained in more detail below, this White Paper proposes that the ISB adopt the following core 
principles:
•Auditors and firms should not be financially dependent upon an audit client;
•Auditors and firms should not have conflicting interests that would impair their objectivity with regard to 
matters affecting the financial statements; and,
313
Discussion Paper re: Independence Standards Board (May 7, 1997), referenced in Letter from Richard H. Walker, 
General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission to Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, AICPA (May 16, 1997).
314
Various prior analyses of auditor independence have described principles o f auditor independence. In each 
instance, the professional body responsible for the analysis has identified a common set o f issues the independence issues 
posed by financial dependence upon an audit client, by conflicts of interest involving an audit client, and by assumption o f 
an inappropriate role vis-a-vis an audit client. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson & Co., et al., The Public Accounting Profession: 
Meeting the Needs o f  a Changing World (Jan. 1991) (describing four principles); AICPA SECPS Task Force, A New  
Approach to Auditor Independence (1992) (proposing three principles). In a similar vein, recent professional guidance 
issued in the United Kingdom attempts to categorize challenges to independence and identifies five types of potential 
threats. See Statement on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence (Apr. 1996).
•Auditors and firms should not have relationships with, or engage in activities for, clients that would entail 
making managerial decisions or otherwise serve to impair an auditor's objectivity.
The ISB should also recognize that risks or threats to achievement of the core principles o f independence set forth 
above can be averted or mitigated in many instances by appropriate compensating controls (i.e., safeguards), and that firms 
should be encouraged to put in place and enforce specific safeguards to protect independence.315 Further, although it is 
neither a principle o f independence per se nor a safeguard, the ISB's new conceptual framework should recognize the 
importance o f materiality. Materiality, a pervasive concept in accounting and auditing, is a factor which, although not always 
stated, is almost always relevant to the question of whether a potential threat to an auditor's independence creates an 
unacceptable risk of impairing his or her objectivity.
Thus, and as discussed in detail below, the ISB 's approach to independence should reflect the following 
considerations:
•Immaterial interactions between an auditor or firm and an audit client should be presumed not to impair auditor 
independence, absent evidence to the contrary; and,
•Many potential risks or threats to independence can be mitigated by appropriate safeguards.
Once the ISB has adopted core principles of independence, these principles should be cooperatively implemented 
through a process involving the ISB, the profession, and individual firms which audit public entities. As discussed below, the 
initial process would consist of several distinct stages:316
•The ISB would issue detailed explanatory "guidelines" expanding upon the independence principles and 
setting forth the types o f risks and threats that firms will need to address in implementing those principles, as well as the 
considerations (e.g., materiality, safeguards) that affect independence judgments.
315
As discussed in Section II supra, professional services firms already have instituted many safeguards in connection 
with their own risk management programs, as well as in response to particular requirements the profession has adopted for 
those firms which audit public entities.
316
This process is illustrated in Figure 1.2 supra.
•The IIC would create a "drafting guide" to aid firms requiring assistance in the formulation o f their codes. 
This drafting guide would provide illustrative examples of safeguards that negate or reduce particular threats to 
independence.
•Each auditing firm would create and adopt an independence code (applying the guidelines) in order to 
implement and internally enforce the ISB's independence principles. Codes must be put in place within a reasonable 
transition period (e.g., three years) to be established by the ISB.317
The ISB guidelines, by identifying the specific risks or threats that firms should address in implementing the core 
principles o f independence, would act, in effect, as the equivalent of the proposing releases that federal agencies have used to 
commence their own analogous regulatory reform initiatives.318 The guidelines would allow the ISB to indicate the relative 
weight that it assigns to the various potential threats to auditor independence, suggest appropriate considerations which could 
serve to counteract or mitigate those threats, such as the imposition of specific safeguards, and identify those unusual 
instances where considerations of public policy might override the results of a normal independence analysis.319
As a practical matter, small and mid-sized firms may require additional assistance, as well as time, in formulating 
appropriate codes. Therefore, it is suggested that the IIC review existing independence rules and the profession's practices, 
and then produce a "drafting guide" to facilitate such firms' participation in the new system.320 (There might even be
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This transition mechanism is suggested in order to accommodate small and mid-sized firms, which otherwise 
might be unable to develop codes in a timely manner. During a firm 's transition period, if  any, it would continue to be 
governed by the existing system o f rules and interpretations.
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See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27282 
(May 23, 1995) (describing the XL program to improve environmental protection through reduced but targeted regulation, 
project criteria, and the selection process for individual facilities and/or industry sectors). See also, text accompanying 
notes 296-299 infra.
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In other words, the ISB should retain the option to allow firms to undertake a relationship or activity that might 
pose an abstract threat to independence but that, in actuality, serves the public interest, whether by producing a more 
effective audit or otherwise. See Wallman, supra note 10, at 91. For example, the current independence rules have, in 
effect, taken such public policy considerations into account in finding that provision o f tax advisory services is acceptable in 
terms of audit independence, notwithstanding the potential for self-review.
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Similarly, when it became necessary for investment companies to draft codes o f ethics to regulate the personal 
securities trading o f those companies' portfolio managers, the Investment Company Institute (the "ICI") prepared a 
"drafting guide" to facilitate that process.
multiple drafting guides intended for different size firms.) Such a drafting guide would provide, through examples, direction 
as to the appropriate resolution of issues raised in the ISB guidelines tailored to the requirements o f those firms.
Those firms participating in the new system o f firm-specific independence codes would elaborate upon and apply 
the ISB 's core independence principles. Some firms would choose to participate in this new system right away; others might 
opt to remain under the prior independence requirements applicable to auditors o f public entities for a reasonable transition 
period (not to exceed three years). Firms that require some time to adopt codes, or that wish to wait and avail themselves of 
codes developed by similarly situated firms, could use this transition rule to remain under the existing independence 
regulations while the new system evolves. After three years, the ISB also would review how well the new process is 
achieving the Board's stated goals for independence before definitively retiring that portion o f the old SEC rules not 
consistent with the ISB guidelines.
Each participating firm would address the specific independence issues identified in the guidelines and drafting 
guide(s). The firm would then craft specific self-regulatory solutions consistent with the guidelines and include them in its 
independence code. The code would be expected to detail the safeguards designed to insulate audit partners and other 
members of the audit team from influences and pressures which could undermine their objectivity. In many instances, the 
guidelines would identify a range o f pre-approved safeguards as appropriate ways to address each particular threat to 
independence; in others, the guidelines would set forth criteria for firms to meet in designing appropriate safeguards. A firm's 
code should be appropriate to its size, its organizational structure (and affiliations) and the nature o f its practice. Under this 
new system, then, firms would aggressively address the threats applicable to their own auditor independence - by designing 
and putting in place safeguards to assure the independence of the firm and of the audit team.321 These safeguards, for 
example, would serve to prevent a "free-riding" audit partner (as previously discussed in Section III) from pursuing his or her 
personal interests at the expense of the firm 's collective need to maintain its reputation. Compliance with the safeguards 
would be subject to periodic testing as part o f the regular peer review process (as described below).
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Firm codes would not represent professional standards as such, but rather would set forth safeguards through 
which professional standards (e.g., the ISB 's principles and guidelines) would be applied. The independence standards 
themselves would continue to be enforceable, just as they are today, by the SEC, the AICPA and State Boards of 
Accountancy.
Each firm 's code would be filed with the ISB and thus would become public. Public filing would provide an 
opportunity for investors and firm clients to understand firm s' independence codes, and would facilitate firms' comparison of 
their own independence codes with those of their peers. This transparency could foster competition among firms to develop 
measures most valued by investors, in effect creating a market in superior independence safeguards and establishing the 
conditions for a potential "race to the top."322 Public filing would also provide firms an additional incentive to comply with 
the provisions they set forth in their codes. Further, in contrast to the present system, in which some o f the guidance o f the 
SEC Staff remains unavailable to the public,323 public filing would engender more open discussion of independence issues, 
giving the codes the educational aspect and moral force that an effective independence regime should possess.
Moreover, additional mechanisms would likely be adopted to ensure that firms put in place and continue to apply 
proper safeguards for auditor independence, as well as to encourage the continued evolution o f codes in the direction of more 
effective safeguards to assure independence, as follows:
•The ISB should be empowered to review firm  codes, assess whether a code contains a comprehensive and 
effective set o f safeguards, and retain the option to disapprove inadequate codes.
•The IIC should analyze the codes adopted by firms and distill from them a set of "best practices" to inform the 
creation of new codes and the evolution o f existing ones.
•Firm-wide independence codes will facilitate the process o f testing auditor independence through peer review. 
(Peer review refers to periodic examination by other accountants o f a SECPS member firm 's audit quality control systems.)
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See In t e r a c t iv e  C o r p o r a t e  C o m p l ia n c e , supra note 261, at 144. The authors note, for example, that:
The nurturance of interactive compliance would require construction o f model programs o f 
compliance. High-complying corporations could provide some kind of model for others in the same regulated group. This flagship 
ach to compliance would create competition among firms to provide the prototype for industry compliance. Competition is 
osed to be one o f the chief characteristics o f a capitalist economy.
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See Checkosky v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 23 F.3d 452,482-483 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concurring opinion, 
J. Randolph) (describing the SEC's use o f an unpublished opinion in connection with a Rule 2(e) proceeding, and 
explaining the problems inherent in a regulator's reliance upon unpublished opinions and interpretations).
Firm codes would be subject to ISB review for content and quality.324 The review process would assess whether 
the codes address threats to independence in a clear and comprehensive manner and contain sufficient detail to give 
meaningful guidance.325 The ISB would have the option to disapprove codes (or portions thereof) that are not consistent 
with the core independence principles, as amplified by the guidelines. Firms would submit to the ISB subsequent 
amendments to firm codes, subject also to ISB review. Firm codes and subsequent amendments would be deemed to be 
approved unless explicitly disapproved (in whole or in part).
Selective ISB review would serve three principal functions. First, it would enable the ISB to develop unique 
competence in assessing independence codes. Second, it could identify potential deficiencies in individual codes and help 
resolve them. This resolution process would enable any firm whose code was the subject of ISB review to explain the factors 
relevant to its particular practice, as well as to draw upon the expertise of the ISB and its staff. The goal would be for the firm 
to craft a code that responded to the realities o f the firm 's practice and fully safeguarded the independence of the firm and its 
auditors. Finally, ISB review would foster greater transparency, and thus enable investors to assure themselves that firms 
have adopted codes that protect auditor independence.
As the ISB itself develops unique experience with and competence in assessing firm safeguards, it could use the 
codes, taken as a body, as a compendium of practice that might prove helpful as new interpretive issues arise. The IIC, to 
facilitate this process, should conduct a detailed review of codes submitted to the ISB and distill from them "best practices." 
The best practices (i.e., exemplary safeguards) identified by these independence experts could serve as benchmarks and, if 
adopted by the ISB, could become standards for the profession. Like the public filing requirement, the IIC 's efforts to
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The ISB could be assisted in its review o f selected firm independence codes by its professional staff and/or by the 
IIC. The IIC is charged, among other tilings, to "address broader interpretive issues, including those that emerge from 
inquiries fielded by the ISB staff," as well as "other duties * * * assigned to it by the Board." Discussion Paper re: 
Independence Standards Board, supra note 313, at 4.
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Given the number o f public accounting firms, ISB review, even o f selected codes, might be perceived by some as 
imposing too great an administrative cost. However, two factors would reduce administrative costs and logistical problems. 
First, groups o f affiliated firms would likely develop codes on a joint basis, thereby reducing the number of codes submitted 
to the ISB. Also, as previously noted, the IIC would publish one or more "drafting guides" to assist small and mid-sized 
firms in the preparation o f their codes. The existence o f these guides would assist firms in drafting codes, thereby reducing 
the review burden o f the ISB and/or its staff.
formulate best practices would assist the ongoing development of better independence codes. Professional services firms 
with effective policies valued by investors would be rewarded in the market. Moreover, the IIC 's ongoing efforts to 
formulate best practices, based upon review of compliance codes by these independence experts, would complement and 
extend its initial effort to provide guidance by means of the drafting guide(s).
Finally, review of firms' compliance with their independence codes would continue to be a major element o f the 
regular peer review process, in order to provide assurance to investors that each firm applies its code in a manner that protects 
auditor independence in conformity with the ISB's principles and guidance. Each peer reviewer would test the subject firm 's 
compliance with its independence code provisions. According to the SEC, peer review provides "added assurance to 
investors, creditors and clients that an accountant is consistently complying with professional standards."326 While peer 
review already tests a firm 's independence,327 a requirement for all firms to adopt and comply with detailed independence 
codes would render peer review even more effective with respect to the efficacy o f safeguards. Strengthening the 
consideration given independence in the peer review process, through the widespread use of detailed independence codes for 
individual firms, would likewise reinforce auditors' commitment to maintaining independence from audit clients.
B. ISB Guidelines on Independence Issues
The ISB, in its guidelines, would describe a methodology for analyzing independence issues and creating 
appropriate independence codes at the firm level. For each firm, the first step would be to apply the ISB 's independence 
principles and address potential threats to the independence o f an auditor or professional services firm. The independence 
principles that the profession is recommending to the ISB are described below, with illustrations o f how these core principles 
can serve as a basis to address the independence issues faced daily by members o f the accounting profession. Each firm
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Independent Accountants - Mandatory Peer Review, Securities Act Release No. 6695, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,122, at 88,641 (Apr. 1, 1987). Similarly, the Commission has indicated its belief that peer review 
"reinforces an accountant's commitment to the maintenance o f adequate audit quality controls." Id. at 88,644.
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See, e.g., AICPA, SEC Practice Section Peer Review Program Manual 13242-49, 13342-45 (1997) (both the 
quality control questionnaire filled out by the subject firm prior to commencement o f the review and the program guidelines 
used by the reviewer address "Independence, Integrity and Objectivity").
would then consider a series of questions in determining how to address different, potential threats to independence, as 
follows:
•Is the risk or threat o f impairment material? (If not, it would normally require no further response);
•Next, are there safeguards that could effectively counteract the potential impairment? (If so, such safeguards 
should be adopted as part o f the firm code);
•Finally, is this one o f the rare cases when a public policy consideration indicates that the normal result of the 
independence analysis should be varied? (If so, the situation should be brought to the attention o f the ISB.)
The ISB guidelines would explicitly discuss how firms should apply each o f these considerations materiality, 
safeguards and (if present) additional public policy considerations when designing independence codes.
1. M ateriality
Materiality, a familiar and fundamental concept in accounting and auditing, should almost always 
be a relevant consideration in assessing whether an auditor can successfully resist a potential threat to his or her 
independence. Moreover, materiality is a factor consistently deemed important by auditors, preparers and users of financial 
statements in reaching judgments as to an auditor's independence.328 Thus, immaterial interactions between an auditor or 
firm and an audit client should be presumed not to impair auditor independence, absent evidence to the contrary.
The SEC's independence requirements now explicitly address materiality only in certain contexts.329 For example, 
under those requirements materiality is considered relevant to many business relationships between auditors and clients 
(except for those which arise as a consumer in the normal course of business) - indirect business relationships are considered 
not to impair independence so long as they are immaterial, while even immaterial direct relationships are prohibited.330
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See, e.g., O r r e n  R e p o r t , supra note 97, at 6 -7  (with respect to business relationships).
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See John M. Lacey, Auditor/Client Joint Investments and Independence, 4 R e s . in  a c c t . REG. 129 (Gary John 
Previts, ed. 1990).
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While the SEC Staff reviews individual independence matters 
case,"331 its judgments as to the relative importance o f facts 
quantitative and qualitative materiality.332
"in the light o f all the pertinent circumstances in the particular 
often appear inconsistent with the common understanding of
Any past reluctance by the SEC explicitly to identify materiality as a relevant factor in making many independence 
judgments may relate simply to the size o f major accounting firms and o f their revenues. However, while firm-level 
measures often will constitute an appropriate yardstick for assessing materiality, they certainly are not the only measures that 
can be applied (for example, in assessing the relevance o f particular threats to the independence o f an individual audit partner 
or audit team). Not only would materiality be expressly identified as a factor relevant to making independence judgments, it 
should also be possible for the ISB guidelines to identify appropriate standards against which to assess the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects o f materiality with respect to most independence-related issues.333 Only in certain instances will a 
potential threat to independence be so great, or a practice so universally regarded as inappropriate, that materiality 
considerations should not apply. These areas would be identified by the ISB and set forth in the guidelines.
2. Safeguards
C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s  602.02.g, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C C H ) 73,272, at 62,905 
(1997). Despite this formal conception, the business relationship analysis as to whether a third entity dealing with the audit 
client is related to a professional services firm may subsume issues o f materiality (i.e., in assessing whether the third party is 
in fact affiliated with the firm).
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Id. at 602.02.a, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,257, at 62,885 (1997). See also, Rule 2-01(c), 17 C.F.R. 
210.2-01(c) (1997).
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Section IV supra describes a number o f instances where the SEC has explicitly or implicitly disregarded 
considerations o f materiality in reaching conclusions as to auditor independence.
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Materiality has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. For example, in the accounting context, while the 
FASB has stated that "[m ateriality judgments are primarily quantitative in nature," it has also specified that "magnitude by 
itself, without regard to the nature o f the item and the circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will not 
generally be [the] basis for a materiality judgment." FASB Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 123, 
125.
As discussed in Section II, the profession has long recognized the importance of appropriate 
safeguards as a means to mitigate potential threats to independence, for example, in the form of various quality control 
measures imposed by the SECPS (e.g., annual confirmation o f independence, partner rotation, concurring partner review, 
peer review).334 The ISB guidelines would identify types o f potential threats to the independence of a firm or an auditor, 
consistent with the principles enumerated above, and then describe the degree to which such threats can and should be 
addressed through safeguards. This safeguards-oriented approach would promote a measured and pragmatic response to 
threats to independence, matching threats and safeguards, and would impose a blanket proscription only where such a step 
was absolutely necessary (i.e., with respect to a limited number o f activities and relationships).
In certain instances, the ISB might find that a potential threat to independence was so serious that it could not be 
mitigated through any combination o f safeguards or that safeguards simply were not practicable (i.e., instances where there 
would be an absolute bar or "red light").335 In most cases, however, one would expect that an appropriate additional 
safeguard or set o f safeguards could mitigate a particular threat to independence (a "yellow light" situation). In such 
instances, the ISB would indicate in the guidelines what type of safeguards would be most effective in addressing each 
specific threat. Thus, for example, when the threat to independence is one that involves factors that could affect the 
objectivity of the engagement partner, it might be mitigated by (among other things) additional review by an industry expert 
or more extensive concurring partner review of the audit than would otherwise occur. Finally, in some other instances, 
threats to independence may be so attenuated that the normal level o f safeguards already associated with the profession's 
existing quality control efforts are sufficient to assure that independence will not be impaired.
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The importance of safeguards is also recognized in other countries; for example, in recent professional guidance 
issued in the United Kingdom  See Statement on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence (Apr. 1996). In particular, this 
Statement notes that "[a]uditors should always consider the use o f safeguards and procedures which may negate or reduce 
threats [and] should be prepared to demonstrate that in relation to each identified threat, they have considered the 
availability and effectiveness o f the safeguards and procedures and are satisfied that their objectivity in carrying out the 
assignment will be properly preserved." Id. at 3.1.
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For example, even though de minimis investments by a partner in a firm 's audit client may be immaterial to the 
partner, the costs o f monitoring and policing such investments might indicate the need for a blanket prohibition. Moreover, 
such a prohibition would be consistent with the profession's aspiration to avoid even an appearance that auditor 
independence might be impaired. Cf. Edwards, supra note 102, at 22-25, Appendix D.
Safeguards come in many forms, and the guidelines, where appropriate, could simply offer examples, indicate 
important characteristics o f the safeguards, and then invite firms that seek to perform certain services to design an adequate 
set of case-specific independence protections. This would allow firms to develop new mechanisms to address potential 
independence concerns. The ISB, of course, could assess whether those safeguards in fact are adequate through its review of 
firm codes, as described earlier.
Areas in which a firm could propose internal safeguards,336 as appropriate, in addition to the protections that exist in 
the environment o f the practice (e.g., professional obligations, litigation exposure, oversight by client audit committees), 
include:
•  Inculcating independence as a cornerstone o f firm  culture and values (e.g., training programs; 
consultative mechanisms for auditors facing independence issues; partner performance review and 
compensation policies);
•  Risk management procedures (e.g., client acceptance and continuance policies);
•  Organizational and structural solutions (e.g., Chinese Walls); and
• Internal accountability (e.g., monitoring of personal investments and related periodic individual 
confirmations; ability to communicate independence-related concerns to top levels o f the firm; concurring 
partner review; audit practice review; self-inspections and special procedures in circumstances of potential 
self-review).
3. Public Policy in Special Cases
As noted in former Commissioner Wallman's recent commentary on independence issues, there may be 
special cases where a relationship or activity that could pose a threat to independence should nonetheless be allowed, because 
it would "add to the ability o f the auditor to conduct a more efficient or effective audit or otherwise serve the public interest, 
in this particular case or in general, so that the public interest warrants permitting the activity or relationship."337 The ISB
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Section II supra lists representative quality control measures currently used by some or all o f the Big Six to 
address independence-related issues. For a discussion o f the types o f safeguards employed by the profession, and how those 
safeguards relate to auditors and their professional obligations, see B u r k e  R e p o r t , supra note 219, Appendix C and 
E d w a r d s  R e p o r t , supra note 102, at 22-25, Appendix D.
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See Wallman, supra note 10, at 91.
guidelines could identify such issues and specify a procedure through which additional considerations o f public policy could 
be brought to the ISB's attention when appropriate.
C. ISB Principles and Illustrative Guidelines
The principles o f independence should be broad in scope and thus not constitute mutually exclusive 
categories. Nevertheless, the ISB would be able, through its guidelines, to highlight major independence issues and articulate 
how they relate to one or more of the core principles it has adopted, as do the illustrative examples presented below. Thereby, 
the ISB can inform the profession as to the considerations, and the types of possible safeguards, that are most pertinent to 
various potential threats to auditor independence.
In recognition o f the inherent difficulties o f regulating on the basis o f appearance, as described in Section II, the ISB 
would direct firms to address threats to the appearance o f independence only where there is an adequate empirical 
foundation, and a clear need, for such measures. Even in the absence of an empirical foundation to support mandatory 
requirements, however, firms are constrained by certain appearance-based AICPA rules, and may well decide to forego 
particular opportunities that raise similar appearance concerns in order to maintain their professional self-image, or for 
purposes o f risk management.338
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As discussed in e d w a r d s  r e p o r t , supra note 102, Appendix D and in Section II supra, the profession views the 
appearance o f independence as an important aspiration for auditors and auditing firms, and, in that connection, has adopted 
certain appearance-based rules (which will remain in effect as professional requirements for all auditors).
1. Auditors and F irm s Should not be Financially Dependent Upon an Audit Client.
An auditor must always retain the capacity to perform an audit in an objective manner, since the 
very essence o f auditing is providing assurance as to reliability. Accordingly, auditors must avoid situations in which their 
judgment might be affected by the financial consequences of audit decisions they make regarding the reliability o f a client's 
financial statements. Further, the reputational value o f an audit firm 's opinion to the investing public is heightened to the 
degree that the firm and its auditors have interests that are distinct from those o f the audit client. Thus, the ISB should adopt 
the principle that, to be independent, an auditor must demonstrably lack financial dependence upon a particular audit client. 
The threat o f financial dependence may arise in a number o f areas, including, but not limited to:
•Auditor investment in an audit client;
•Revenues derived from a particular audit client;339
•Auditor compensation and incentives; and,
•Loans to or from an audit client to the auditor(s), including unpaid professional fees. 
For example, compensation for audit partners could give rise to a potential threat to independence if designed to reward 
partners for success in obtaining and retaining specific audit clients. Similarly, a firm with an established practice could be 
considered to be financially dependent if that firm or an autonomous unit o f that firm consistently obtains a material portion 
of its revenues from, or in cooperation with, an audit client.340
The guidelines should identify the threat to independence posed by such financial reliance and which threats are 
subject to mitigation through safeguards. Student loans from banking clients to individual auditors who have since graduated, 
for example, probably should be viewed as a "yellow light" situation, whereas investments by individual auditors in their
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As mentioned above, it may be appropriate to test relative dependence (i.e., materiality) not just with respect to the 
firm, but also in relation to particular regions or offices o f the firm.
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An appropriate quantitative "rule o f thumb" for such dependence might be a figure o f 15% of revenues, or 10% for 
a firm exceeding a certain size. This 15% figure is, in fact, the SEC's current "rule of thumb." A  similar standard has been 
proposed in the United Kingdom.
audit clients presumably would be barred. In the former instance, and in other "yellow light" cases, the guidelines would 
direct firms to put in place adequate safeguards and compensating controls at the level o f the firm, the audit team and the 
engagement partner. Thus, in the case o f an engagement partner or an audit team, overcoming a particular threat might 
require that specified quality control procedures be performed by individuals from another office or unit of the firm, or might 
necessitate additional review by an industry expert.
2. A uditors and Firm s Should not have Conflicting Interests tha t would Affect Their 
Objectivity with Regard to M atters Affecting the Financial Statements.
Under the profession's standards, an auditor's only interest in the financial statements o f a client 
should be in whether they present fairly, in all material respects, the client's financial position, results of operations, and cash 
flows in conformity with GAAP. Actual and potential conflicts of interest are unacceptable from an independence standpoint 
to the degree that they could interfere with an auditor's objective evaluation of the client's financial statements. These 
conflicts may take two forms - an interest directly adverse to the client or a self-interest otherwise inconsistent with objective 
performance o f an audit.
Interests adverse to clients not only tend to affect the auditor's objectivity, but can also impede client management's 
ability to communicate frankly with the auditor, and thus limit the ability o f the auditor and his or her firm to obtain all o f the 
information necessary to provide a reasonable basis for the firm's report. Thus, for these reasons, litigation where an audit 
client and an auditor have adverse interests will often serve to impair the auditor's objectivity. However, litigation unrelated 
to the audit involving claims that are immaterial with respect to both the firm and to the client's financial statements (e.g., 
billing disputes regarding non-audit services) would not usually be considered to imperil objectivity. As one example of how 
the ISB's guidelines could shape firm independence codes, the guidelines could identify the relevant considerations, and 
invite firms to explain how they would both insulate the auditing team from pressures arising from litigation and ensure that 
any litigation did not affect the flow of information between the auditor and client management.
Auditors should also avoid self-interest relative to material matters affecting the financial statements that would 
conflict with their role and duties as auditors, such as would exist when an auditor or the firm has a stake in the financial 
statements, the results of the audit or the success o f the audit client (i.e., an inappropriate mutuality o f interests). Such a stake 
can interfere with the objectivity with which an auditor examines information and reaches conclusions regarding the fairness 
o f those financial statements. A classic example o f a potential threat to independence which may be said to arise from a
mutuality o f interest would be a business relationship with an audit client where the firm and its client are jointly providing 
services to a third-party, including prime-subcontractor arrangements, strategic alliances, joint ventures, value added re-seller 
arrangements and co-investments.341 So long as the business relationship was immaterial, the relationship normally would 
be allowed. On the other hand, if the relationship proved to be material, it normally would be approached as a "yellow light" 
situation (requiring the application of appropriate safeguards to protect auditor independence), as discussed more fully 
below 342
Other examples of self-interest that may pose a threat to auditor independence include, but are not limited to, the 
following:
Auditor investment in an audit client;
A former firm partner who becomes affiliated with an audit client; and,
Preferential treatment provided to the auditor by the client (e.g., gifts).
One would use the same methodology applied to other potential threats to independence to analyze the various 
business relationships between auditors and their clients. For example, in the case of relationships where a professional 
services firm works with another entity to perform activities in furtherance o f the economic success of the endeavor (e.g., a 
prime-subcontractor relationship to install an audit client's software at a third-party site), one first would assess the 
materiality o f that alliance or business relationship to the revenues o f professional services firm and the audit client. Where 
pertinent, the materiality o f compensation derived from that relationship might also be assessed (using appropriate measures) 
with respect to the individual audit partner. Second, if the relationship is material, one would analyze whether any safeguards
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On occasion, business relationships involving an audit client may pose a potential threat not just in terms of 
mutuality o f interest but also with regard to the third core principle, the requirement not to assume managerial 
responsibility. As previously discussed, the core principles are not mutually exclusive. The breadth o f these core principles 
provides assurance that, taken together, they are sufficient to encompass the entire range of independence issues that a 
regulator should seek to address.
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Existing SEC rules and interpretations allow immaterial business relationships only when the relationship is 
indirect, and bar all direct relationships, even if  immaterial to both the auditor and the client. See c o d if ic a t io n  o f  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  Po l ic ie s , supra note 330, at 602.02.g.
could be applied to maintain the independence o f the professional services firm, such as structural or organizational solutions 
designed to insulate the engagement partner and the audit team from potential threats to independence. Another possible 
organizational safeguard, for example, would be for a firm to create a compliance team to monitor and review the audit work 
o f clients participating in specific business relationships (e.g. teaming) that could give rise to a potential threat to 
independence.343
3. A uditors and F irm s Should not have Relationships with, O r Engage in Activities for, 
Clients that would Entail M aking M anagerial Decisions O r Otherwise Serve to Im pair An Auditor's Objectivity.
Management bears ultimate responsibility for corporate decision-making and the presentation of a 
company's financial statements. An auditor's role is to express an independent opinion, for the benefit o f investors and others, 
regarding the fair presentation o f the financial statements prepared by management. By contrast, if  an auditor were to 
undertake managerial responsibility for a client's financial reporting decisions, that auditor might set aside the skeptical and 
objective view that is necessary to perform an independent audit. An auditor thus cannot be expected to be objective with 
regard to matters for which the auditor, or his or her firm, has assumed managerial responsibility.
On the other hand, when a professional services firm assists client management with professional services, there is 
no logical or empirical reason that would suggest the existence o f a threat to independence, so long as management reviews, 
understands and bears responsibility for adopting or rejecting the results of those services. This conclusion is strengthened 
when the professional services are of an essentially ministerial nature (e.g., routine maintenance of a computer network) and 
does not involve the exercise o f managerial discretion.
Examples o f relationships344 that may pose a threat to an auditor's independence include, but are not limited to, the 
following:
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To be effective in safeguarding the fact and the appearance o f independence, an internal compliance team would 
need (among other things) adequate resources, a direct reporting relationship with high levels in the firm, and an established 
protocol for testing independence.
Similarly, a compliance team, or some other additional level of internal review or inspection, might be an 
aproriate safeguard for outsourcing engagements. As discussed below, the potential threats posed by a typical outsourcing engagement will 
from those raised by most business relationships with third parties because there is the potential for self-review (in addition to any 
partial threat relating to inappropriate forms o f mutuality o f interest).
344
The auditor is an officer, director or employee o f an audit
•client;
The auditor or audit firm acts as a promoter or underwriter o f the client's business or its
securities; and,
A close relative of a member of the audit team is an officer, director or employee of an audit
client.
The profession has long recognized that independent auditors cannot become part of management, in the sense of 
making managerial decisions, and therefore may not hold an official position with a client (e.g., an officer or a director) that 
entails the assumption of such responsibilities. Thus, a blanket ban on auditors assuming these roles would be appropriate 
regardless of materiality considerations, safeguards or other factors, such as the relative size o f a director's annual fee.
In contrast, when auditors or professional services firms perform functions that do not involve the assumption of 
managerial responsibility, the independence analysis under the ISB's guidelines should involve the considerations previously 
outlined, including materiality and possible use o f safeguards in circumstances where a potential threat to independence may 
arise. For example, an outsourcing relationship that gives rise to the potential for self-review would be analyzed to see 
whether the firm 's relationship was truly inconsistent with performance o f an objective audit. Thus, in the case o f internal 
audit outsourcing, a firm would be expected to have adequate safeguards in place to provide reasonable assurance that there 
would be no improper assumption o f management responsibility. Making managerial decisions would be a prohibited "red 
light," but performing such an internal audit outsourcing (or "extended audit") engagement would not, provided that no 
managerial decisions are made. Such an engagement would be a "yellow light" situation where firms could proceed so long 
as appropriate safeguards were in place to mitigate the threat to independence by assuring that inappropriate activities do not 
occur.
Appropriate safeguards for an extended audit engagement would involve, for example, documenting an 
understanding in the engagement agreement that the auditor and client management each possess distinct responsibilities, and
As with other lists in this Section V, the following list of relationships that may pose a threat to independence is 
not intended to give rise to an inference that listed relationships actually do create a potential threat. Family relationship 
issues, in particular, can be quite complex.
that they share an understanding o f what those responsibilities will entail over the course o f the engagement. Further, the 
firm would need to assure itself that the client's board o f directors (e.g., the audit committee) was fully apprised of the terms 
of the engagement, and, in addition, might wish to supplement the client's monitoring o f the engagement with its own 
internal procedures for monitoring the respective activities. Interpretation 101-13, recently adopted by the AICPA under its 
Rules o f Conduct, contains a detailed discussion o f the various measures that the profession has identified as necessary 
protections for auditor independence in connection with internal audit outsourcing engagements.345
Another example o f a "yellow-light" situation would be an instance where a client has coded all client financial 
data, but such source data is subsequently processed on an auditing firm 's computer system. The current SEC approach, 
would bar even such ministerial assistance to an audit client.346 By contrast, under the profession's own rules, the auditor's 
ministerial act o f processing such information would not impair the auditing firm 's independence so long as the client itself 
had coded all o f the financial data and the auditor or auditing firm had not assumed managerial responsibility in relation to the 
client's financial reporting 347 It is precisely this type o f situation, where the potential threat to independence is so
attenuated that the profession has considered and rejected a blanket prohibition, that would most clearly benefit from 
development o f a new conceptual approach involving considerations of materiality and the application of appropriate 
safeguards for independence.
VI. Conclusion
345
See AICPA Professional Standards, ET 101.15.
346
See C o d if ic a t io n  o f  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  P o l ic ie s , supra note 330, at 602.02.g. Indeed, this situation is 
treated as if it actually involves self-review.
347
See AICPA Interpretation 101-3 Under Rule o f Conduct 101: Accounting Services, ET 101.05.
The creation o f the ISB constitutes a significant opportunity to conduct a fundamental re-examination o f the 
regulation o f auditor independence. This White Paper is intended to aid the ISB in conducting such a re-examination. The 
profession looks forward to participating in a searching discussion of the issues bearing on this most important subject and 
anticipates that the ISB will adopt a new conceptual framework for auditor independence that will guide the profession as it 
prepares for the challenges o f the 21st Century.
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A bstract
This paper analyzes the appearance standard of auditor independence from  an empirical perspective. It 
begins by critically reviewing what past empirical studies tell us about the public's perception o f auditor 
independence and the impact o f non-auditing services on those perceptions. W hile some early studies concluded 
that public confidence in auditor independence was adversely affected by the provision o f non-auditing advisory 
services by auditing firms, those studies were few in number and methodologically weak. Most studies have found 
that non-auditing services have minimal effects on the appearance o f auditor independence. These studies also show 
that people with greater knowledge about the auditing profession are less concerned about the potential threat of 
non-auditing services on auditor independence, and that public perceptions are closely tied to materiality when 
considering auditor-client business relationships or the provision o f services to audit clients. The paper concludes 
by proposing a research methodology for collecting empirical data which will provide a principled basis for making 
regulatory judgments on the appearance issue. The proposed research design is a multifaceted one, incorporating 
multiple methodologies (using survey and non-survey techniques to gather both quantitative and qualitative data) 
which pose a wide range of questions to many different stakeholders at regular intervals over time.
THE APPEARANCE STANDARD FO R  A U D ITOR IND EPEN D EN CE: 
W HAT W E KNOW  AND SHOULD KNOW
G ary  O rren
One o f the hallmarks o f contemporary life is the erosion o f trust in nearly every institution— from 
government to the media to business and labor.348 However, if  our financial m arkets are to work properly, the 
public must have confidence in the integrity and objectivity o f auditors. Faith in the independence o f auditors is a 
professional imperative.
Over the years, two standards for assessing auditor independence have emerged: fact and appearance. The 
former refers to the actual, objective state o f the relationship between auditing firms and their clients; the latter to
348 Gary Orren, "Fall From Grace: The Public's Loss o f Faith in Government," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip
D. Zelikow, and David C. King, Why People D on't Trust Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
October, 1997), pp. 77-107. Also, Seymour Martin Lipset and W illiam Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, 
Labor, and Government in the Public M ind  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
the subjective state o f that relationship as perceived by clients and third parties. The focus o f this paper is on the 
appearance standard.349
The purpose of this paper is to explore the appearance standard empirically, both retrospectively and 
prospectively. W hat do past studies tell us about the public's perception o f auditors' independence and the impact of 
those perceptions? How might we design future studies to improve our understanding? Do the users o f auditors' 
financial statements think that auditors lack independence? How are those perceptions colored by the substantial 
growth o f non-auditing services provided by auditing firms? Does this increasing supply o f management advisory 
services adversely affect the auditing profession by eroding the public's confidence in auditors' independence?
The Illusiveness and  Elusiveness of Perception
The appearance standard is about perception. The perception problem which faces regulators and 
standards-setters is two-fold. First, they must ascertain whether the public's perception o f auditing firms is accurate 
or inaccurate. Empirically speaking, regulators and standards-setters are not especially challenged by either the 
ideal situation, where auditors are in fact independent and also are perceived to be independent by the public, or by 
the worst situation, where auditors lack independence in fact and also are perceived to lack independence.
The m ore challenging situations involve misperceptions, instances where auditors are actually independent 
but the public perceives them not to be, or where auditors lack independence but the public thinks they are
349 The American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) acknowledged the importance o f 
perceptions o f auditor independence in 1972: "Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they 
should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence." The current AICPA Code o f 
Professional Conduct explicitly requires not only actual independence from  audit clients but also the appearance o f 
independence to third parties. Also in 1972 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began issuing a series 
o f interpretive guidelines which emphasized the need for auditors to maintain independence from their clients in 
both fact and appearance. In 1979 the SEC quoted with approval the report o f the Public Oversight Board (POB) 
which stated that "it is also important that the auditor appear independent to all users o f the financial information he 
provides. This latter concept is a key ingredient to the value of the audit function since users o f audit reports must 
be able to rely on the independent auditor. If  they perceive that there is a lack o f independence whether or not such 
a deficiency exists, much of that value is lost."
independent. Some observers have addressed this last possibility, concluding that the fact o f independence should 
have primacy over the question o f appearance. "There is a place for appearance o f independence in the conceptual 
structure on audit independence, but not as the separate coequal o f the fact o f independence, i.e., not as the notion 
that the auditor 'should be independent in fact and in appearance.' The role o f appearance o f independence should 
be limited to determining the fact o f independence."350
Perceptions are notoriously inaccurate. We perceive things that are not true, and we fail to perceive things 
that are. Often our vantage points are inadequate. For example, by perception standards alone, it was hardly 
unreasonable for the ancients to suppose that the sun revolved around the earth. Every morning and evening they 
could observe it rising and setting. It was only when mankind was armed with sophisticated scientific instruments 
that this reasonable perception could be refuted.351
Regulators face an even greater challenge with perception. They must perceive what the public perceives. 
Their task is to discern whether users and potential users of financial audits think auditors are sufficiently
350 Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, "Audit Independence: Concept and Application," The CPA 
Journal, March, 1992, pp. 35-36. Former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman quotes Elliott and Jacobson 
favorably, and echoes their conclusion: " If we keep saying that we must guard against appearances being tainted 
even though there is no tainting in fact, then we confuse the public and ourselves and, worse, we promote bad public 
policy." Wallman, p. 79.
351 The fields of social and cognitive psychology abound with examples o f hum an misperception. These 
misperceptions stem from a variety o f human tendencies: to see regularity and order where only chance is 
operating, to fail to detect and correct for incomplete and unrepresentative data, and to interpret ambiguous and 
inconsistent data in light o f our pet theories and prior expectations. See Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What 
Isn 't So (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Richard N isbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and 
Shortcomings o f  Social Judgm ent (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980); Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science, Vol. 185, 1974, pp. 1124-1131; Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Subjective Probability: A Judgment o f Representativeness," Cognitive Psychology, 
Vol. 3, 1971, pp. 430-454; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology o f Prediction," Psychological 
Review, Vol. 80, 1973, pp. 237-251; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Belief in the Law o f Small Numbers," 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 76, 1971, pp. 105-110; Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, "Confidence in 
Judgment: Persistence o f the Illusion o f Validity," Psychological Review, Vol. 85, 1977, pp. 395-416; Robert K. 
Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," Antioch Review, Vol. 8, 1948, pp. 193-210; Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, 
Simple Truths: The Psychology o f  Deception (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Robert Abelson, "Beliefs 
Are Like Possessions," Journal fo r  the Theory o f  Social Behaviour, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 222-250; and Irving L. Janis, 
Groupthink: Psychological Studies o f  Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Hougton M ifflin, 1982).
independent. As W allman put it, the appearance standard turns on "someone's view  [the regulators' and standards- 
setters' view] o f public opinion."352
Seat o f the pants perceptions o f others' perceptions are no more reliable than our general perceptions o f the 
world. For the past three decades I have been a practitioner, analyst, and teacher o f survey research. Yet I am still 
struck by how often the conventional wisdom o f what people think is proved wrong by well-crafted opinion surveys. 
For example, it was widely believed for many years that Independent voters were the best-informed and most issue- 
oriented citizens, compared to knee-jerk partisan loyalists. Survey data conclusively showed just the opposite.353 
Watching nightly news coverage o f anti-war protests on college campuses at the height o f the Vietnam War, most 
people assumed that young Americans were dovish on the war. Surveys showed that the young were mostly 
hawkish.354 Time and again we are fooled by our prejudices, biases, and preconceptions. We are deceived by the 
riveting anecdote and dramatic personal experience. Personal hunches are poor substitutes for systematic, reliable 
evidence.
352 Wallman, p. 94. Italics and bracketed comment added.
353 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. M iller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960).
354 Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: 
Harper and Rowe, 1970), pp. 53-79.
W hat W e Know A bout A ppearance: the E m pirical Evidence
A series o f blue-ribbon committees have concluded there is virtually no evidence that the provision of non- 
audit services for audit clients has in fa c t  impaired the independence of accounting firms.355
The empirical evidence on appearance suggests a similar conclusion. A few empirical studies have 
concluded that the provision o f non-audit services to audit clients has enhanced the risk o f perceived auditor 
dependence.356 But most empirical studies find that non-auditing services have minimal adverse effects on the
355 The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations (Cohen 
Commission), AICPA, 1978; Scope o f  Services by CPA Firms, Report of the Public Oversight Board o f the SEC 
Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, AICPA, 1979, 1986, and 1994; Report o f  the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission), October 1987; The Future Relevance, Reliability, and 
Credibility o f  Financial Information, Recommendations to the AICPA Board o f Directors by Seven M ajor 
Accounting Firms, April 1986, 1991; and the Securities and Exchange Commission OCA Report, 1994. In the 
words o f POB Chairman A.A. Sommer, Jr.: there is no known "instance in which it can be demonstrated that the 
provision o f MAS to an audit client interfered with independence in performing the audit function." Public 
Perceptions o f  Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms fo r  Audit Clients, Report prepared for 
Public Oversight Board, SEC Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, AICPA, by Audits & Surveys, Inc., 1986. 
Similarly, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in 1996 that "[n]one o f these studies reported any 
conclusive evidence o f diminished audit quality or harm to the public interest, or any actual impairment o f auditor 
independence, as a consequence o f public accounting firms providing advisory or consulting services to their audit 
clients."
356 Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "Com patibility o f Management Consulting and Auditing," The Accounting Review, 
July 1965, pp. 587-593; Abraham J. Briloff, "Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy," The Accounting 
Review, July 1966, pp. 484-495; Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "Management Services: A Challenge to Audit 
Independence?," The Accounting Review, October 1966, pp. 721-728; Ronald V. Hartley and Timothy L. Ross, 
"MAS and Audit Independence: An Image Problem," The Journal o f  Accountancy, November 1972, pp. 42-51; 
Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "The Effect o f Gifts, Discounts, And Client Size on Perceived Auditor 
Independence," The Accounting Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1980, pp. 50-60; M ichael Firth, "Perceptions o f 
Auditor Independence and Official Ethical Guidelines, The Accounting Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 1980, pp. 451- 
465; Randolph A. Shockley, "Perceptions o f Auditors' Independence: An Empirical Analysis," The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 1981, pp. 785-800; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "Auditor Independence and 
Non-Audit Services: Director Views and Their Policy Implications," Journal o f  Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 
2, Spring 1983, pp. 43-62; and Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "Non-Audit Services and Auditor 
Independence— A Continuing Problem," Auditing: A Journal o f  Practice and Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1984, 
pp. 89-97. The results reported by Schulte actually support a more mixed conclusion. A full 67 percent of the 
respondents in his sample reported that they perceived no adverse effect from non-audit services.
perception o f auditor independence.357
What generalizations can we draw from this body o f research?
• Despite the critical importance o f the appearance issue in the debate over auditor independence, the 
quantity of empirical studies on the impact o f non-auditing services on the appearance o f independence is 
surprisingly slim. An inventory o f only two dozen or so studies, some quite minor or even flawed, over the span of 
three decades is a thin empirical base.
• The bulk o f available research indicates that the confidence o f the investing public and other market 
participants in the independence o f accounting firms has not been significantly impaired by the growth o f non-audit 
services. While users do not perceive perfect or pure independence— hardly surprising since auditors are paid by 
their clients—they do perceive substantial independence that has been minimally affected by the provision o f non- 
audit services. The following conclusions are typical o f those reported in these studies: "There was no indication
357 Pierre L. Titard, "Independence and MAS— Opinions o f Financial Statement Users," The Journal o f  
Accountancy, July 1971, pp. 47-52; David Lavin, "Perceptions of the Independence o f the Auditor," The Accounting 
Review, January 1976, pp. 41-50; Philip M.J. Reckers and A.J. Stagliano, "Non-Audit Services and Perceived 
Independence: Some New Evidence," Auditing: A Journal o f  Practice and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1981, 
pp. 23-37; James H. Scheiner, "An Empirical Assessment o f the Impact o f SEC Non-Audit Service Disclosure 
Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their Clients," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Vol. 22, Autumn 1984, 
pp. 789-; G. W illiam Glezen and James A. Millar, "An Empirical Investigation o f Stockholder Reaction to 
Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, Autumn 1985, pp. 859- 
870; Sue McKinley, Kurt Pany, and Philip M.J. Reckers, "An Examination of the Influence o f CPA Firm Type, 
Size, MAS Provision on Loan Officer Decisions and Perceptions," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
Autumn 1985, pp. 887-896; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "W ithin- Vs. Between-Subjects Experimental 
Designs: A Study o f Demand Effects," Auditing: A Journal o f  Practice and Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1987, pp. 
39-53; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "MAS, Auditing, and Your Orientation," The CPA Journal, February 
1988, pp. 70-72; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, "Auditor Performance o f MAS: A Study o f Its Effects on 
Decisions and Perceptions," Accounting Horizons, June 1988, pp. 31-38; Nicholas Dopuch and Ronald R. King, 
"The Impact o f MAS on A uditors' Independence: An Experimental Markets Study," Journal o f  Accounting 
Research, Vol. 29, Supplement 1991, pp. 60-106; D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, "CPA Performance o f Consulting 
Engagements with Audit Clients," Auditing: A Journal o f  Practice and Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1995, pp. 35- 
53; and D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, "An Examination o f the Effects o f Type o f Engagement, M ateriality, and 
Structure on CPA Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients," Accounting Horizons, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 
1996, pp. 32-51. Some analysts have placed the Titard and Lavin studies in the "adverse effects" column. 
However, they actually belong on the opposite side o f the ledger. According to Titard, "the appearance o f 
independence does not appear to be a problem o f great concern at the present time...The overall conclusion is that 
MAS and the appearance o f independence is not a serious problem for the profession..." Lavin's respondents were 
more likely to view his scenarios as not impairing auditor independence, and more likely to express views closer to 
the AICPA's position than the SEC's.
that the buyers perceived these reports to be less credible because the same auditors provided MAS to the sellers."; 
"Overall, professional financial analysts who responded to this study expressed a very high degree o f confidence in 
the CPA 's ability to remain independent while doing non-audit work along with the audit."; "Our results are 
inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that providing MAS for clients negatively effects financial statement 
users' perceptions o f auditor independence, whether performed by Big Eight or local firms."; " .. .this study indicated 
that auditor provided MAS exerts little, if  any, effect on typical investment or credit granting decisions, on 
perceptions o f financial statement reliability, or on perceptions o f auditor independence."358
• Most surveys show that people with greater knowledge about the auditing profession are less concerned 
about the threat that expanded services m ight pose for auditor independence. People who are uninformed and lack 
familiarity with auditing are more likely to be skeptical and suspicious o f the widening scope o f non-audit 
services.359
• Studies have explored how a variety o f factors might diminish or enhance the public's perception o f 
auditor independence (and the impact o f non-auditing services on that perception), such as firm  size, the separation 
o f auditing and non-auditing functions, and how many years auditors have served their clients. By far, the most 
important o f these factors is the materiality o f the auditor-client relationship. As one study reported: "These results 
provide consistent support for the conclusion that the materiality o f a prime/ subcontractor business relationship 
between a CPA firm  and its audit client significantly affected financial statement users' perceptions and decisions. 
Respondents perceived greater CPA independence and higher financial reliability to exist with an immaterial as 
compared to a material CPA relationship. These perceptions were also revealed in the loan decision."360
358 Dopuch and King, p. 88; Reckers and Stagliano, p. 34; McKinley, Pany, and Reckers, p. 894; and Pany and 
Reckers, 1988, p. 38.
359 For a thoughtful discussion o f the relationship between knowledge o f the auditing profession and 
perception o f auditor independence see Burton, pp. 3-5. Pany and Reckers (1984) do not find evidence o f this 
relationship in their results.
360 Lowe and Pany, 1995.
• The handful o f empirical studies which found that non-audit services seriously damaged the appearance 
o f auditor independence were, for the most part, the earliest studies conducted on this subject. More recent research 
has found little adverse effect. This may be due to the fact that market participants have become more accustomed 
to non-audit services, and the use o f these services has been refined over the past 30 years. It also may stem from 
the fact that the methodological rigor of the research has improved over time.
In some of the earlier studies question wording was inadequate and research designs unsophisticated. 
These methodological flaws probably exaggerated the signs o f an auditor appearance problem. For example, some 
studies included questions about whether non-audit services may possibly compromise an auditor's independence. 
Respondents in one study were asked: "Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients whose 
financial statements they also audit. Do you think that providing any o f the following services to audit clients may 
possibly result in a CPA's losing some o f his audit independence?"361 One cannot place much confidence in 
questions which inquire about possible effects or which present vague hypotheticals. Other studies introduced bias 
by asking subjects to compare different levels o f non-auditing services in a way that transparently revealed the 
researchers' expectations and focus, probably causing them to overstate the severity o f the appearance problem.362 
Finally, some early studies focused too heavily on whether there was an effect o f non-audit services on perceived 
auditor independence which could be shown to be "statistically significant."363 In some cases the size o f the sample 
virtually guaranteed statistical significance. Furthermore, it is the magnitude of such effects and not simply whether 
they exist or not that is most relevant.364 To regulators, meaningful results must be more than statistically
361 Titard, p. 49.
362 See, for example: Briloff, Hartley and Ross, Lavin, Pany and Reckers 1983 and 1984, Shulte, and Titard. 
Pany and Reckers, 1987 and Pany and Reckers, June 1988, discuss how such poor experimental design may have 
biased earlier studies.
363 For example: Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980; and Shockley, 1981.
364 On the critical importance of estimating the magnitude of effects, see Robert P. Abelson, Statistics as 
Principled Argument (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), especially pp. 39-53.
significant. They must be practically significant, and that depends largely on the size o f effects.
F uture  Em pirical Research on A ppearance
In the remaining pages o f this paper I shall propose a methodology for collecting and analyzing empirical 
data which will provide a principled basis for standards-setters and making regulatory judgments on the appearance 
o f independence. This methodology will be described in macro, not micro form. This is not the place to detail the 
myriad nuts and bolts o f a research methodology. It is the place, however, to specify the underlying core principles 
that should guide the proposed methodology.
We begin with a simple truth: the valid interpretation of public opinion on any issue cannot be captured in 
a single question. It requires a variety o f questions with different formats, alternative wordings, asked at various 
times. This is certainly the norm in other disciplines. Economists, for example, have long relied on an assortment 
o f indicators and composite indexes for appraising economic performance. We would not be content to rely on a 
single economic measure— say, the CPI index or the rate o f unemployment—to summarize the overall state o f the 
economy. Public perceptions are even harder to measure than economic performance. A phenomenon as elusive and 
illusive as the public's perception o f auditor independence requires a multifaceted approach.
Multifaceted is, indeed, the watchword o f our proposed research design. It can be summarized in terms of 
four questions: How  should the data be collected? What questions should be asked? Who should be asked these 
questions? And, When should the data be collected?
How should the d a ta  be collected? Four different methodologies should be used to collect the data.365 
Traditional surveys (using mail questionnaires and telephone surveys) are well-suited to the task o f posing the basic 
contextual and policy questions.366 However, these traditional surveys must be supplemented with surveys using
365 The advantages o f employing multiple research methodologies are described in Gary King, Robert 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994) and Delbert C. Miller, Handbook o f  Research Design and Social Measurement 
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1991).
366 Peter H. Rossi, James D. Wright, and Andy B. Anderson, Handbook o f  Survey Research (New York: 
Academic Press, 1983).
experimental and quasi-experimental designs?61 These are studies which divide subjects into groups who receive 
different materials and scenarios in order to "control for," or isolate, the effects o f various factors. As critical as 
these first two methods are, neither can supply the essential qualitative data which focus groups yield. These in- 
depth discussions lasting about two hours with carefully selected groups o f 10-20 participants can uncover some of 
the nuances and subtleties that elude mass surveys, help reveal the processes that lie behind the opinions found in 
surveys, give people a more comfortable setting for expressing sensitive opinions, and suggest issues and questions 
which should be explored with larger samples in future surveys.368 Finally, although traditional surveys, 
experimental designs, and focus groups can shed considerable light on people's attitudes, none o f them reveals much 
about people's actual behavior. Data on people's behavior can be collected more directly with what data analysts 
call aggregate data.369
Two examples illustrate how aggregate data might enrich our understanding o f the public's perception o f 
auditor independence. One important indicator o f the public's faith or lack o f faith in a company and its decisions is 
how that company's stock performs in the stock market. It might be revealing, therefore, to compare the stock 
market value of companies whose accountants provide non-audit services with the stock market value o f companies 
whose accountants do not provide such services, or to compare the stock values before and after audit firms began 
providing non-audit services. The information necessary to perform this type o f analysis was available between 
1978 and 1982 when public companies were required by the SEC to disclose the percentage o f fees they paid for 
non-audit services in relation to audit fees. It may or may not be available after 1982 when such disclosure was
367 Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs fo r  Research 
(Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1963); and Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Quasi- 
Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues fo r  Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979).
368 The pioneering work o f Peter Hart and Associates with focus groups has demonstrated the value o f this 
technique in social research. On the critical importance o f qualitative data in general, see King, Keohane, and 
Verba, Designing Social Inquiry and Louise G. White, Political Analysis: Technique and Practice (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 211-229.
369 Louise G. White, Political Analysis, pp. 239-260.
voluntary.
Incidentally, related aggregate data analyses already have been conducted examining whether shareholders 
or audit committees were less likely to approve decisions to retain audit firms following disclosure that those firms 
were supplying significant non-audit services to their companies. The studies found that disclosure had no 
discernible effect on the behavior o f these users of financial audits. Neither auditor retention rates nor the decision 
to procure non-audit services from audit firms changed significantly following disclosure.370
Another illustration o f how aggregate data might augment our understanding o f the appearance issue is an 
analysis o f the behavior o f the insurance industry. Aside from auditors themselves, no one has a greater economic 
stake in potential auditor liability than insurers. Insurers are extremely sensitive to the risk o f audit failure. 
Nonetheless, according to one leading insurance broker, insurance brokers and underwriters do not assign higher 
risk factors and premiums to audit firms who provide non-audit services than to firms who do not provide such 
services, casting doubt on whether the provision o f non-traditional services undermines auditor independence in the 
eyes o f insurers.371 It would be useful to examine industry-wide data to confirm this statement.
Each o f these four methods has its own peculiar strengths and limitations. They complement each other, 
and together would provide a full picture o f the public's view o f auditor independence.
W hat questions should be asked? Future research should not be limited to ju st one or two key questions 
(what social scientists call dependent variables) or one or two background factors, or independent variables.372
At least three categories o f dependent variables seem essential: questions which probe the perception o f 
auditor independence (both confidence in the independence o f auditors, generally, and confidence in auditors who
370 See studies by Glezen and Millar and by Scheiner referenced in footnote 10 above.
371 Letter from Peter S. Christie o f Minet (a subsidiary o f Aon Group Inc.).
372 For discussions of the need for multiple questions in social research, see Gary Orren, "Presidential 
Popularity Ratings: Another View," Public Opinion, May/June 1978, p. 35 and Henry E. Brady and Gary R. Orren, 
"Polling Pitfalls: Sources o f Error in Public Opinion Surveys," in Thomas E. Mann and Gary R. Orren, eds., Media 
Polls in American Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 55-94.
provide non-audit services, more specifically) under different circumstances or scenarios; questions which probe the 
perception o f financial statement accuracy and reliability, again under varying circumstances; and questions which 
ask respondents about specific decisions which they have the discretion to make (i.e., questions to loan officers 
about making a loan decision, to creditors about granting credit, to investors about the decision to invest, to 
stockholders about the vote to engage an audit firm, etc.). The questions would probe what decisions these people 
would make and have made under varying circumstances.
As mentioned earlier, it is not sufficient simply to learn whether non-audit services have diminished the 
public's perception o f auditor independence or not. We must learn the magnitude o f the effect. How else can we 
intelligently determine whether the threat o f non-audit services to perceived auditor independence is large enough to 
warrant regulation? Beyond that, future research must help us learn more about how investors and other market 
participants arrive at their perceptions. This involves exploring several "independent" variables: the impact of 
different types o f non-auditing services, different kinds o f third parties, different degrees o f materiality, separation 
o f function, length o f association between auditors and clients, and size o f firms. This also requires more in-depth 
conversations with stakeholders trying to understand why they perceive audit firms as they do.
W ho should be asked these questions? The answer to the appearance issue w ill not be found in particular 
situations involving this or that auditor and client. The answer will be found among users and observers o f  audits 
generally. Future research must involve a system-wide analysis.
All types o f consumers o f audit services should be studied: financial analysts, lenders, insurers, fund 
managers, shareholders, and clients. There should be one restriction, however: research subjects should be limited 
to typical users o f financial statements. For several reasons, the public-at-large is not an appropriate target for future 
research.
The traditional answer to the question o f who should judge auditor independence is "a reasonable person 
having knowledge o f all the relevant facts." The average citizen does not have the requisite knowledge o f the facts 
to assess whether auditor-client relationships pose an unacceptable risk to independence. Previous public opinion
research suggests that surveys o f uninformed users will elicit evanescent "doorstep opinions," created on-the-spot by 
the survey itself, instead o f measuring thoughtful perceptions that existed prior to the questioning.373 For the most 
part, the public-at-large is unaware o f the relevant tradeoffs involved, and therefore has little reason to demand 
anything less than absolute, pure independence of auditors. Citizen views also are likely to reflect the deep 
cynicism, disenchantment, and suspicion which the public feels toward most institutions and authorities these days.
In 1992 the Office of Government Ethics, in establishing uniform standards o f conduct for executive 
branch officials, decided to revisit the issue o f appearance, and adopted a "reasonable person test." The Office of 
Government Ethics argued, as we have here, that this provided an "appropriate assurance to an employee that his or 
her conduct will not be judged from the perspective of the unreasonable, uninformed, or overly zealous 
[observer]."374
W hen should the data  be collected? The final core principle is that future research should be conducted 
periodically at regular intervals.375 Ideally, each o f the proposed four methodologies (traditional surveys, 
experimental designs, focus groups, and aggregate data studies) would be conducted every year, but that may not be 
financially feasible. Alternatively, a staggered schedule o f two methods per year would still be enlightening.
The auditing profession is undergoing dynamic change. Investigations o f it can be no less dynamic. Up to 
now, regulators have relied on empirical information which is static, and even stale. Future research ought to 
provide up-to-date information, reflecting current experience among auditors, clients, and third parties. Also up to 
now, empirical information has been generated in an ad hoc, sporadic, and kaleidoscopic fashion governed only by
373 Brady and Orren, "Polling Pitfalls: Sources o f Error in Public Opinion Surveys," pp. 71-76 and Donald R. 
Kinder and David O. Sears, "Public Opinion and Political Action," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson, eds., 
The Handbook o f  Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Third Edition (New York: Random House, 1984).
374 Office of Government Ethics, "Standards o f Ethical Conduct for Employees o f the Executive Branch," 
August 7, 1992.
375 On the value o f longitudinal data see David C. Hoaglin, Richard J. Light, Bucknam McPeek, Frederick 
Mosteller, and Michael A. Stoto, Data For Decisions: Information Strategies fo r  Policy Makers (Cambridge, MA: 
Abt Books, 1982), pp. 107-116.
the particular interests o f individual scholars. Regular empirical monitoring overseen by a central authority would 
ensure that questions, sampling, and other methodologies would be systematic and comparable. This would permit, 
for the first time, the analysis o f changes over time.
This multifaceted research design will yield a rich body of information. The truth about the perception of 
auditor independence and how non-audit services affect perception will emerge from the intersection o f multiple 
methodologies asking multiple questions o f multiple sources at multiple times.
In  Conclusion
The impact o f standards-setters and regulatory decisions on the auditing profession is too great for us 
simply to conclude with a call for more humility and caution in conducting studies and interpreting results. Instead, 
we will conclude by stressing that decisions about the appearance o f auditor independence should not rest on 
personal hunches and subjective impressions.
It is true that measuring public perceptions is a slippery task. The distinguished public opinion scholar 
V.O. Key, Jr. once cautioned that "to speak with precision o f public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with 
the Holy Ghost."376 Critics o f empirical research are fond o f quoting Mark Twain's quip, "There are three kinds of 
lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics." But statistician Frederick Mosteller probably offered an even wiser reply: "It is 
easy to lie with statistics. But it is easier to lie without them."377
The principles that will guide future regulations on the appearance issue should be neither capricious nor 
arbitrary, but should be based on sound evidence with solid empirical foundation. As former Commissioner 
Wallman has written, "There appears to be little choice at this moment but to take into account appearance issues. 
Nevertheless, we could all do a better job in helping the public arrive at more informed perceptions about auditor
376 V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (Knopf, 1961), p. 8.
377Interview with Frederick Mosteller, Emeritus Professor o f Mathematic Statistics at Harvard University.
independence matters."378 We also could do a better job in helping regulators arrive at more informed perceptions 
o f those perceptions. If  regulators and standards-setters are to establish appropriate professional standards for 
auditors, they themselves should surely base their decisions on empirical studies which also m eet strict professional 
standards.
Wallman, p. 94.
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EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY
This paper provides an economic analysis o f multi-client, multi-service accounting firms. The objective is 
to aid in the development of a new framework for auditor independence. We adopt the modem theory of the 
economics o f organization, which views organizational structures and relationships as the results o f efforts to create 
and deliver value. We see auditor independence as a property o f auditors' interests, both at a personal level and at the 
level o f the accounting firm.
A proper assessment o f auditors' interests requires a holistic approach. That is, in assessing auditor 
independence, we must examine the totality o f auditors' interests. We identify and analyze a complex web of 
institutional and personal incentives that affect auditors' interests. Our major findings are:
♦ A uditors' liability is significant and provides incentives to m aintain  auditor independence.
Auditors' actual and potential losses from litigation play a large role in determining 
auditors' incentives. Losses from litigation contributed to the 1990 bankruptcy o f Laventhol & 
Horwath, at one time the seventh largest accounting firm. In 1993, the six largest accounting firms 
(hereafter, the Big Six) incurred more than $1 billion in costs o f judgments, settlements and legal 
defense. Although rarely alleged to be a cause o f loss, auditor independence is an issue in 
litigation. Impairing independence at the level o f the accounting firm would invite an avalanche of 
litigation.
♦ A uditors' investm ents are  substantial and  provide incentives to m aintain aud ito r independence.
Auditors have many investments that they must protect by safeguarding their 
independence.
•  Accounting firms invest in their reputations, part of which is a reputation for independence. Honest clients 
want independent auditors. A crucial feature o f the modem, multi-client accounting firm is that any threat 
to the firm 's independence threatens its entire stream o f audit revenues. These revenue streams are 
substantial. For example, the aggregate audit revenues o f the Big Six in 1996 exceeded $6 billion.
•  Auditors have financial capital invested in their firms. The total partners' capital in the Big Six is in excess 
o f $3.5 billion.
•  Auditors have investments in technology and audit methodology. In the last year alone, four o f the Big Six 
spent more than $170 million on audit technology and methodology.
♦ Accounting firm s earn  substantial and growing revenues from  supplying non-audit services.
The Big Six's revenues from non-audit services in 1996 exceeded $9.0 billion, $5.6 
billion o f which came from supplying consulting services. $1 billion of their consulting revenues 
came from  their SEC audit clients. Consulting revenues account for all o f the real growth in the 
revenues o f the Big Six since 1990.
♦ There is a s trong  intuitive case for economies of scope between auditing and non-audit services.
Economies o f scope are cost efficiencies obtained by delivering multiple services through
one firm.
•  Because auditing, tax work and consulting generate knowledge o f clients' organizations, processes, and 
problems, it is intuitive that there exist economies o f scope in auditing and these non-audit services. 
Auditors and tax professionals typically help each other in performing their services. Many accounting 
firms stress the sharing o f information between their auditors and consultants.
•  Auditors often rely directly on the work o f tax professionals. Also, experience in specific cases is 
suggestive o f economies o f scope in auditing and consulting.
•  While quantitative estimates o f economies o f scope are not available, the success o f accounting firms in 
competing in consulting markets is testimony to their existence.
There is no evidence th a t the supply of non-audit services threatens auditor independence.
The supply o f non-audit services is not a significant factor in auditors' losses in litigation 
or in pricing their liability insurance. There is no evidence that investors are concerned that the 
supply o f non-audit services impairs independence.
•  O f 610 claims against the Big Six tracked by an insurance broker, at most three involved even an allegation 
that the supply o f non-audit services impaired auditor independence.
•  Auditors' insurers do not include clauses in insurance contracts restricting the supply o f non-audit services, 
and they do not consider the supply o f non-audit services as a risk factor in determining prices for the Big 
Six's liability insurance.
•  There is no evidence that shareholders, managers, auditors or investors had any reaction to the SEC's 
required disclosures about non-audit fees that were in force from 1978 to 1982, at which time the 
requirements were rescinded.
T rends tow ard increasing globalization and the rap id  ra te  of change in inform ation technologies will
place new dem ands on accounting firm s and the practice o f auditing.
Improvements in information technology and low transportation costs are changing 
business practices. These trends have fundamental implications for auditing, as clients change the 
way they capture, process and distribute information. They are also likely to create new 
opportunities for accounting firms to benefit from economies o f scale and scope. In assessing the 
efforts o f accounting firms to compete in this environment, it is vital that we fully recognize their 
attempts to craft their organizations and their relationships in ways that protect their independence, 
deliver value to their clients, and benefit the public.
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an economic analysis of auditor independence for multi- 
client, multi-service public accounting firms
1. O bjective and Introduction
1.1. Objective
The objective o f this paper is to provide an economic analysis o f multi-client, multi-service accounting 
firms to aid in the development o f a new conceptual framework for auditor independence. The analysis adopts the 
modern theory o f the economics o f organization.379 The basic tenet o f this theory is that organizational structures 
in a capitalist society are the result o f efforts to craft economies and deliver value. Regulation that best serves the 
public interest is that which reinforces value creation and checks abuses.
The demands o f the economic environment, economies o f scope and scale, and the expectations o f society 
as imposed through legal liability are important determinants o f the organization o f the auditing industry. A new 
conceptual framework for auditor independence should be grounded in a thorough understanding o f  these economic 
realities. The current approach to auditor independence is not based on a consistent view o f the incentives o f 
accounting firms flowing from their economic environment. It does not pay consistent attention to efficiencies of 
scope and scale. It too often is based on the appearance o f independence assessed in a piecemeal fashion, as opposed 
to being based on the totality o f incentives for independence. It is not surprising, then, that current independence 
rules have been characterized as inconsistent, outmoded, and, most importantly, costly.380
One o f the greatest sources o f dissatisfaction with current independence rules relates to the provision o f 
non-audit services to audit clients. The economic success o f accounting firms in supplying non-audit services is 
testimony to the value created by offering multiple lines o f service. Despite repeated contentions that the supply o f 
non-audit services threatens auditor independence, we find no evidence o f it in litigation against auditors, the pricing 
o f auditors' liability insurance, or in investor reaction to disclosures about non-audit services.381 We conclude that 
these contentions are based on the appearance o f threats to auditor independence, and do not take into account the 
totality o f an accounting firm's incentives to create economic value and to maintain its independence.
1.2. Organization of the Paper
To introduce our analysis, we provide some background in the remainder o f this section. We turn in Section 
2 to a brief description o f the audit process and the environment within which auditing takes place. Sections 3, 4 and 
5 take up crucial areas o f auditors' incentives: legal liability, investments in reputations and expertise, and the 
supply o f non-audit services, respectively. Two important trends affecting the auditing industry, globalization and 
rapidly changing information technology, are discussed in Section 6. B rief concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 7.
379See Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism , The Free Press: New York, 1985.
380See, for example, Elliott, Robert, K. and Peter D. Jacobson, 1992, "Audit Independence: Concept and 
Application," The CPA Journal, 34-39, and Wallman, Steven M.H., 1996, "The Future of Accounting, Part III: 
Reliability and Auditor Independence," Accounting Horizons, 10(4) 76-97.
381 We examine the relevant evidence in detail in Section 6.
1.3. Background
1.3.1. G eneral Econom ic B ackground
By almost any measure, the world's financial markets today are more active, more influential in human 
affairs, and more efficient in allocating resources than at any other time in history. Worldwide financial markets 
allow investors across the globe to shift financial resources and spread risks quickly and efficiently.382 Information 
is the life-blood o f these markets. Forward-looking information allows market participants to assess the risks and 
returns o f potential investments. Backward-looking information allows them to monitor the uses o f resources and to 
construct appropriate incentives for proper stewardship. Financial information is a vital element in maintaining the 
level of public confidence that is required for active and vibrant capital markets.383
Much o f the valuable information o f use to capital markets begins in the hands o f managers and must be 
reported by them.384 Yet managers' financial interests and their undiversifiable human capital can lead to erroneous, 
manipulated, and consciously or unconsciously misstated financial reports. Intended or not, these actions divert 
resources to management's personal use. Financial markets impose a premium for this risk, which managers have 
incentives to reduce. One way to do this is to provide financial disclosures about the use o f resources. In turn, it is 
then often helpful to employ auditors to provide assurance that managements' financial reports are reliable. Even 
before independent audits became mandatory, a great many companies obtained them.385 Today, many private debt 
agreements call for periodic, audited financial statements.386
Even at this simple level, it is apparent that auditors' interests cannot be co-extensive with managements' 
interests. I f  they were, an external auditor's report would be ineffective in monitoring management.
382For example, according to International Monetary Fund statistics, cross-border U.S. equity and bond transactions 
have increased approximately fifty-fold since 1980, and the daily turnover on world currency markets now exceeds 
the global stock o f  foreign exchange reserves (The Economist, September 20, 1997, p.24).
383The value o f informing investors through financial disclosure forms a cornerstone for the regulation o f financial 
markets. Perhaps the most famous words in this respect are those o f Louis D. Brandéis who recommended adequate 
publicity " ... as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best o f disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman." (L. D. Brandéis, Other People's M oney and How the Bankers Use It, 1914, p. 
93).
384For an analyses o f companies' incentives to disclose financial information, see Dye, Ronald, "Disclosure of 
Nonproprietary Information," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Spring 1985, and Dye, Ronald, "Mandatory Versus 
Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases o f Financial and Real Externalities," The Accounting Review, Jan. 1990, pp. 1-24.
385Before federal securities laws mandated independent audits, 94% o f the companies traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange issued audited financial statements. See Arthur Andersen & Co., et al., The Public Accounting 
Profession: M eeting the Needs o f  a Changing World, Jan. 1991.
386Society's interests sometime go beyond those of individual managers and auditors, and government regulations, 
state laws, and exchange listing requirements call for audits o f financial reports. But beyond this, individuals may 
find that the potential gains from subverting their professional responsibilities outweigh the costs, and they may 
sacrifice their personal integrity and issue fraudulent financial reports. Fraudulent financial reporting can shake the 
public's faith in the fairness o f markets. This can disrupt the functioning o f financial markets and impose costs on all 
honest market participants. Therefore, the public has a legitimate and important interest in monitoring and regulating 
the behavior o f managers and auditors.
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1.3.2. A uditors' and M anagers' Interests
While it is clear that auditors' and managers' interests cannot be co-extensive, should we expect them to in 
no ways coincide? From an economic perspective, the answer is clearly no. Both auditors and managers have strong 
incentives to issue accurate financial reports. Managers have fiduciary duties to shareholders, reputations to protect, 
internal controls to limit their actions, legal and regulatory reporting requirements to follow, and peers to monitor 
their behavior. Also, as we stated above, financial markets set the cost o f capital as a function o f the quality o f the 
information disclosed.387 Managers have many incentives to ensure the integrity o f financial reports.
Similarly, auditors have duties of care to follow in performing audits, reputations to protect, internal 
policies and control mechanisms to limit their actions, liability to consider, professional and governmental 
regulations to obey, and peers to monitor their behavior. Auditors are held accountable for their reports in many 
ways.
Auditors and managers have many other common interests. For example, both have interests in ensuring 
the client's internal control systems are functioning well. By far the most cost effective way to conduct an audit is to 
examine a sample o f records kept by reliable accounting systems that are under management's supervision. In 
addition, an effective audit requires an understanding o f the client that is most efficiently acquired from 
management.
Auditors and managers have common interests in the viability o f the client. Managers have a strong interest 
in maintaining the financial health o f the firms for which they work. Auditors are interested in having financially 
healthy clients.388 Both have likely invested in a specialized relationship that benefits both parties from its 
continuation.389
Auditors and managers have common interests in assuring that the terms o f the audit engagement provide 
appropriate economic incentives to perform all necessary, and no unnecessary, audit work. These incentives will be 
strengthened by giving the auditors a tangible stake in assuring the reliability o f  the financial statements.390
While each o f these factors gives auditors and managers common interests, there are important places 
where their interests diverge. Auditors' interests center on accuracy and reliability. Their interest in reported 
financial results is secondary. For example, it might not matter to the auditors whether a client's reported income is 
$1 billion or $2 billion. The auditor wants the most appropriate figure under generally accepted accounting 
principles. On the other hand, managers' interest in reported results is often very high, and may overwhelm their 
interest in accuracy. Managers will almost always prefer, other things being equal, a reported income of $2 billion to
387See Botosan, Christine A., 1997, "Disclosure Level and the Cost o f Equity Capital," The Accounting Review, 
72(3), 323-347.
388Prospering clients usually mean a safe, growing base o f audit fees. Also, business failure often brings a flurry o f 
litigation in which auditors and managers are accused o f common misdeeds.
389Levinthal, Daniel A. and M ark Fichman, "Dynamics o f Interorganizational Attachments: Auditor-Client 
Relationships," Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 1988, pp. 345-369, estimate the hazard rates, which are the 
probability laws that govern the dissolution o f auditor-client relationships. Their estimated rates increase for the first 
four years o f the auditor-client relationship, and decrease after that. The decrease o f the hazard rates is consistent 
with the build-up o f relationship-specific capital.
390See Antle, Rick, "The Auditor as an Economic Agent," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Autumn 1982, Part II, 
Antle, Rick, "Auditor Independence," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Spring 1984, and Antle, Rick and Richard 
Lambert, "Accountants' Loss Functions and Induced Preferences for Conservatism," in Economic Analysis o f  
Information and Contracts: Essays in Honour o f John E. Butterworth , G. A. Feltham, A. H. Amershi and W. T. 
Ziemba, eds., (Kluwer, 1988).
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a reported income o f $1 billion. The divergence o f interests allows auditors to enhance the market's perceptions of 
the integrity o f financial reports.391
1.3.3. A udito r Independence
There is a history o f trying to characterize the extent of the necessary divergence o f interests in qualitative 
terms. In particular, the concept o f auditor independence has been used to describe the boundaries o f sufficient and 
insufficient divergence o f interests. The complexity and partially overlapping composition o f auditors' and 
managers' interests make this description a challenging and, very likely, an on-going activity. One recent effort in 
this regard produced the definition o f independence which we adopt. For our purposes, the Special Committee on 
Assurance Services' definition o f independence is an absence o f interests that create an unacceptable risk o f bias 
with respect to the quality or context o f information that is the subject o f an audit engagement.392
With this background, we begin our in-depth analysis o f auditor independence with an examination of the 
audit process and the environment within which auditors work.
2. The A udit Process and Its Econom ic Environm ent
2.1. Auditors' Products
In the abstract, an auditor's product is simply information - an assurance about the financial statements - 
and the perceived statistical properties o f that assurance determine its economic value. To elaborate, public financial 
reports convey information to many audiences faced with several potential decisions. Investors might be deciding 
how much and at what prices to purchase a company's common stock. Shareholders might be deciding whether to 
vote for a candidate for a directorship. Bank loan officers might be assessing the riskiness o f a loan to the company 
in order to settle on an appropriate interest rate.
We adopt an economist's view o f decision-making. The decision-maker begins with a set o f prior beliefs 
and basic preferences over the potential outcomes o f the decision. He or she acquires and processes information 
helpful in improving the decision. In particular, the decision-maker combines relevant information with prior beliefs 
to form a better assessment o f the likelihood o f possible consequences. The audit report's statistical properties393 
come into play in the process o f combining relevant information with prior beliefs. For example, i f  the decision-
391See Antle, Rick and Barry Nalebuff, "Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations," Journal o f  Accounting 
Research, Supplement 1991, pp. 31-54.
392The definition we have characterized was obtained from the American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) web site at <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/comstud/assind/index.htm> visited on August 8, 1997.
393Precisely what aspects o f the perceived statistical properties o f the audit report are important varies with the 
particular decision-maker and the particular decision problem at hand. For example, an investor interested in 
assessing the value o f a stock will be primarily interested in the perceived statistical properties o f forward-looking 
information about future cash flows, given how the firm will be managed. A shareholder interested in assessing 
management's stewardship will be primarily interested in the perceived statistical characteristics o f backward- 
looking information. (See Gjesdal, Froystein, "Accounting for Stewardship," Journal o f  Accounting Research, 
Spring 1981, pp. 208-231.) Further, in assessing stewardship, it is important to compare what actually happened 
with what should have happened under good stewardship. (See Holmstrom, Bengt, "Moral Hazard and 
Observability," The Bell Journal o f  Economics, 1979.) Comparing what actually happened with what should have 
happened is where the statistical characteristics o f the audit report come in.
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maker processes information in a Bayesian fashion,394 the joint probability distribution o f the relevant information is 
involved in revising beliefs to make the best decision. In an economic view of decision making, the statistical 
characteristics o f the audit report determine its value.
The importance o f this observation is that it focuses attention on the informational properties o f auditors' 
outputs. Auditors' incentives, personal characteristics and circumstances are relevant only insofar as they impact the 
information in auditors' reports. To address the effects o f these factors on auditors' reports, we view auditors' 
decision processes in the same way we view other decision-makers' processes.395 Auditors gather information, 
update their beliefs, and then make decisions as a function o f their incentives. We describe this process in more 
detail below.
2.2. The Audit Process
2.2.1. A udit Team s
Auditing involves gathering and processing information in order to express an opinion about financial 
statements. For all but the smallest clients, this is done by a team o f individuals with varying experience and rank 
within the accounting firm. The lowest ranking members o f the team (hereafter, staff) are recent college graduates, 
some o f whom may not have completed the CPA examination or experience requirements. The highest ranking 
member o f the team is a partner o f the accounting firm (lead or engagement partner), who has many years of audit 
experience and is always a CPA.396 Between the engagement partner and the staff are individuals with varying 
experience (hereafter, seniors and managers), almost all o f whom are CPAs.
At lower levels, the tasks on an audit are highly structured. Everyone on the audit follows an audit program, 
which is typically derived from tailoring a template supplied by the accounting firm. Auditors are required by 
generally accepted auditing standards to plan their work adequately,397 and structured audit programs have been in 
use in the major accounting firms for many years.398 O f course, changes in technologies, clients' innovations in 
business practices, new transactions, and a host o f other factors make the development and application of audit 
programs an ongoing task.
Higher ranking members o f the audit team supervise the lower ranks, review the audit work, and make 
important accounting and auditing judgments.399 Managers and partners also negotiate with the client on
394Bayes' Theorem shows how the laws o f probability dictate updating beliefs with new information. It states that a 
decision maker updates his or her probability about event x, P(x), given new information y, which occurs with 
probability P(y), according to the formula P(x|y) = P(x,y) /P(y), where P(x,y) is the join t probability o f receiving 
both x and y. The important point for our purposes is the crucial role played by the joint probability in this formula.
395See Antle, Rick, "The Auditor as an Economic Agent," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Autumn 1982.
396For SEC registrants, there must also be a concurring partner.
397AU Section 150.02.
398The standardization o f  audit work has led to claims that auditing is becoming an industry rather than a profession. 
One consequence is that price competition for audits has at times been fierce. For example, Maher, Michael W., 
Peter Tiessen, Robert Colson, and Amy J. Broman, "Competition and Audit Fees," The Accounting Review, Jan. 
1992, pp. 199-211, reports that real audit fees declined significantly between 1977 and 1981.
399In addition to those directly assigned to the audit team, the larger accounting firms typically make available 
partner-level specialist groups to assist the engagement partner with complex accounting and auditing matters.
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accounting and auditing matters and on audit fees, and market the accounting firm's other services to the client. The 
work at higher levels, particularly at the level o f the engagement partner, involves significant judgment.
Figure 2.1 sketches our characterization o f the basic elements o f the audit team's task. The team applies a 
set o f information processing rules to the evidence and assertions o f importance to the audit at hand to generate an 
audit report. The team possesses a unique set o f personal characteristics and relationships among its members, and 
has some level o f resources and technology at its disposal. The audit team is usually composed of individuals who 
bring it specialized expertise, some by technique, some by experience, and some by knowledge of the client. The 
team's behavior is also affected by its incentives, and this is the point at which independence arises. Therefore, we 
will discuss the teams' incentives in some detail.
2.2.2. A uditors ' Incentives
The audit team's incentives may be thought o f as some combination o f the incentives o f the team's 
members. In the modern economy, the totality o f an auditor's incentives are determined by a constellation o f factors 
arising from three basic sources:
1. Institutional incentives from the environment
2. Institutional incentives from the accounting firm's governance structure400
3. Individual factors.
To elaborate, we give some examples o f the factors arising from each o f these three sources. 
Institutional incentives from  the environm ent:
1. A complex, dynamic web o f professional relationships with clients.
2. Competition in the markets for audit services.
3. Competition in the markets for non-audit services, especially consulting and taxation advice.
4. Professional regulations, including codes of professional conduct, professional standards, and 
administrative disciplinary processes administered by peer professionals.
5. Government regulations and private sector standards subject to regulatory oversight.
6. Legal liability, including federal and state securities laws and liability insurance polices. 
Institu tional incentives from  the accounting firm 's governance structure :
1. The firm's choice o f particular auditing and non-auditing services to offer.
2. The firm's internal control practices.
3. The firm's compensation policies and practices.
4. A complex, dynamic web o f professional relationships with other members o f the team and the firm.
400Throughout the paper, we use the term "governance structure" to encompass all the devices used to organize and 
mediate economic relationships. Our use o f this term is in the tradition o f the economics o f organization.
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Individual factors:
1. Each auditor's sense o f professionalism.
2. Each auditor's web o f personal relationships.
3. Each auditor's personal investment and economic situation.
4. Each auditor's family situation.
These factors operate differently across the different members o f the team. For example, the work of any 
auditor on the team might be compromised by a close familial relationship with key client personnel. An audit junior 
is more likely to have incentives determined heavily by the accounting firm's internal control and compensation 
policies, and is not likely to have many incentives tied to the accounting firm's web o f relationships with the client. 
An audit partner has more flexibility in dealing with internal control policies and is less likely to simply take them as 
a fixed incentive, but a partner has much more responsibility at the level o f the web o f relationships with clients.
We see the incentives as operating on two levels: personal and institutional. Personal-level incentives 
involve the incentives of individual auditors. These include their personal relationships, investments and individual 
legal liability. Personal-level incentives include the compensation o f individual auditors and their professional 
relationships with other members o f the accounting firm. Institutional-level incentives involve forces that affect the 
accounting firm. These include pressures from competition, professional and governmental regulations applied at the 
firm level, and firm-level liability.
The firm's governance structure is the vehicle through which institutional-level incentives are translated to 
personal-level incentives. In assessing auditors' independence, we seek to differentiate the firm's incentives to 
maintain good governance from the individuals' incentives to comply with the firm's interests. This allows us to 
obtain some separation between the problem of individuals' incentives to impair independence401 and the problem of 
the accounting firm in maintaining a governance structure which adequately protects its independence.
We will not comment extensively on independence concerns arising from personal-level incentives, such as 
members o f the audit team owning the common stock o f audit clients or having a close familial relationship with 
important client personnel.402 Independence at this level is, we believe, best handled through a combination of 
accounting firms' internal quality controls, compensation policies and practices, safeguards, requisite training and 
proficiency, and professional regulations. Since the first four o f these-quality control, compensation, safeguards and 
training-are largely internal governance matters, we would expect each firm to devise economically efficient means 
o f implementing them through its governance structure. Therefore, m ost o f our effort and analysis is directed at 
institutional-level independence issues.
In analyzing auditor independence in terms o f the totality o f auditors' institutional-level incentives, there 
are three main areas that should be considered. One is auditors' professional and legal liability. Another is auditors' 
incentives to protect their investments in reputational and intellectual capital. The third is the supply o f non-audit 
services to clients. We discuss auditor's liability in the next section, then turn to the role o f investments in reputation 
and intellectual capital, and finally to the supply o f non-audit services.
401 In economic terms, we are concerned here with the problem of free-riders who take advantage o f the difficulties 
in organizing collective actions.
402We do not intend to imply that the current rules on familial relationships and ownership o f common stock should 
not be re-examined. Particularly in the context of a large accounting firm, ownership o f common stock by one 
partner o f the firm who is not involved in the audit and with appropriate safeguards in place should not impair the 
independence o f the entire firm with respect to that client.
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3. A uditors' L iability
Auditors' liability is important to consider when assessing independence because it is significant in amount 
and can impose costs on firms that impair their independence. This section examines the significance o f litigation 
first, then discusses the incentives to maintain independence resulting from liability.
3.1. Amount and Cost of Litigation
Auditors face significant monetary costs through their liability. While we do not have data for all 
accounting firms, Mayer, Brown & Piatt have compiled the costs to the Big Six403 firms o f  protecting their practices 
from 1990 to 1993, and their results are in Table 3.1.404
403The Big Six are the six largest U. S. accounting firms: Arthur Andersen LLP, Coopers & Lybrand LLP, Deloitte 
& Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG Peat M arwick LLP and Price Waterhouse LLP.
404Source: Mayer, Brown & Piatt, letter o f June 3, 1994, to Mr. Walter Schuetze, Chief Accountant, Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
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Table 3.1 
Big Six Accounting Firms 
Accounting and Audit Practice Protection Costs405
(in millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Gross accounting and auditing revenues406
Costs of judgments, settlements and legal 
defense
Insurance premiums, net o f recoveries 
Net audit practice protection costs 
Net costs as a percent o f revenues
$5,275 $5,319 $5,470 $5,588
$367 
37
$485 
(8)
$783 
(185)
$1,082 
(416)
$404 $477 $598 $666
7.7% 9.0% 10.9% 11.9%
The Big Six firms' gross losses from litigation in 1993, $1,082 billion, were an astonishing 19.4% of their 
revenues. Legal liability costs helped drive Laventhol & Horwath, at one time the seventh largest accounting firm, 
into bankruptcy. W hen it filed for Chapter 11 on November 21, 1990, Laventhol & Horwath (with revenues in 1990 
o f more than $345 million) was the largest professional services firm ever to go bankrupt.407
To get an idea o f the importance o f legal liability to individual partners, we examine per-partner losses in 
settlements and litigation relative to per-partner average earnings for the Big Six firms. Data408 are contained in 
Table 3.2.
405All our data, both in the tables and the text, are for the United States only.
406These figures for revenues were taken directly from the Mayer, Brown & Piatt letter and differ slightly from the 
gross revenue figures from the SECPS that we use later in the paper. The Mayer, Brown and Piatt revenue figures 
were compiled to be consistent with the cost figures reported later in the table. These data, unlike the SECPS data, 
are not derived from  the firms' own fiscal accounting periods. The Mayer, Brown & Piatt data are the best revenue 
estimates against which to compare litigation costs. In any event, the differences among these numbers and the ones 
we rely on more heavily later are slight. Using the revenue data from Table 4.1, net costs as a percent o f revenues 
are 7.7%, 9.1%, 11.1%, and 11.9% in 1990-93, respectively.
407See Weber, Joseph, M. Galen, C. Yang, and D. Greising, "Behind the Fall o f Laventhol," Business Week, 54, 
1990, p. 54.
408Source: "A Disproportionate Burden o f Liability," Tables VII and VIII.
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Table 3.2
Awards, Settlem ents and Average Earnings per Big Six Partner
1990-1992
(in thousands)
Year Amount o f Awards and 
Settlements Paid per Audit 
Partner
Average Earnings per Partner Awards & Settlements as a % 
o f Average Earnings
1992 $186 $212 88%
1991 $38 $190 20%
1990 $20 $206 10%
Even at the lowest o f the three per-partner figures o f 10%, litigation provides a substantial influence on 
partners' behavior. A t 88% of the average partner earnings, the influence o f litigation is overwhelming. Having 
experienced a year in which the Big Six incurred such heavy litigation losses as 1992, nearly all audit partners will 
be cognizant o f the possibility o f litigation for a long time.
We attempted to compile dollar amounts similar to those in Table 3.2 for more recent years, but time 
pressures prevented it. Instead, we obtained data from Minet, Inc., (hereafter, Minet) an insurance advisor and 
broker for the Big Six firms, on the numbers o f claims filed against the Big Six accounting firms in the United States 
from 1990 to the present. M inet data (collected on a policy year basis) show that legal liability remains a strong 
force on auditors. The Minet data are presented in Table 3.3.409
T a b le  3 .3
N u m b e r  o f  C la im s/S u its  a g a in s t B ig  S ix  F irm s
1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 6
Policy Year Claims/Suits
1995-96 109
1994-95 124
1993-94 126
1992-93 145
1991-92 140
409These data were taken from Minet's Statistical Database. M inet believes that since 1993, the Big Six firms might 
not have reported small settlement payments to their insurers. If  true, this would at least partially explain the 
decrease in claims reported since 1993.
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1990-91 203
3.2. Liability Provides Incentives to Maintain Independence
While a comprehensive and scientifically rigorous analysis o f auditors' losses in litigation is beyond the 
scope o f this paper, it is clear that the possibility o f litigation plays a large role in determining auditors' incentives. 
Further, although many public accountants contend the primary reason behind their losses is the failure o f the 
clients' businesses, as opposed to audit failures, data from Minet indicate that a significant amount of litigation does 
not involve insolvent clients. From 1987 to 1993, the percentages o f claims against Big Six firms involving 
insolvent clients are shown in Table 3.4.410
T a b le  3 .4
P e r c e n ta g e s  o f  C la im s  a g a in st B ig  S ix  F irm s I n v o lv in g  In so lv e n t  C lien ts
1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 3
Year Percentage o f Claims Involving Insolvent Clients
1993 48
1992 34
1991 47
1990 58
1989 41
1988 46
1987 60
Aside from whether the losses from litigation are deserved or excessive, the point here is that the possibility 
o f litigation exerts powerful effects on auditors' behavior. Auditors losses in litigation are not due only to the 
business failures o f their clients. Although it is somewhat rare, plaintiffs do specifically allege lack o f auditor 
independence as a cause o f loss. According to data from Minet's Risk M anagement database, plaintiffs alleged that 
lack o f independence/objectivity was a cause o f loss in 9%  o f claims against Big Six accounting firms in the United 
States since June 1, 1972.
Combining the very large potential losses in litigation with the observation that independence issues are 
sometimes alleged to be a cause o f loss, it seems clear that an accounting firm  that engages in an institutional level 
o f lack o f independence would face an avalanche o f litigation. We conclude that the possibility o f  litigation provides 
accounting firms with powerful incentives to avoid systemic independence violations.
410These data were compiled from Minet's Risk Management database, which contains 610 matters against the Big 
Six firms in the United States. The Risk Management database includes all reported matters on which there is 
sufficient information in addition to every reported matter with an incurred loss o f at least $1,000,000.
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4. Auditors' Investm ents
Auditors have incentives to preserve their independence beyond those forced on them  by the liability 
system. Auditors have investments in their firms' reputations for independence and in their stock o f expertise which 
would be put at risk should they im pair independence. We observe auditors taking steps to protect these investments. 
This section discusses these investments, beginning with reputations.
4.1. Auditors' Reputations
Competition in the markets for their services induces auditors to invest in their reputations, of which a 
reputation for independence is a part. It is hard to imagine anything but a corrupt Board of Directors allowing the 
company to hire a non-independent auditor. Engaging in an institutional-level abrogation o f independence would put 
the firm's entire stream of audit revenues at risk.411 This is a crucial feature o f the multi-client nature o f the 
practices o f almost all modem accounting firms. W ith one client, the threat o f a loss o f revenue might be used to 
gain power over the auditor and impair auditor independence. With multiple clients, an abrogation o f independence 
with one client threatens the revenue stream derived from the entire client pool.412
As a conservative estimate o f the total amount o f audit revenue obtained by the auditors o f public 
companies in the United States, we examined the Big Six firms' reports to the AICPA SEC Practice Section 
(SECPS). Even considering only these six accounting firms, the revenue streams are substantial. As indicated in 
Table 4.1, audit revenues in the U.S. for the Big Six firms topped $6 billion in 1996. In terms o f constant 1996 
dollars, the Big Six firms' revenues have been hovering just over $6 billion for several years 413
T a b le  4 .1
B ig  S ix  F irm s' A u d it  R e v e n u e s
1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 6
Year Big Six Total Audit Revenues 
(millions o f nominal $)
Big Six Total Audit Revenues 
(millions o f 1996 $)
1996 6,136 6,136
411The non-audit revenues might be at risk as well, if  the audit reputation provides a positive spillover onto non- 
audit services.
412Economic analyses o f  independence often focus not on revenues but on quasi-rents, which are the excess o f 
revenues over costs in a given period that allow relationship-specific capital to generate a return. See DeAngelo, 
Linda, "Auditor Independence, "Low Balling," and Disclosure Regulation," Journal o f  Accounting and Economics, 
1981. There are no data on quasi-rents, so we state our analysis in terms o f revenues.
413Nominal revenue figures were taken from the firms' reports to the SECPS. These are restated using the Consumer 
Price Index from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics (BLS). In particular, we extracted Series ID CUUROOOOSAO, U.S. 
City Average, All items, on Sept. 26, 1997, from the BLS Web Site, accessible at 
<http://stats.bls.gov/datahome.htm>.
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1995 5,839 6,011
1994 5,856 6,200
1993 5,603 6,083
1992 5,405 6,044
1991 5,266 6,067
1990 5,225 6,272
It is clear that the present value o f this revenue stream is a very large number, and that it represents a 
substantial "bond" to insure that accounting firms protect their independence. For example, estimating the stream of 
audit revenues to be flat at $6 billion per year in perpetuity and using an interest rate o f 10%, the total present value 
o f the Big Six revenue stream is $60 billion. O f course, costs must be deducted from this revenue stream to get the 
net value of future profits at risk. We offer this examination of their revenues as a reflection o f the size o f the 
market.
4.2. Partners' Capital
Another, much more conservative measure o f the amount that would be put at risk by compromising 
independence is the total partners' capital in accounting firms. As a conservative estimate o f this capital, we obtained 
estimates for the Big Six firms in the U.S. In each o f the firms, the total partners' capital as o f the latest fiscal year 
end was in the hundreds o f millions o f dollars. The total partners' capital in the Big Six firms as o f the latest fiscal 
year end for each firm was in excess of $3.5 billion.414
This is a very conservative measure, since it represents only the partners' total current financial investment. 
It does not consider the devastating effects on the value o f their human capital, should they lose their rights to 
conduct audits. The bankruptcy o f  Laventhol & Horwath establishes that, at a minimum, the partners stand to lose 
their total capital in the firm, should the firm sacrifice its independence.
4.3. Investments in Audit Methodology and Technology
Accounting firms also have an incentive to protect their substantial investments in audit methodology and 
technology. We asked the Big Six firms how much they spent on improving audit methodology and technology in 
the most recent fiscal year. Four o f the six had that amount available, and the total o f the four was in excess o f $170 
million.415 Two o f the six were able to provide figures for the total investment in audit methodology and 
technology over the last five years. These two firms alone spent in excess o f $500 million over this period.
In more qualitative terms, we asked each o f the Big Six firms to describe their recent investments in audit 
technology and methodology. Based on their responses, it is apparent to us that the industry is making substantial 
investments in software and data/knowledge bases. We will comment more on this trend in Section 6. Our purpose 
here is to note the firms' interest in protecting these investments. Investments in audit technology and methodology 
are specific to the auditing industry. That is, it is unlikely that they would be o f much use to anyone other than an 
accounting firm, and perhaps not even to another accounting firm. The firms have powerful incentives to protect 
these investments by policing themselves.
414Compiled from data supplied to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson.
415Compiled from data supplied to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson.
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4.4. Protection of Investments through Internal Controls and Safeguards
Accounting firms protect their investments in many ways, the most important o f which are the accepted 
control procedures they apply within their organizations. Accounting firms have in place elaborate safeguards to 
insure the independence o f their individual auditors with respect to their clients. These safeguards include careful 
selection and training o f audit personnel, tracking of personal investments, consultation requirements, national-level 
consultation functions, partner rotation, second partner reviews, and client acceptance and retention policies.
5. The Supply o f Non-A udit Services
The independence implications o f auditors supplying non-audit services to audit clients have long been a 
source o f dispute and controversy. Independence concerns led the SEC to issue ASR 250 in June 1978, requiring 
proxy-statement disclosures about audit fees and fees for non-audit services paid to the accounting firm. Serious 
doubts about the usefulness o f these disclosures led to the withdrawal o f ASR 250 after only three years, but the 
issue o f auditor supply o f non-audit services to audit clients has not gone away. In fact, the growth o f such services 
has led to renewed interest in their implications for auditing.
This section examines the economics o f accounting firms' supply of non-audit services to audit clients. We 
begin with an examination o f the significance o f these services, then turn to the crucial issue o f economies o f scope 
with audit services. Finally, we seek to understand whether there appears to be any harm in the supply o f such 
services by examining the relation between the supply o f non-audit services and the practice protection costs paid by 
Big Six firms.
5.1. Significance of Non-audit Services
Revenues from non-audit services are a significant and growing portion o f the revenues o f  accounting 
firms. For the Big Six, Table 5.1416 shows that total revenues from consulting had virtually equaled those from 
auditing in 1996. Given the trends o f the two revenue streams, consulting revenues very likely now exceed those 
from auditing. Revenues from tax services have grown somewhat, but seem to behave much more like audit fees in 
terms o f growth than do the consulting fees.
416Compiled from data submitted by the Big Six firms to the SECPS.
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T ab le  5 .1
B r e a k d o w n  o f  B ig  S ix  F e e s  b y  S o u r c e 417
Year Audit Tax Total Consulting Total Revenues 
(millions o f 1996$)
millions o f 
1996$
% millions of 
1996$
% millions o f 
1996$
%
1996 6,136 40 3,439 23 5,582 37 15,156
1995 6,011 44 3,104 23 4,431 33 13,546
1994 6,200 50 2,868 23 3,346 27 12,413
1993 6,083 51 3,022 26 2,732 23 11,838
1992 6,044 52 3,044 26 2,622 22 11,710
1991 6,067 52 3,027 26 2,583 22 11,676
1990 6,272 53 3,113 26 2,482 21 11,867
Table 5.1 also shows that consulting revenues have grown substantially as measured by their fraction of 
total Big Six fees. Combining tax and consulting fees, we see that 60% of the revenues o f the Big Six firms in 1996 
were from the supply o f non-audit services.
Because there appears to be little controversy in accounting firms' supply o f tax services, we focus on 
consulting services. One important fact not revealed by our analysis to this point is the extent o f consulting services 
supplied to audit clients. While we do not have the data to answer this question for general audit clients, the Big Six 
firms' reports to the SECPS separate consulting fees for SEC audit clients from those o f all other consumers of 
consulting services. Table 5.2418 shows that auditors supply a substantial amount o f consulting services to their SEC 
audit clients.
417The percentages are stated in terms o f percentages o f total revenues.
418Compiled from data submitted by the Big Six firms to the SECPS.
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T a b le  5 .2
C o m p o s it io n  o f  B ig  S ix  C o n su lt in g  F ees:  
S E C  C lie n ts  &  A ll  O th er419
Year SEC audit clients All other clients Total Consulting 
(millions o f 1996$)
millions o f 1996$ % millions o f 1996$ %
1996 1,024 18 4,558 82 5,582
1995 708 16 3,723 84 4,431
1994 583 17 2,763 83 3,346
1993 497 18 2,236 82 2,732
1992 438 17 2,184 83 2,622
1991 350 14 2,233 86 2,583
1990 431 17 2,050 83 2,482
Table 5.2 also shows the percentage o f total consulting revenues obtained by supplying consulting services 
to SEC audit clients and all other clients. It is apparent that the proportion o f consulting services supplied to SEC 
audit clients has been fairly constant. Therefore, the growth in the consulting revenues o f the Big Six firms has not 
been the result o f a disproportionate growth in the consulting services consumed by their SEC clients. This suggests 
that the growth in consulting revenues has been driven by the value o f those services in the market, and not by 
increasing attempts to undermine the independence of auditors by tying lucrative consulting contracts to audit 
outcomes.
In the next subsection, we discuss the ties between auditing and non-audit services, particularly consulting. 
From a policy perspective, it is very important that we understand as much as possible about why auditing and 
consulting services are linked. The most cynical view is that clients demand consulting from their accounting firms 
as a way o f creating additional means through which to influence the audit. I f  true, we would expect to see a relation 
between audit failures and the supply o f non-audit services. We would also expect to see a tie between audit-practice 
protection costs and the supply o f non-audit services. We find in subsection 5.3 that neither is in fact the case.
An alternative perspective is that accounting firms supply consulting services because they have a 
comparative advantage at doing so. The validity o f this view turns on the existence o f economies o f scope between 
audit and non-audit services. The evidence supporting this view is currently mostly o f a suggestive nature, and is 
discussed in the next subsection.
5.2. Economies of Scope with Audit Services
5.2.1. Potential Sources o f  E conom ies o f  Scope
Cost advantages obtained by producing different products or delivering different services within one firm 
are economies o f scope. There has never been much debate about whether there are economies o f  scope linking tax 
and audit services.420 The relation between auditing and consulting is another matter. One problem  in this area is
419The percentages are stated in terms of percentages o f total consulting revenues.
420Audits invariably involve issues o f taxation, as taxes are important factors in calculating net income. Good tax 
advice depends on an intimate knowledge o f financial affairs, a great deal o f which is acquired in the process o f 
doing an audit. A thorough understanding o f the client's records is important in supplying both auditing and tax 
services.
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that consulting services are varied and hard to categorize. But regardless o f the nature o f the consulting services they 
provide, the success o f accounting firms in establishing rapidly growing consulting operations is itself testimony to 
the comparative advantage these firms have in this arena.
Ideally, we would like to have rigorous, econometric measures o f the economies o f scope among various 
types o f services offered by accounting firms. Lacking this quantitative evidence, we identified two possible sources 
o f economies o f scope and sought to understand whether the practices o f accounting firms were consistent with 
economies arising from these sources.
One potential economy o f scope is the use in consulting and auditing o f the same information. Both 
auditing and consulting involve learning about the client, and it might be the case that this learning can be done once 
and applied to both areas. The Big Six firms have described to us their practices o f sharing information across 
auditing and consulting teams.421 Therefore, it is possible that the accounting firms' enjoy learning-based economies 
o f scope by doing both auditing and consulting, as opposed to doing only one or the other.422
Another possible source o f economies o f scope is information about the value o f consulting projects that is 
obtained in the course o f doing an audit. The audit team, in its study o f client business practices and systems, might 
learn that the client could benefit from a certain type o f consulting service. The audit team could create value, then, 
by informing its firm's consulting practice and the client o f this potential for the profitable performance o f the 
service. Accounting firms' policies stress the use o f audit information to deliver value to clients by pointing out 
possible improvements in their business practices, some o f which can be obtained by employing the accounting 
firms' own consulting experts.
5.2.2. Social C ost o f  Foregone Econom ies o f  Scope
Economic welfare is enhanced when the most efficient supplier o f a good or service is allowed to fulfill the 
demand for that good or service. To the extent that there are economies o f scope between audit and non-audit 
services, a social cost is imposed when an accounting firm is not allowed to supply consulting services. The 
magnitude o f the social cost depends on the extent o f the economies o f scope. If  the most efficient supplier is 
prohibited from fulfilling demand, the next most efficient supplier has a profit opportunity. That next most efficient 
supplier will use more o f society's resources to fulfill demand, imposing a social loss. It is also likely that demand 
will drop. Projects that are profitable when done by the most efficient supplier may be unprofitable when done less 
efficiently. The social loss in this case is the net value o f the foregone project.
In a free market system, the market participants themselves judge which projects add net value and how the 
gains to that added value are to be split. Because they can capture the value produced, the market participants have 
incentives to seek out profit opportunities and agree on how to divide the gains. Accounting firms and audit clients 
have incentives to find opportunities to profit by economies o f scope and to exploit those opportunities. This creates 
social value.
421 Some o f the firms have formally organized client service teams that are charged with the responsibility o f making 
sure there is full communication among auditors and non-auditors. Others have a partner who is the "point person" 
for a given client. All described ways in which they sought to make sure information obtained in consulting was 
used in doing the audit.
422There are some examples that are quite suggestive o f economies o f scope from learning about the client. One 
accounting firm related an interesting experience about one client's warranty costs. Because o f its efforts in auditing 
warranty reserves, the client asked the audit team to assist with a project aimed at improving and distributing 
information about product quality within the client company. The audit team, by virtue o f its work in auditing the 
warranty reserves, understood the drivers o f product quality and the specific information that would be o f use in 
assessing those drivers. Further, the development o f information about quality by the client led to improvements and 
efficiencies in future audits o f warranty reserves.
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Accounting firms also have incentives to weigh the gains derived from exploiting economies o f scope 
against any the costs o f independence safeguards, and to craft their organizations to minimize these costs. In a 
competitive market for audit services, accounting firms have appropriate incentives, from a social point of view, to 
make the proper tradeoffs between exploiting economies o f scope and the costs o f designing and maintaining 
organizational structures to safeguard independence. Restricting accounting firms' ability to take consulting 
assignments will only improve social welfare if  there are social costs not weighed in the firms' cost-benefit calculus. 
This seems unlikely. The market for audit services is by all accounts active and competitive. The identity and quality 
of service o f the larger accounting firms is well-understood, as are their incentives to protect their reputations and 
minimize their exposure to liability.
A t the individual level, however, a given CPA might well not make an appropriate tradeoff between 
independence costs and other benefits. The reason is simply that an individual participant in an accounting firm can 
impose externalities on other members o f  the firm. Misdeeds by one individual can impair the reputation o f an entire 
firm, so monitoring o f individual behavior by the firm is warranted and routinely done.423 It is difficult to tell 
directly, however, whether this monitoring is sufficient to curb systemic independence violations. In the next 
subsection, we examine the practice protection costs o f the Big Six firms for evidence that they are incorrectly 
assessing potential independence costs in their supply o f non-audit services.
5.3. Relation between Non-audit Services and Audit Practice Protection Costs
This subsection examines the relation between the costs o f protecting audit practices and the supply o f non- 
audit services. We explore two facets o f  this issue: losses from litigation and the costs o f liability insurance.
5.3.1. N on-audit Services and Losses from  L itigation
The first striking fact about the relation between the supply o f non-audit services and losses from litigation 
is the paucity o f specific examples in which the supply o f non-audit services was shown to cause damages. In 
Minet's risk management database424 o f 610 claims against auditors, there are only 24 claims in which the claim 
mentions that the auditor also supplied consulting services. In 19 o f those cases, it does not appear that 
independence was an issue. In two o f the remaining five cases, there were allegations o f a lack o f independence, but 
the allegations were not directed at the supply o f consulting services. This leaves us with only three out o f 610 cases 
in which there were allegations that independence was somehow impaired by the supply o f consulting services.
We supplemented the M inet database with informal queries o f attorneys whose practices involve 
knowledge o f claims against the Big Six. We again failed to uncover any specific instances in which the supply of 
non-audit services led to an audit failure.
For a more quantitative picture o f the relation between the supply o f non-audit services and audit failures, 
Table 5.3 reports the consulting fees o f  the Big Six firms, broken down into SEC clients, other clients and total fees, 
against the number o f claims against Big Six firms from the Minet statistical database. Clearly, consulting fees have 
been going up while the number o f claims and/or suits has been declining. Figure 5.1 contains a graph o f these data, 
which reveal that the effects o f consulting fees on claims, if  they exist and if  they are positive, are heavily 
outweighed by the main factors that drive litigation and consulting fees.
423Professional organizations like the AICPA also have an interest in monitoring and disciplining their members.
424The following data were supplied by Minet.
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T a b le  5 .3
N u m b e r  o f  C la im s /S u its  a g a in s t B ig  S ix  F irm s an d  C o n su lt in g
F ee s4 2 5
1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 6
Policy Year Num ber of 
Claims/Suits
Total Big Six 
Consulting Fees 
from SEC audit 
clients
Total Big Six 
Consulting Fees 
from all other clients
Total Big Six 
Consulting Fees
1995-96 109 1,169 4,165 5,334
1994-95 124 875 3,184 4,059
1993-94 126 720 2,401 3,121
1992-93 145 595 2,068 2,663
1991-92 140 490 1,996 2,486
1990-91 203 452 1,863 2,315
The lack o f specific instances in which the supply o f non-audit services undermined independence and the 
opposing time trends of consulting fees and the number o f claims against Big Six firms, are evidence that the supply 
o f non-audit services has not compromised auditor independence. There are two more sources o f evidence on this 
issue. One is the pricing o f auditors' liability insurance. The other is the reaction to the SEC's requirement in 
Accounting Series Release (ASR) 250 that firms disclose information about fees for auditor-supplied, non-audit 
services. These disclosures were made in their proxy statements from September 30, 1978 through February 1982, 
when the requirement was removed. We examine this evidence in the next two subsections.
5.3.2. N on-audit Services and the Pricing o f  L iab ility  Insurance
To facilitate their purchase o f liability insurance, Minet develops risk profiles o f  the Big Six firms. Minet 
stated that it does not consider the supply o f non-audit services to be a relevant factor in the development o f these 
risk profiles. Further, Minet does not use the supply of non-audit services, either to audit clients or others, as a 
predictive variable in estimating the Big Six firms' litigation losses. Their loss estimation is based on the experience 
o f the individual firms,426 tempered with general economic variables on a judgmental basis. There are no known 
covenants in existing liability insurance contracts which restrict an accounting firm's ability to offer non-audit 
services.
Auditors' insurers have obvious incentives to assess properly the factors that are associated with audit 
failures. They have incentives to find the most diagnostic predictors possible o f future losses in litigation. They have 
the ability to write insurance contracts which restrict the amount o f loss reimbursement whenever specified types o f 
non-audit services are provided. A t the least, this is evidence that existing safeguards o f auditor independence 
operate to ensure that accounting firms protect their independence when providing non-audit services. It is also 
consistent with the view that the firms themselves have taken adequate steps to protect their independence, insofar 
as the insurers are concerned. Because the insurers have such an obvious and direct monetary interest in such 
matters, this is evidence that the supply o f non-audit services has not damaged auditor independence.
425The fees are averages of the fees in the two years indicated in the "Policy Year" column. Fees are measured in 
millions o f constant 1996 dollars.
426Minet's use o f the experience o f the individual firms is consistent with the importance o f the firms' reputations.
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5.3.3. R eaction  to A SR  250
ASR 250 required firms to disclose the percentage o f fees for auditor-supplied, non-audit services to audit 
fees in proxy statements. It also required separate disclosure o f the percentage o f fees for each auditor-supplied, non- 
audit service to audit fees whenever it exceeded 3%, and whether the board o f directors or the audit committee had 
to approve auditor-supplied, non-audit services. To underscore the dangers to independence that it perceived, the 
SEC stated in ASR 264, which proposed guidance for auditors and boards o f directors in assessing whether auditors 
should supply non-audit services:427
The Commission believes that public confidence is significantly lessened if 
auditors engage in activities and services that the public perceives as foreign to the 
expected role o f the auditor.
With the disclosures required by ASR 250 and the official concern about non-audit services expressed in 
ASR 264, one might expect that firms would alter their purchases o f non-audit services from their auditors. Yet in 
his study o f firms' purchases o f non-audit services from auditors after ASR 250, James Scheiner found "no 
significant changes in the quantity of specific nonaudit services among CPA firms or categories of clients occurred 
subsequent to ASR No. 250."428
It is conceivable that managers and auditors were disregarding adverse effects on shareholders in 
continuing the non-audit services. If  that were true, one would expect that shareholders would be more likely to vote 
against retention o f the auditor. Yet William Glezen and James Millar, in their study o f shareholder votes to select 
an independent auditor, found no significant difference in auditor approval ratios before and after the disclosures 
required by ASR 250.429 I f  the shareholders' interests were being compromised, they did not employ an obvious 
and inexpensive way to express their displeasure.
As a final gauge o f reactions to the ASR 250 disclosures, we read the letters sent to the SEC by interested 
parties when the SEC was considering withdrawal o f ASR 250 and ASR 264. Without going into undue detail, it 
was clear to us that the letters fell neatly into two categories: competing suppliers o f consulting services, and 
everyone else, including accounting firms and their clients. The accounting firms and clients argued that the 
disclosures were not providing useful information to the investing public. Firms that were competing suppliers of 
consulting services argued that auditor provision o f such services constituted a serious threat to auditor 
independence. W ith no evidence of such a threat, ASR 250 and ASR 264 were rescinded.
5.4. Concluding Remarks about Non-audit Services
Auditors' supply o f non-audit services to audit clients has been the most consistent, troublesome target for 
those critical o f the independence o f auditors. The fees from non-audit services are significant, both as a percentage 
o f the total fees o f the accounting firms and in an absolute sense. The delivery o f non-audit services often requires a 
close relationship with management, and with taxation advice, may place the firm in the position o f articulating
427As quoted in Scheiner, J., "An Empirical Assessment o f the Impact o f SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure 
Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their Clients," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Autumn 1984, p. 790.
428 Ibid., p. 790.
429Glezen, G. William, and James A. Millar, "An Empirical Investigation o f Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures 
Required by ASR No. 250," Journal o f  Accounting Research, Autumn 1985, pp. 859-870.
19
clients' positions before regulators.430 Viewed in isolation, it is easy to understand how critics can perceive that the 
supply o f non-audit services to audit clients impairs independence.
A much different picture emerges when we consider the totality o f auditors' incentives. Legal liability and 
the value o f reputations provide incentives for accounting firms to maintain their independence. Auditors are seen, at 
both the firm and the professional level, to regulate, monitor and protect their independence. Still, we might question 
whether the incentives and safeguards that exist are enough. To settle this, we must look at the evidence.
The evidence provides no support for the position that the supply o f non-audit services has impaired 
independence to the point that costs have been imposed on any constituency. There are very few instances in which 
the supply o f non-audit services is even alleged to have damaged independence. Insurers do not constrain the supply 
of non-audit services in their liability contracts with auditors, and insurers do not use the supply of non-audit 
services either as a risk factor or in estimating losses. The number o f claims and/or suits against the Big Six is 
unrelated to fees from non-audit services. Managers and auditors did not alter their behavior when the SEC required 
disclosure o f information about non-audit fees, even though this information was supplied directly to shareholders in 
proxy statements. Shareholders did not change their voting behavior in auditor selection as a function o f disclosures 
about non-audit fees. When the SEC withdrew ASR 250 and ASR 264, the only audible protest came from the 
auditors' competitors in the market for non-audit services.
While we find no evidence that the supply o f non-audit services damages independence, we find a lot of 
evidence that the supply o f non-audit services adds value. Accounting firms have been very successful in supplying 
non-audit services, as measured by the fees they generate. In assessing value created, it is important to consider 
more than just the fees received for non-audit services. The buyers o f these services are also getting value from 
them. In classical economic terms, we must consider consumer, as well as producer, surplus in assessing the social 
value o f non-audit services.
The extreme step o f prohibiting auditors from supplying non-audit services to audit clients would not 
destroy the entire social value o f the non-audit services. It would open a profit opportunity for other suppliers o f 
these services. However, because these suppliers cannot currently wrest the market away from accounting firms, 
they must be less efficient than the accounting firms, perhaps due to economies o f scope with audits. The difference 
in efficiencies and the accompanying change in the amount o f services purchased would represent a social cost o f 
banning auditors from non-audit activities with their clients. In view o f our economic analysis and the evidence, we 
believe this social cost outweighs any realistic view of the possible benefits.
These remarks pertain primarily to the past. The evidence can only reflect actual experience, and there are 
environmental changes and developing trends that could effect auditor independence. We make a few brief 
comments on these trends in the next section.
6. Trends Affecting the A uditing Industry
We confine our remarks to two major trends, which we view as related: the increasing scale of some 
economic organizations associated with globalization, and the impact o f rapid changes in information technology.
6.1. Globalization and Scale
Major economic organizations today operate on a global scale. In the absence o f serious, widespread 
political conflict, they are likely to continue to do so. Clearly, organizations with a global reach require auditors with
430O f course, accounting firms perform similar functions in their capacities as auditors. See Section 921.12 of the 
AICPA Bylaws.
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a global reach. Audit clients have been operating internationally for some time now, and all o f the Big Six and many 
other accounting firms operate worldwide. However, improvements in information technology and low 
transportation costs make possible levels o f consistency, communication and operational harmony in clients' 
international operations never before possible. Organizations are crafting structures that allow them to reap the 
benefits o f economies o f scale on a new plane. The most efficient and effective ways to audit them will very likely 
be through accounting firms that take advantage o f the same economies o f scale.
Just as our major stock exchanges have felt the presence o f international competition, so too are efforts 
increasing to harmonize, or at least coordinate, accounting standards at an international level. Extrapolating this 
trend, we can expect some pressures on accounting firms to harmonize their international practices. The increasingly 
global nature o f reputations will reinforce these pressures, because a major audit failure in one country could impact 
an accounting firm's worldwide reputation.
Increasing globalization and scale have implications for auditor independence. They expand the scope of 
understanding necessary to assess the totality o f the incentives faced by a global accounting firm. The environment 
that provides institutional incentives through client relationships, competition, and governmental regulations is 
increasingly a global environment. There are likely to be differences across jurisdictions that must be identified and 
weighed. The institutional incentives provided by the accounting firm's governance structure also operate on a 
global scale. This complicates the task of understanding the economic organization o f accounting firms by 
encompassing issues such as how revenues are shared internationally, how much standardization is applied in the 
approach to audits, and how a worldwide audit staff is selected and trained. The individual factors in auditors' 
incentives, such as personal relationships, economic situation, and family situation are also likely to be more varied 
in accounting firms comprised of personnel that are truly drawn internationally.
Increasing globalization creates pressure to view auditor independence on a worldwide scale. For example, 
developing economies often lack the institutional infra-structure (government oversight, legal systems, organized 
financial markets, an active and forceful auditing function, etc.) that is necessary for modern economic activity.431 
The development o f a clear, concepts-based approach to auditor independence that is founded on a solid 
understanding of the demands of the economic environment, economies o f scope and scale, and the expectations of 
society about the auditors' functions would facilitate the application o f independence rules to such jurisdictions.
6.2. Information Technology
Clients' rapidly increasing use o f sophisticated information technology continues to place great demands on 
auditors. Recent announcements o f two breakthroughs in microprocessors that portend acceleration o f the historical 
pace o f a doubling o f computing power every eighteen months (Moore's Law) imply even faster rates o f change in 
information technology.432 There are many ways in which changes in information technology affect auditing.
Changes in information technology change the ways an organization captures, processes and communicates 
the data that underlie the financial statements subject to audit. In turn, these changes place new demands on the audit 
process. For example, as clients' information processing becomes more automated, integrated, and distributed in a 
client-server environment, auditing becomes more a process o f monitoring and relying on controls within the 
information processing system, rather than on controls o f users o f the system. Many accounting firms now pride 
themselves in their proprietary software, which makes auditing o f client controls much more efficient than earlier 
approaches which sampled transactions. Proper application o f this audit technique, however, is dependent on a deep
431 See Khanna, Tarun and Krishna Palepu, "Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets," , 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1997, pp. 41-51.
432See Markoff, John, "Innovation to Double Chip Power May Cut Life Span o f Computers," The New York Times, 
Section A: Business/Financial Desk, Sept. 17, 1997, p. 1, and Zuckerman, L., "I.B.M. to Make Smaller and Faster 
Chips," The New York Times, Section D: Business/Financial Desk, Sept. 22, 1997.
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understanding o f the audit client's organization and business processes. The demands on auditors to keep up with 
increasingly sophisticated client software are likely to be high.
Changes in information technology have impacted and likely will continue to impact the way organizations 
are crafted. For example, relationships between customers and suppliers are being radically altered by integration of 
their information systems. Customers now place orders directly through suppliers' information systems, blurring our 
traditional concepts of organizational boundaries. This has extended to the physical location o f suppliers in 
manufacturers' facilities. These changes may require that audit effort be integrated across supplier-manufacturer 
clients. They are likely to place new demands on our thinking about auditor independence.
Dramatic improvements in information technology may also cause fundamental changes in the approach to 
accounting. For example, there would seem a real possibility that some form o f continual access to information will 
at least partially replace periodic reporting. Given access to instant information on the World Wide Web, it will 
likely not be long before investors are demanding to look at a constantly updated picture o f financial performance 
over the last twelve months, rather than rely on an even mildly dated annual or quarterly report. Providing requisite 
assurance services on such systems will likely necessitate further continual involvement o f auditors with their 
clients, and raise a host o f unforeseen issues about auditor independence.
6.3. Concluding Remarks about Trends
Just as the trends toward globalization and the use o f increasingly sophisticated information technology are 
changing the business practices o f audit clients, we also expect them to change the business practices o f accounting 
firms. Already we see accounting firms wishing to engage a variety o f innovative business relationships, including 
joint ventures and strategic alliances. It is in accounting firms' interests to engage in these opportunities to create 
value. It is also in their interest to structure their relationships in ways that protect their independence. We believe 
that whatever independence rules are ultimately adopted, they should be open to the efforts of accounting firms and 
their clients to design innovative relationships that create value and assure audit independence.
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7. Conclusion
Taking a holistic view, we have found that auditors have many incentives to protect their independence. 
Legal liability is significant, and any firm that would damage its independence risks an avalanche o f litigation. 
Auditors' have substantial investments in reputations, audit technology and methodology, and directly in their 
financial stakes in accounting firms. We have found no evidence that the supply o f non-audit services threatens 
auditor independence, and there is a strong intuitive case that accounting firms create value by capturing economies 
o f scope between audit and non-audit services.
We have approached our analysis o f auditor independence with the view that accounting firms and their 
clients have every incentive to devise organizational structures that take advantage o f economies and create 
economic value. This contrasts with the skepticism we perceive is embodied in many critical views o f auditor 
independence. This skepticism is reminiscent o f the inhospitality tradition in antitrust regulation, which presumed 
that nonstandard modes o f contracting were anticompetitive.433 Further, we believe that the emphasis that has often 
been placed on perceptions invites adoption o f a piecemeal view that does not give full recognition to all o f auditors' 
incentives. Effective auditor independence rules should give auditors and their clients the opportunity and incentive 
to be innovative in structuring relationships that protect the independence o f auditors, yet take advantage of 
economies to deliver value.
433See Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism , The Free Press: New York, 1985.
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I. Introduction
This study considers auditor independence from the perspective o f organizational psychology. In 
that connection, particular attention was given to:
•  understanding in general how the auditing process is conducted today — The "father" of 
social-organizational psychology, Kurt Lewin, pointed out many years ago that to 
understand behavior, one must simultaneously take into account the individual's 
personality (in this study, we concentrated primarily on one important facet of 
personality-m otivation) and the individual's environment, especially his or her 
perception o f that environment (Lewin, 1951). Understanding, therefore, the context—the 
audit itself and the engagement team, i.e., what surrounds and influences the auditor's 
behavior, particularly independence-related behavior—was central to the study;
•  the behavior of auditors, especially with respect to factors that affect individual 
motivation and in what ways — While Freudian theory, psychoanalysis, remains alive, it 
is not well. Psychoanalytic theory requires a diagnosis o f what is "going on inside one's 
head." The more accepted approach in psychology today is to study behavior, what the 
researcher can actually see and record. Attributions are made about cognition (i.e., 
thought processes), but usually on the basis o f observations. (See, for example, Dennett, 
1991);
• the auditor's relationships with his/her
- supervisor
- peers
- managing partner
- clients
as a member of the "engagement team." As noted above, these relationships are key to 
understanding the auditor's environment;
•  organizational context, especially the firm's
- culture
- reward system
- safeguards
- performance evaluation system/process
- recruitment and training processes
- process o f professional development for auditors
With the exception o f safeguards (which are o f particular pertinence to this study, of 
course), this list o f variables comprises some o f the more basic fundamentals o f study in 
organizational psychology (Schein, 1980); and
• understanding external safeguards, i.e., the broader context.
II. Methodology
In addition to reviewing existing literature addressing issues o f auditor independence (for 
example, such articles as the ones by Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewemstein, 1997; Jeter and Shaw 1995; 
Nichols and Price, 1976; Pearson, 1985; and Wallman, 1996) and related documents provided by the "Big 
6" accounting firms (e.g., excerpts from policy manuals), interviews were conducted with senior auditing 
partners from each o f those firms. In addition, my associate, Miriam Javitch, Ph.D., also conducted 
interviews with auditors in those firms who were less senior, but on the "front line" with respect to the 
active practice o f auditing clients today.
The analysis conducted was to extract information that relates to what we know from social and 
organizational psychology about such variables as motivation, organizational reward systems, leadership 
and management, group dynamics, and organizational culture from (1) the interviews, (2) articles about 
auditor independence, and (3) the documents provided by the Big 6 accounting firms These psychological 
variables were deemed to be the most relevant for purposes o f this study. In other words, I focused on what 
can be explained via social and organizational psychology about auditor behavior that is pertinent to an 
auditor's independence. The following sections provide such an explanation and analysis.
III. Discussion and Analysis
A. M otiva tiona l F actors A ffec ting  Independence and  A u d it Q uality
People are m otivated  by  the po ten tial for bo th  positive  and negative 
rew ards (Vroom , 1964). Positive rew ards are outcom es that an ind iv idual values and 
desires to obtain. The po ten tia l for gaining these positive  rew ards m otivates a person  to 
perform  in a w ay tha t increases the likelihood tha t he or she w ill attain  these desired  
rew ards. A uditors ' com m itm ent to m ain tain ing  independence and objectiv ity  in carrying 
out the  audit is based, in  large part, on the positive rew ards they associate w ith  achieving 
this perform ance standard. In  contrast, negative rew ards are outcom es that the individual 
desires to avoid. In  the case o f  auditing, these are the negative consequences that m ay  
result i f  the auditor does no t m aintain  objectiv ity  and independence during the audit 
process. A uditors' com pliance  w ith  the ru les set forth  by  the SEC and the A IC PA , as 
w ell as firm  policies, is, in  large part, m otivated  b y  the ir desire to avoid  these po ten tial 
negative consequences.
The psychologist w ho has provided  the m ost definitive research  in  this dom ain o f  
m otivation linked to rew ards and punishm ents w as B. F. Skinner. See, fo r exam ple, one 
o f  his m ajor w orks (Skinner, 1953). Skinner w as perhaps the suprem e behaviorist, 
m easuring w hat could  be  observed, ra ther than surm ising w hat w ent on  inside people 's
heads. H e led the w ay for us to understand the fundam ental d ifference betw een 
com pliant behavior and com m itm ent.
The follow ing three sections d iscuss in  greater detail the m otivators and inhibitors 
associated w ith  (1) the  potential for positive rew ards i f  independence is m aintained, (2) 
the potential for negative rew ards i f  independence is no t m aintained and (3) the ro le o f  
self-serving biases.
1. W hat m otivates auditors to strive to achieve the positive  rew ards 
associated  with m ain ta in ing  independence and  objectivity?
There are both positive intrinsic and positive extrinsic m otivators that 
affect an aud ito r's  desire and effort to m aintain independence. Intrinsic m otivators 
concern perform ing w ork in such a w ay that one achieves a g reater sense o f  personal 
com petence, control, and pride in  w hat one has accom plished (D eci, 1976; 1975). For 
professionals th is often  has to do w ith  adhering to a set o f  professional standards in order 
to m aintain  a sense o f  professional in tegrity  and pride. O ur in terview s w ith  auditors 
indicate that these in trinsic m otivators are central to the ir com m itm ent to  m aintain  an 
objective and independent approach w hen w orking w ith  audit clients. A s m em bers o f  the 
auditing profession, these individuals expressed a sense o f  com m itm ent and obligation to 
uphold the responsib ility  o f  "doing the righ t th ing" on b eh a lf o f  the ir profession. Their 
desire to m aintain  a  h igh  level o f  professional integrity  is consistent w ith  the theoretical 
w ork and em pirical research that has been  done in  the area o f  psychology know n as role 
m otivation theory  (Javitch, 1997; M iner, 1993, 1980). W e generally  find this 
characteristic am ong m ost professionals, including physicians, scientists, lawyers, and 
academ icians, to nam e a few  (H arrison, 1974).
R ole m otivation  theory proposes four distinct inducem ent system s that m otivate 
d ifferent types o f  em ployees to perform  (M iner, 1980). They are h ierarchic, professional, 
group, and task inducem ent system s. The theory proposes tha t professional role 
prescriptions w ill m ore effectively  pred ict professional accom plishm ents than 
hierarchical role prescrip tions. O ne o f  the  m ajor role prescrip tions for professionals is 
professional com m itm ent. P rofessional com m itm ent keeps m em bers o f  the profession 
responsive to ethical norm s through the ir sense o f  personal identification  w ith  the tenets 
and values o f  the p rofession  (V ollner, 1966). Thus professionals w ho have a high level 
o f  value-based identification w ith  and com m itm ent to their p rofession w ill perform  m ore 
effectively.
In  com parison w ith  in trinsic m otivators, positive extrinsic m otivators are provided 
from  external sources, and include such th ings as pay, prom otion, and recognition by
peers, clients, professional associations, and others (Saal and K night, 1988). The auditors 
w e in terview ed provided us w ith  the follow ing descrip tions o f  the audit profession. They 
pointed out, for exam ple, tha t they  do not get m ore pay or o ther types o f  m onetary  
incentives for m aintaining independence because th is is sim ply a standard  that m ust be 
m aintained (essentially  a m inim um  standard). Indeed, partner com pensation is related  to 
firm w ide results, no t tied  to revenue from  a "partner's clients." F rom  the descriptions o f  
how  auditors advance in  the ir firm s, how ever, it does seem  that, over the  longer term , 
they are prom oted  and rem unerated  based on the quality  o f  the audits they  m anage. 
There are differences in  how  sk illed  and adept auditors are at m anaging the to tality  o f  the 
client relationship . Those w ho are better at identify ing and alerting the clien t to financial 
and accounting issues as soon as they em erge, and then  helping the clien t to deal w ith 
these issues before they becom e so significant that they adversely affect the aud ito r's  
report, are recognized as m ore skilled and adept auditors. O ver tim e, w ith  increasing 
experience, they are likely to be prom oted to m anage larger and m ore com plex audit 
engagem ents. A s they  successfu lly  m anage these larger and m ore com plex m atters, their 
positions in  the firm  becom e m ore secure and, as they build  up seniority , they  are 
rem unerated  m ore highly. So w hile, in the short run, auditors reported ly  do not receive 
additional financial incentives d irec tly  attributable to  m aintaining independence, as they 
learn to apply  their skills, w ith  objectiv ity  and independence, to helping clients deal w ith  
specific accounting issues, they  are apparently rew arded  by  receiving opportunities to 
audit m ore substantial clients. O ver the long run, these types o f  prom otions enhance their 
status in  the  firm  w hich, in turn , translates into h igher levels o f  rem uneration.
F o r a com prehensive and highly  objective description o f  how  the process that 
these auditors discussed w orks in  a variety  o f  organizational contexts, see the w ork  o f  
V irginia B oehm  (e.g., B oehm , 1991). The w ork o f  D avid  M aister (1993) on  professional 
service firm s is also relevant here. H is book is no t science, yet it is thorough and 
illum inating w ith  respect to professional service firm s. See especially  Part F ive o f  
M aister's book, w here he d iscusses partner com pensation. T hese chapters by  M aister 
help to explain  in m ore dep th  (and confirm ) w hat the auditors w e in terv iew ed w ere 
telling us.
A nother form  o f  extrinsic m otivation com es from  w ithin  the clien t system . The 
CEO  and the audit com m ittee w ill all recognize and value the quality  o f  the aud ito r's  
w ork as they  gain confidence in  h is or her ability  to m ain tain  independence, w hile  at the 
sam e tim e providing the clien t w ith  sound advice on  accounting issues. The c lien t's  
satisfaction w ith  the au d ito r's  perform ance helps to ensure that the clien t w ill w ant to 
m aintain  the auditor on the engagem ent. It also m eans that, w hen auditors ro tate o ff  one
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client and are recom m ended as poten tial new  auditors for another client, the ir reputation 
w ith  the o ld client w ill m ake them  m ore attractive to the new  client.
It could be argued that this process w ould be highly  seductive for the  am bitious 
auditor, that is, it w ould  bias h im  or her in favor o f  w hat a clien t m ay  w ant and lead to 
dependence rather than independence. There are, how ever, tw o factors affecting this 
process tha t actually  help  instead to further prom ote and ensure aud ito r independence. 
First, w ith in  the clien t system , one role o f  the audit com m ittee is to  ensure tha t neither the 
client m anagem ent no r the auditor engage in any activities tha t m ay jeopard ize 
independence. O ur interview s indicate that their efforts are, by  and large, successful in 
this regard. A udit com m ittees are reportedly extrem ely conservative and cautious about 
w hat they  perceive to b e  correct conduct. Thus, in a sense, the aud it com m ittee acts as 
yet another form  o f  safeguard w ith in  the client system . Second, w e m ust b ear in m ind 
that the recognition an  auditor receives from  the client is ex trinsic — external to the 
person. W ithout in trinsic m otivation (w hich provides a greater assurance o f  com m itm ent 
to independence), the auditor is m ore susceptible to bias. This d ifference and com parison 
o f  extrinsic and in trinsic m otivations, as w ell as com pliance and com m itm ent, are 
explored in m ore depth  below.
Finally , w hile it w as not explicitly  discussed in  the interview s, there appears to  be 
a strong norm  both  w ith in  these firm s, and throughout the p rofession , for m aintain ing 
independence as a  m eans o f  providing clients w ith  the best possib le  audit service and, in 
the larger schem e, provid ing  financial statem ent users w ith the m ost accurate inform ation 
w ith  w hich they can m ake decisions. It w ould  seem , then, that auditors w ho uphold the 
norm s o f  objectivity  and independence w ill be recognized, to a  large extent, inform ally 
by  their peers and the ir supervisors, and to a som ew hat lesser ex ten t, perhaps, by  their 
profession, for their contribution to supporting w hat are the underp innings o f  our free 
m arket econom y.
2. What motivates auditors to avoid the negative rewards associated with not
maintaining independence?
W hile the potential for positive rew ards engender a strong sense o f  
com m itm ent to m aintain ing independence, the potential negative rew ards, or 
punishm ents, associated w ith no t m aintaining independence ensure a h igh  level o f  
com pliance w ith the p ro fession 's  rules and the firm 's  policies and procedures established 
to  prom ote auditor independence. There are both  in trinsic and extrinsic m otivators 
associated w ith  the negative rew ards that m ay result i f  it becom es apparent tha t an auditor
either in ten tionally  d id not m ain tain  independence o r failed affirm atively  to m ain tain  due 
care in assuring objectivity.
T he in trinsic m otivators are rela ted  to experiencing a sense o f  guilt, rem orse, and 
hum iliation for either having done, or considering doing, som ething tha t fundam entally  
violates professionalism  and independence. A uditors recognize that v io lating  standards 
o f  objectiv ity  and independence has ram ifications beyond their ow n personal careers. It 
can create a  w hole host o f  p rob lem s for their firm , their profession, and the financial 
statem ent users w ho rely  on the veracity  o f  the statem ents they audit. So i f  an auditor 
contem plates violating p rofessionalism  and independence, either b y  com m ission  or 
om ission, in  order to gain prom otion, status, or profit, he or she m ust w eigh  the em otional 
and psychological consequences o f  such action. B ecause auditors have such a strong 
sense o f  in tegrity  and personal and professional p ride in  w hat they  do, the possib ility  o f  
experiencing so m uch negative em otion  is actually a  very  strong deterrent ~  one w hich  
m otivates them  to com ply w ith  w hat som etim es appear to be excessively  m inu te and 
harsh ru les and requirem ents. The psychological literature that helps to explain  th is 
aspect o f  m otivation  com es from  cognitive choice research. The assum ption underly ing  
this line o f  research and theory  is that people are, for the m ost part, rational beings and, 
therefore, w eigh the consequences o f  certain  acts (choices) before actually  behaving. 
W hen the w eight o f  choice is unbalanced  (e.g., po ten tially  too m uch punishm ent), the 
m ore rational choice is to avoid  such an im balance. This assum ption is no doubt 
synonym ous w ith  com m on sense; in  any case, there is em pirical evidence to support it 
(w hich is no t alw ays true in psychological research). F or a com prehensive rev iew  o f  
m otivation theory  and research in  organizational settings, including cognitive choice 
research, see K anfer (1990).
Extrinsic m otivators tha t foster com pliance am ong auditors fall into tw o prim ary  
categories. They include negative consequences for the auditor and negative 
consequences for the firm . T hese negative consequences generally  com e in  the form  o f  
d isciplinary and other sanctions. The individual auditor w ho is found to be actively  
v iolating the tenets o f  ob jectiv ity  and independence m ay experience a host o f  sanctions, 
ranging from  reprim ands to significant liabilities, loss o f  jo b , and even loss o f  one's 
professional license. T hese severe personal negative consequences are effective in 
m otivating auditors no t to v io late the ir professional independence and to com ply  w ith  the 
rules and regulations set forth b y  the SEC, the A IC PA  and, in  the future, the ISB , as w ell 
as the firm 's  policies. (See, again, the chapter by K anfer, 1990.)
B ased  on our in terview s and other research, w e believe that auditors are also 
extrem ely aw are and concerned about the negative consequences to their firm  i f  it is
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charged w ith  a breach o f  independence. N ot only m ay the firm  incur huge liabilities that 
could jeopard ize its financial viability, it m ay  also lose its status and reputation  in the 
industry, m aking it m ore difficult to m aintain  current clients and to gain  new  clients. The 
auditors w e in terview ed w ere extrem ely cognizant o f  the potential dam age they could 
create to their colleagues and their firm , as w ell as to the reputation o f  the profession  as a 
w hole. T hey expressed, w ith  strong conviction, that in  w eighing the po ten tial personal 
gains against the poten tial negative consequences o f  violating the standards o f  
independence, the scale clearly  tips in favor o f  m aintain ing independence — a code o f  
professional conduct tha t they all seem  to believe in very  strongly.
R elated  to these negative consequences flow ing from  a v io lation  o f  independence 
is the problem  o f  the so-called  "free rider" (i.e., one w ho, having derived  benefit from  his 
or her firm 's good reputation, nonetheless p laces that reputation  in jeo p ard y  by  violating 
the princip le o f  independence). Such violators have, o f  course, surfaced in the past. It is 
likely that, on occasion, they  w ill appear again. A fter all, to take an ex trem e parallel, the 
death penalty  does not seem  to d im inish the m urder rate  in  this country. T he price to be 
paid for com prom ising one's independence, w hile not death, is severe nevertheless. The 
m ost effective forces for reducing the occurrence o f  free riders are the intrinsic 
m otivators (see the nex t section for a  list o f  these factors that contribute to  a positive 
com m itm ent to independence).
3. Self-serving Bias in Favor o f  Objectivity and Independence
There is an additional psychological phenomenon that helps to explain why 
auditors are motivated to maintain independence. The concept o f "self-serving bias" (Wetzel, 1982) 
referred to by Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein (1997) helps to explain how people who are called 
upon to make impartial judgments are likely to be biased by their own self-interest. Bazerman and his co­
authors suggest that such bias may render auditor independence effectively impossible. Their conclusion is 
based on research that was conducted in a different context from our study o f auditors. One study they 
refer to, for example, was conducted with jurors. The reward process o f desired juror behavior is very 
different from that that o f auditors. Moreover, as stated in our Introduction, to understand human behavior 
adequately, one must consider both individual personality and the person's environment, i.e., context. 
Auditors, in contrast to the jurors who are referred to in the Bazerman et al. article, have a strong self- 
serving bias for maintaining objectivity and independence (which can be viewed as a form o f impartial 
judgment) because of the potential for both positive rewards and negative rewards. Thus, our own findings, 
which are consistent with theory and other literature in the field (see below) indicate that auditors are quite 
capable o f maintaining independence.
Auditors' self-serving bias for maintaining independence, which is fundamentally grounded in 
their sense o f professional commitment (Miner, 1993), supports the outcomes auditors most want to 
achieve. These include (1) providing the best possible audit service to their clients, (2) feeling that they 
have upheld their professional responsibility with integrity, (3) performing the audit in a manner that their 
firm recognizes by giving them future opportunities to manage larger audit engagements, and (4) avoiding 
the negative consequences o f not maintaining independence (e.g., damaging their sense of personal pride, 
losing their careers, and negatively affecting their firm's success). Both the positive consequences o f 
maintaining independence and the negative consequences of not doing so create a strong self-serving bias 
for upholding independence. Especially if  coupled with the right culture in the firm and the right climate 
on the engagement team (factors discussed below), these factors will tend to create a strong "self-serving 
bias" in favor o f maintaining objectivity and independence. This is also corroborated by the interviews we 
conducted with audit partners who are currently managing client audit engagements.
B. Safeguards
From our perspective, the number and comprehensive character o f the safeguards that 
exist today are more than adequate. We would not recommend the addition o f safeguards, at least not those 
categorized as external. The practices o f firms o f (a) keeping a "best practices" database and providing all 
auditors in their firms with easy access to these data, and (b) publishing occasional updates about auditing 
practices that are not addressed in manuals are adequate reinforcements for safeguarding independence. 
Our focus, therefore, is more heavily oriented toward safeguards that are personally internal.
1. Comparison o f  External and Internal Safeguards
As noted earlier, what is important here is the distinction behaviorally between 
compliance and commitment, especially with respect to group norms. One can comply with a norm yet not 
be committed to its achievement. Commitment to a norm is a function o f an individual's attitude and belief 
that the mode o f behavior (conformity) that the norm dictates is the right and proper thing to do. In other 
words, when there is congruence between norm-specified behavior and one's personal attitudes, beliefs, 
and behavioral disposition, compliance and  commitment are automatic. Compliance can occur without an 
individual's personal disposition to do so, however. In the latter situation, rewards and punishments must 
be clearly specified and directly related to the conforming behavior desired. W ith respect to commitment, 
intrinsic motivation is key. Commitment is internally and personally driven. Extrinsic rewards have little 
to do with commitment. In fact, heavy use o f extrinsic rewards and/or punishments may ensure 
compliance, but simultaneously decrease commitment. (Deci, 1975; for more recent support for these 
statements, see Bandura, 1986; Lepper, 1985; and Malone & Lepper, 1987.)
W hat follows is a taxonomy o f independence safeguards organized according to compliance and 
commitment. The stronger safeguards for purposes o f auditor motivation are by far the commitment
column. Some external safeguards may be internalized, especially if  the individual auditor considers the 
source o f those safeguards to have values and interests identical to, or congruent with, his or her own.
External Safeguards 
(External to the Individual Auditor)
Internal Safeguards 
(Internal and Personal to the Individual Auditor)
- COMPLIANCE - - COMMITMENT -
•  Promulgated Rules (SEC, AICPA, and the firm's own 
policy manuals).
•  Desire to be a professional, to be a part o f a special if 
not elite group in society; a group that protects the 
public by adhering to a code o f ethics and practice.
•  Professional practice letters/memos occasional 
updates about specific audit situations that provide 
guidance not addressed in current manuals).
•  Desire to be respected as an expert; to be sought out 
and asked for one's objective, independent opinion 
and judgment.
•  Investment tracking • For younger auditors, desire to rise in the firm; to be 
promoted; to be recognized as a good risk manager; 
to one day be partner; to be recognized for strong, 
high quality performance.
• Internal inspection review • Being supported by fellow team members, senior 
executives, and partners; i.e., knowing that one (a) 
does not have to confront tough client issues alone 
and (b) is expected to seek help.
•  Annual confirmation/affidavits • The need to be technically competent, to maintain 
and improve this competence; and to strive to avoid a 
re-statement process, i.e., done right the first time.
•  Concurring partner review • Desire to be a key player in helping to maintain and 
improve the firm's reputation.
•  Peer review • Desire to be a key player in helping to grow  the 
firm's business.
•  Consultation requirements • Desire to be a team player, respected by peers as a 
contributing member with value to add to the 
engagement team  process.
External Safeguards 
(External to the Individual Auditor)
Internal Safeguards 
(Internal and Personal to the Individual Auditor)
- COMPLIANCE - - COMMITMENT -
• To avoid litigation; to keep one's job; to remain in the 
profession.
• Pride in being a professional (as above) but also in 
being a contributing member o f a prestigious firm.
• Compensation m ethods------------------------ > • Compensation methods—being competitive in the 
marketplace to attract and retain talent, yet have in 
place a system that provides long-term growth 
financially for the individual auditor; i.e., the auditor 
can "see" the value o f staying with the firm.
• Training------------------------------------------ > • Training inculcates techniques for both competent 
work and the underlying values o f audit work and the 
firm's culture; the value and importance of 
objectivity and independence is "drilled" into the 
auditor to the degree that eventually this aspect o f 
behavior becomes "second nature."
• Partner rotation--------------------------------- > • Partner rotation can be internally motivating when 
coupled with broader, more challenging assignments; 
in other words, a rotation resulting in a more 
challenging or prestigious assignment is an important 
reward.
Note: Safeguards number 10, 11, and 12 can begin as external but gradually become internal. Other 
safeguards, such as firm manuals and internal safeguards, might also be internalized over time.
In summary, the most effective compliance-oriented rules will be those that reinforce or lead to 
commitment. Safeguards that depend on compliance are external to the individual and thereby less 
motivating. Their motivation and focus concern more what to avoid, or what not to do, with little emphasis 
on what to do, what one needs to learn to do things right and with high quality. Yes, there may be 
guidelines and instructions for what to do, and these are, o f course, crucial. Psychologically, however, they 
are mandates that eventually may be internalized for the individual auditor. W hat facilitates internalization 
are processes that focus on and emphasize positive qualities o f human behavior—the desire to be 
professional, to be recognized as such, to leam  and grow in the profession, to have peer and senior partner 
support, etc. Strengthening the independence process, therefore, should rely more on professional growth 
and development, on learning, and the appeal to one's integrity. External safeguards should be viewed as 
"givens" that are necessary and, o f course, provide guidance. But strictly speaking, for such factors as fear 
o f litigation, of being banished from the profession, and failing as an auditor, as powerful as these may be 
in obtaining compliance, they are not internally motivating. This conclusion is supported by the work of 
Herzberg (1974; 1966; Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959) where he distinguishes between 
motivating factors, e.g., recognition, autonomy on the job, opportunity to achieve, etc., and maintenance or
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physical hygiene factors, e.g., fringe benefits, disciplinary actions, safe and clean working conditions, etc. 
The latter simply reduce dissatisfaction; they do not motivate, i.e., contribute to job satisfaction.
2. Command-and-Control vs. Enforced Self-Regulation
Three main points can be made that are relevant to the effectiveness o f any 
command and control approach. While these points are set forth in the context o f organizational 
psychology and address relationships at the leader-follower, supervisor-subordinate level rather than at the 
regulatory agency-firm relationship, the principles in both contexts are essentially the same and, in any 
case, are o f general applicability.
1. Due to the fact that people in the workplace today are more educated if  not more 
sophisticated than in decades past about matters o f (a) good management, (b) organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness, and (c) how work can be improved (without always being told), they are less tolerant o f (1) 
the arbitrary use o f power and authority, (2) managers and leaders who are technically incompetent, and (3) 
managers and leaders who have little or no sense o f direction, purpose, and goal clarity. When faced with 
conditions like those listed above, people in the workplace are likely to find ways to "beat the system," 
resist if  not sabotage what they believe to be inept leadership and management, or become apathetic and, 
as a consequence, nonproductive (Burke, 1982; see especially, Chapter 7). In other words, a command- 
and-control system is simply considerably out o f touch with the times. The future will only continue in this 
direction, not return to the past (see, for example, Hornstein, 1996; Lawler, 1996, 1992; and Pfeffer, 1994).
2. The general point made in #1 does not mean that people in the workplace have 
no desire for leadership. Quite to the contrary. Leadership today is desired as much as ever, if  not more so. 
But not just any form of leadership will be tolerated. People want a voice and to be involved. The point is 
as follows:
For every given goal there are a myriad o f paths that can be taken to accomplish the goal. Thus, 
people are more tolerant, if  not desirous, o f  leadership with respect to the determination o f goals, and less 
tolerant, if  not rebellious, about leaders' direction regarding the determination o f  paths to the goals. Since 
any given goal can be achieved in more than one way, the odds o f disagreement about one particular 
mandated path increase. An organizational leader can therefore "take command" about direction, but (if 
prudent) will be highly participative and delegatory about implementation, i.e., how to achieve a given 
direction or goal. The application to auditor independence is obvious. The SEC, AICPA, and ISB can be 
directional regarding policy, concepts, and general goals, but should promote and support self-regulation 
when it comes to implementation o f policy and goals.
3. In psychology there are precious few scientific principles o f behavior. 
Individual differences are so great that it is difficult to declare "truths" about people that hold across a 
variety o f situations. One o f the few principles that we can rely on is that people will do in the future what 
they have been rewarded for doing in the past, and will do what they expect to be rewarded for in the 
future. Another behavioral "truth" that is highly related to the issue under discussion here is the principle
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that involvement leads to commitment (Lewin, 1958). At least in Western cultures, we can count on the 
veracity o f the following statement: The extent to which people will be committed to a decision is a direct 
function o f the degree to which they have been involved in making the decision. By contrast, rules 
imposed by some distant authority without "local" involvement (especially if o f dubious justification or 
complex or burdensome to implement) will secure, at best, a grudging compliance. Thus, there is strong 
empirical evidence to support the approach o f self-regulation (Lawler, 1992; Sashkin, 1984).
C. The Im portance o f  P eers and  G roup D ynam ics
To a great extent, auditors' strong com m itm ent to m ain tain ing  objectivity 
and independence stem s from  and is fostered by  the support they receive from  their peers 
in the firm  and, m ore specifically , through the support they  receive from  m em bers o f  
their audit engagem ent team . Sim ilarly, how ever, strong, bu t m isguided, p eer pressure at 
the firm  level and at the engagem ent unit level could also p lace the auditor at m ore risk 
for v iolating independence. This m eans that it is v itally  im portant for audit firm s to 
create a firm -w ide culture as w ell as engagem ent team  clim ates that support, encourage, 
and dem and high levels o f  integrity  o f  their m em bers.
1. Com m ents fro m  A ud itor Interview s
O ur interview s revealed  that, at the engagem ent team  level, the 
engagem ent partne r's  approach to m anaging the engagem ent team  is v itally  im portant to 
creating a clim ate o f  independence ~  one w here m em bers feel a strong sense o f  personal 
com m itm ent to m aintain ing their independence and w here they feel safe asking for help 
from  team  m em bers and the engagem ent leader w hen dealing w ith  specific and especially 
tough issues. Engagem ent leaders w ho create this type o f  supportive environm ent are 
described as taking an active in terest in getting  to know  their team  m em bers both 
professionally  and personally . They are aw are o f  the ir subordinates' needs and know  
how  to  respond to them  in  a supportive fashion.
These team  leaders (usually  partners in  the audit context) are also described as 
"zealo ts" w hen it com es to their personal sense o f  in tegrity  and com m itm ent to 
objectiv ity  and independence. They pass along their com m itm ent to the ir team  m em bers 
w ith  a  passion. They also engage w ith  their team  m em bers in  spirited  d ialogue about 
issues surrounding specific professional standards and interpretations. Through this type 
o f  dialogue they are able to strengthen the w hole te am 's  focus on and com m itm ent to 
independence. In  our ow n research, these engagem ent leaders are w hat w e refer to as 
transform ational leaders. T hey  are leaders w ho, w hile they  have legitim ate authority  over 
their subordinates, w ill engage team  m em bers in  a h igher level relationship  — one that 
fosters a  sense o f  com m itm ent am ong team  m em bers to  strive to achieve a com m on goal,
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in this case, independence, tha t goes beyond each individual m em ber's  need  to succeed 
(Bass, 1990; B urke, 1986; V an Eron and B urke, 1992).
A nother in teresting poin t raised in  the in terview s concerned the effect tha t the 
physical location o f  the engagem ent team  could have on creating an  environm ent that 
supported and fostered independence. W hen the engagem ent team  is on-site in  the 
c lien t's  o rganization on an extended basis, team  m em bers develop a sense o f  unity. 
Furtherm ore, because o f  their physical p roxim ity  to each other, it is easier for m em bers to 
engage inform ally  in substantive discussions about specific professional standards issues 
as they arise. Thus, the physical location o f  m em bers together at the clien t site creates a 
m ore open and supportive atm osphere. It also m akes it m uch easier for the engagem ent 
leader to deal w ith  issues as they surface and before they  m ay becom e m ore d ifficu lt to 
resolve.
B o th  these factors, the engagem ent lead er 's  behavior w ith  the team  and the 
physical p roxim ity  o f  team  m em bers, have been  show n in  the behavioral psychology 
literature to be related  to the overall perform ance o f  the team  (K atzenbach and Sm ith, 
1993; S teiner, 1972; Zander, 1994). O ur interview s indicate that auditors recognize the 
im portance o f  these factors in  m aintaining a strong clim ate o f  independence. A ll 
engagem ent leaders should w ork actively to create this type o f  w ork  environm ent w ith  
their audit team  m em bers.
R elated  to these factors o f  leadership and physical p roxim ity  o f  engagem ent team  
m em bers, another im portan t issue w as raised in  the interview s. There w as a com m on 
concern am ong several interview ees that auditors w ho w ork in offices w here they have 
little access to m ore senior partners or to  a supportive w ork environm ent o f  the type w e 
described above need the support structure and leadership  w hich  are desirable to develop 
and m ain tain  a  h igh  level o f  objectivity  and independence, especially  in  the face o f  client 
pressures and the ir ow n desire to advance their careers. The firm s endeavor to create this 
structure through  regu lar m eetings w ith  peers, periodic v isits by  leaders from  larger 
offices and, increasingly, the use o f  e-m ail and o ther technologies w hich  reduce the sense 
o f  iso lation  w hich  m ay be caused by geographical separation.
2. Sum m ary o f  R elevant P sychology L itera ture on Group L evel
D ynam ics.
W hat follow s is a  m ore theoretical and research-based  discussion 
o f  the im pact o f  group dynam ics on individual behavior. This sum m ary o f  the literature 
has d irect relevance to the audit engagem ent team .
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A ccording to a recently-published chapter by  J. R ichard  H ackm an (1992), two 
general factors o r types o f  stim uli that have an im pact are:
•  indirect
•  direct
Indirect factors (referred to as ambient stimuli) are typically not readily apparent or in one's 
conscious awareness. Ambient stimuli are therefore background, cultural, and usually not discussed; just 
taken for granted.
Direct factors (discretionary stimuli) are typically messages, often in the form of feedback to an 
individual, that are sent to guide or correct specific behavior. If  an individual has violated a group norm 
that is highly important to the group, the person will soon hear about it. This "hearing about it" is the direct 
stimulus.
a. Evidence about ambient or indirect factors
1. Ambient stimuli are rarely noticed and discussed. The group member is usually unaware 
o f their continuing impact, e.g., knowledge about and norms associated with conducting an audit. For 
example, when asked, an auditor might respond with, "It's just the way we do it."
Implication: Since the general process and procedure for conducting an audit becomes "second 
nature" and the original stimuli for how to do it are not typically in one's conscious awareness, it is 
therefore critical that the auditor's training (i.e., instilling the methodology o f and rationale for audits) be 
conducted according to clear and appropriate standards. Consideration might be given by the profession to 
making more public the nature o f training and how it contributes to the norms and standards of 
independence. More to the point, the profession might demonstrate how the training makes independence 
"second nature."
2. The diversity of indirect or ambient stimuli impinging on group members becomes 
narrowed and restricted over time. Just sticking to the task at hand with little or no distraction increases the 
efficiency and effectiveness o f a work group—up to a point. There is some evidence that ignoring all 
"distractions" can actually decrease effectiveness. Thus, it is a matter o f selectively allowing in outside, 
potentially distracting stimuli.
Implication: Separating the audit function ("Chinese Walls") from other aspects o f the firm 's 
business may work against audit effectiveness. Learning more about the client organization, beyond 
merely the numbers from accounting, can potentially increase work effectiveness.
3. Group members tend not to test publicly the private inferences they make from indirect or 
ambient stimuli. In a highly task-oriented group, observations about process, how  the group is going about 
its business, are considered bad form and are negatively valued. Yet evidence shows quite clearly that 
questioning assumptions, particularly about the way we do things, rarely, if  ever, adversely affects the 
group's effectiveness. Nonetheless, because o f this indirect or ambient norm, many work group members
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develop an expectancy that making such comments (i.e., about the group's process) will lead to unpleasant 
consequences.
Implication: This point may appear to contradict point #1 above. The distinction can be made, 
however, that in this case it is not the audit procedure itself, but the group process or interpersonal 
relationships that is the focus. Audit groups should be encouraged to speak openly about and question on 
occasion, the process o f their work. Process observations can not only lead to improved group 
effectiveness, but can also increase individual commitment to the work. Having a chance to influence the 
"way we do things" typically strengthens commitment to the group and to the task. Moreover, feeling free 
to be open and to question occasionally "the way we do things" in the group can increase a sense of 
empowerment for members o f the audit engagement team. This empowered freedom to speak up can then 
lead team members to challenge potential compromise that could reduce audit independence.
b. Evidence about direct factors and group norms
First, some important concepts, and second  some evidence.
Three important classes o f variables are critical to understanding conformity-- 
the group norm itself, the person, and the person's role in the group.
The norm : Norms that are both well crystallized (group consensus and clarity about the
range o f approved vs. disapproved behaviors) and highly intense (overall strength o f approval and 
disapproval is clearly linked with norm-regulated behavior) have the greatest likelihood o f engendering 
compliance.
The person : People differ with respect to their degree o f conformity to most any norm. For those 
who lean in the direction o f nonconformity, compliance is even more dependent on rewards and 
punishments.
The role: Some role occupants have more behavioral latitude (or "idiosyncrasy credit," to use 
Hollander's (1958) words) than do others—consider Dennis Rodman o f the Chicago Bulls. Some group 
members:
• bring with them high external status, e.g., joined the group from another prestigious firm, 
daughter o f a managing partner within the firm, advanced academic degrees, etc.;
• are assigned to a high-status role, e.g., team leader; or
• earn idiosyncrasy credit over time by being "good group citizens."
These individuals, potentially at least, can strengthen the norm o f independence because they can more 
easily "afford" to be independent. Thus, these kinds o f role occupants should indeed be tolerated.
c. Evidence about direct group norms and conformity
- 15 -
1. Groups have more influence on the individual when other members are physically present 
as opposed to when they are absent (i.e., when the individual member is working alone).
Implication: Audit teams are likely to be more effective than individuals working alone, since 
conformity to important norms regarding the audit such as independence is more likely to occur.
2. Groups generate and maintain normative structures that efficiently and powerfully shape 
and constrain behavior. Strong norms (well crystallized and intense) indeed shape and control behavior, 
but they can also suppress innovation and perspective. With persistence, two or more members in the 
minority can alter majority enforced norms or at least get the majority to review and reconsider what is 
being reinforced. A member acting alone as a deviant is more likely to conform eventually to the 
overwhelming majority or become "institutionalized" as the group deviant.
Implication: Since bucking a norm is so difficult, support from at least one other person is 
imperative. When a member believes that a particular norm is ineffective or even wrong, e.g., 
compromising objectivity and independence, he or she must gain support for change to occur.
3. Groups directly and contingently reinforce specific individual behaviors. As an 
individual member's behavior strays from the norm, the group will typically be more direct and specific 
about the desired compliance. Getting the member back into line requires time and energy on the part of 
the group, however. Also, too much pressure on the group member to conform can result in behavior that 
is the opposite to what is desired, even if  the action is not in the individual's best interest. When a person 
believes that his or her freedom o f  choice is at stake, the person will often reassert control by behaving 
perversely. Brehm referred to this seemingly odd behavior as "psychological reactance."
Implication: Too much group pressure to conform can result in behavior opposite from what is 
desired. Freedom of choice is an extremely powerful human motive. Too much external pressure on the 
auditor to conform to standards o f independence could be counterproductive in terms o f his or her level o f 
commitment.
4. Groups affect behavior indirectly as well by shaping members' beliefs and attitudes. As 
Hackman put it, " If as a result o f group influence a person comes to believe that a certain set o f outcomes 
will be obtained if  he or she exhibits a given behavior and if  these outcomes come to be highly valued by 
the person, then he or she is likely to engage in the behavior spontaneously" (1992; p. 251). This process is 
more subtle than the direct use o f pressure to manage behavior. It is also more likely to engender 
commitment with little or no risk o f psychological reactance. As the individual connects the valued 
outcomes with the need to conform to certain norms, the required and desired behavior is likely to persist 
over time, to generalize across differing situations, and to occur whether or not other group members are 
present.
Implication: As expectancy theory predicts (Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968), the more an 
individual values certain outcomes (e.g., doing a superb audit) and sees a direct linkage between his or her 
behavior and the achievement o f the valued outcome, the more likely the individual will be committed to
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the process (norm) that leads to such achievement. What is critical to the process o f optimum commitment 
is that the individual figures all o f this out for him self or herself (which should not be too difficult) and 
experiences the least necessary external pressure to conform. Moreover, the further (in terms o f 
relationships) from the individual such pressure is sourced, the more risk o f psychological reactance and 
reduced commitment.
D. The Significance o f  the Firm's Culture
All organizations that have existed for at least a few years and as a result of growth have 
become more complex (not the mom-and-pop food market on the comer, although arguably a culture exists 
there as well) have a culture, defined simply as "the way we do things around here." (See, for example, 
Kotter and Heskett, 1992; and Schein, 1985.) The "way" means that there are key norms to which 
organizational members conform. Underlying these norms are organizational values~the right and wrong 
way o f doing things. Culture also includes the organization's history (especially what former leaders and 
founders stood for), legends, and even myths. The culture perpetuates itself through hiring, selection, and 
promotion processes as well as via ceremonies, rituals, systems, e.g., performance appraisals, and policies.
It is important that all organizations pay attention to their respective cultures (i.e., to understand 
them, particularly in terms o f how the culture perpetuates certain organizational behaviors). It is even more 
important for organizations on which outsiders may rely, such as hospitals, law firms, public accounting 
firms, and pharmaceutical companies to understand and attempt to manage their cultures, because they are 
involved in highly "ethical" businesses. The Johnson & Johnson credo, for example, is an extremely 
important document in this regard. By the same token, the public accounting firms must attend to their 
organizational cultures. Their cultures' values undergird the standards of independence. Thus, the way 
things are done in an audit firm needs to be constantly monitored to make certain that those factors which 
perpetuate and reinforce auditor independence (see especially the commitment list) are maintained.
Culture is also maintained, and at times changed, by what the firm chooses to measure, especially 
regarding performance (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). As one senior audit partner put it, "It is very important 
for audit partners to be clear about what they are being measured on." Understanding what the 
performance criteria are is perhaps just as important as the performance itself. The point is that what is 
rewarded and what is measured are direct reflections o f culture. Monitoring these variables helps to ensure 
understanding o f what affects (and maybe does not affect) auditor independence. A classic article by Steve 
Kerr (1975)~"On the Folly o f Rewarding A, While Hoping for B "-illustrates the importance o f this 
understanding.
IV. Conclusion
It is my opinion that the safeguards for independence, especially those classified as external, are 
adequate, perhaps more than adequate. The measures instituted by those audit firms whose partners we
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interviewed, with their professional policies and manuals, their training and development programs, their 
modes o f reward, performance measurement criteria, and the like, are impressive as steps to ensure 
independence.
The profession's continued attention should be focused on the commitment side o f the ledger, 
because emphasis there will not only reinforce auditor independence most effectively, but will undergird 
self-regulatory behavior as well. Each firm should continuously assess its culture, the climate o f its 
engagement teams, and the leadership practices o f its engagement leaders to assure that they foster an 
environment o f independence. Based on this type o f assessment, firms can then refine and perfect their 
training programs to enhance among their auditors behaviors that foster the highest commitment to 
independence.
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Executive Sum m ary
F o r eighteen years, I have served as a consultant on business and professional ethics for 
over 150 m ajor corporations and associations and tw o P residential C om m issions. M y consulting 
perspective has been inform ed by  graduate education in m oral ph ilosophy and the law.
I have exam ined the accounting p rofession 's  self-regulatory  efforts to assure auditor 
independence at both the A IC PA  and accounting firm  level. I have exam ined also the role that 
professional ethics p lay  in  inform ing the judgm ent and conduct o f  accountants engaged in 
providing audit and attestation services to public com panies. B ased on m y experience and 
training, I conclude tha t the accounting p rofession 's  self-regulatory  program  m eets all the criteria 
for successful self-regulation and that the activities and safeguards that are a  part o f  that 
self-regulation are strengthened by the professional ethics and judgm ent that auditors should 
possess as a result o f  training, firm  leadership and culture. I conclude, as well, that 
self-regulation to preserve auditor independence w ill be  further enhanced by  the ISB 
principles-based independence standards, the IS B 's  consu ltative function and the em erging 
issues identification and best practices responsibilities o f  the IIC . F inally , I have exam ined the 
issue o f  appearances as it pertains to the independence o f  auditors and com pared that to the 
appearance o f  im propriety issues that face law  and governm ent service. I conclude that assuring 
the appearance o f  independence is best treated as an aspiration, rather than  an enforceable 
regulation.
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Introduction
Independence is one o f  the hallm arks o f  any true profession. W hat professional 
independence entails, the risks o f  its com prom ise, and the m ost effective m eans o f  preserving it
are subjects o f  continual reflection w ith in  each profession.434 T hey are also appropriate 
subjects for exam ination by those w hose lives are affected b y  the decisions and conduct o f  
professionals, especially  their clients, bu t also the public  and its representatives in governm ent.
The independence o f  public accountants w ho provide audit and attestation services for 
public com panies is presum ed by  the capital m arkets and is a necessary  condition for their 
efficient functioning. In addition to m illions o f  individual and institu tional investors, the audited 
com panies them selves, their suppliers, custom ers, and business partners all p lace im portance on 
the representations o f  public accountants for the ir assurances on the financial statem ents o f
participants in  the capital m a rk e ts .4 35  The quality  o f  those representations by  public 
accountants is d irec tly  related to the independence o f  the auditors  f ro m  the com panies for w hom  
they p rov ide the audit and attestation services.
T he requirem ent o f  public accountants' independence, and particu larly  the independence 
o f  those engaged in  auditing o f  public com panies, has been addressed by  the C ongress, the 
Securities and Exchange C om m ission (SEC), the A m erican Institu te o f  C ertified Public 
A ccountants (A IC PA ) and the A IC P A 's SEC Practice Section. B oth  the SEC and the A IC PA  
have expressed concerns about preserving the "appearance o f  independence," as w ell as 
"independence in  fact."
Ronald C. Horn, On Professionals, Professionals and Professional Ethics. Malvern, P.A.: American 
Institute for Property and Liability Underwriters, 1978, p. 29.
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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This report has been  prepared in  connection  w ith a  p resen ta tion  to the Independence 
S tandards B oard (the "ISB ") on b eh a lf o f  the A IC PA  to address the  relevance o f  self-regulation 
and professional ethics to the preservation o f  auditor independence. T he report contrasts self- 
regulation  in the accounting profession w ith  seven key  features o f  self-regulatory  activities by 
other organizations w ith  a focus on how  m echanism s that have been  developed  to protect auditor 
independence com pare w ith  features o f  o ther self-regulatory in itiatives. M y analysis lends to the 
conclusion that the self-regulatory  efforts o f  the A IC PA  already reflect the key  features o f  other 
successful self-regulatory program s, bu t tha t a significant opportunity  exists to strengthen further 
the self-regulation o f  auditor independence by  u tiliz ing  the ISB  to articulate principle-based 
standards that accounting firm s can use to develop or im prove the ir ow n independent policies 
and procedures. M y report also exam ines the concept o f  a profession  and the role o f  professional 
ethics in  assuring the independence o f  accountants who provide audit and other attestation 
services to clients. The report sets forth m y conclusion  that the p rofessional status o f  accounting 
and the professional ethics o f  auditors p rov ide the public w ith  assurance that auditor 
independence w ill be protected. A uditor p rofessionalism  is reinforced, and independence further 
ensured, by  the safeguards that the A IC PA  and pub lic  accounting firm s have developed.
T he R elevance o f Self-R egulation  to A uditor Independence
Self-regulation encom passes the various activities o f  p rofessional associations and 
societies (hereafter, referred  to as professional societies), trade associations, corporations, firm s 
and o ther organizations designed to ensure com pliance w ith law s, regulations, and h igh  standards 
o f  business and professional ethics. Self-regulation accepts the perform ance standards set by
Congress or the regulatory  agencies and utilizes appropriate and fam iliar p rivate  sector system s 
and m echanism s to ensure com pliance.
The goal o f  self-regulation, how ever, is not sim ply com pliance, b u t the  cultivation and 
preservation o f  the p u b lic 's  trust, because a free society and its institu tions— governm ent, as w ell 
as business and the professions— are based  on an assum ption o f  honesty , m utual trust and
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  4 3 6  the extent that regulation has developed due to actions that have called  
into question those assum ptions, self-regulatory in itiatives them selves m ust be  transparent and 
accountable.
The basis for self-regulation is ethics, understood not sim ply as the discip line or science
o f  m oral philosophy but, in  the w ords o f  Dr. A lbert Schw eitzer:
E thics is the nam e w e give to our concern for good 
behavior. W e feel an  obligation to consider not on ly  our 
ow n personal w ell-being, bu t also that o f  others and o f  
hum an society as a  w h o l e . 4 3 7
The concern for good behavior and sense o f  obligation for others perm it cooperation to
displace adversarialism  and suspicion in  the pursu it o f  regulatory  objectives. M oreover, they
perm it a presum ption o f  intent to violate regulations to be rep laced  by a presum ption  o f  in ten t to
c o m p l y . 438
Form er SEC chairm an H arold W illiam s described self-regulation in  term s o f  enhanced 
accountability, as a consequence o f  ethics:
Robert V. Krikorian. "The Time for Self-Regulation is Now." In Self-Regulation: Conference 
Proceeding. Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, Inc., 1982, p. 65.
Albert Schweitzer, Paris lecture, quoted in Ivan Hill, Common Sense and Everyday Ethics. Washington, 
DC: American Viewpoint, 1980, p. 5.
Krikorian, op. cit., p. 66.
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The m ost attractive attribute o f  self-regulation is that it 
enhances, rather than displaces, traditional private sector 
processes and accountability  m echanism s. Self-regulation 
leaves the private sector w ith the opportunity  to apply its 
ow n ethical values and judgm ent to its decision m aking, as 
w ell as the responsibility— if  challenged—  to ju s tify  the 
basis upon w hich  these decisions are  m a d e .4 3 9
T he success o f  self-regulation turns on the effectiveness o f  those "processes and 
accountability  m echanism s" and the quality  o f  the "eth ical values and judgm ent" that are 
cultivated  w ith in  an industry, profession, com pany or firm . A lthough there is no com prehensive 
check-list o f  the necessary  and sufficient conditions fo r a successful self-regulatory program , 
there are m any  com m on factors am ong effective program s.
K ey Features o f  E ffective Self-R egulatory Program s
1. T he Public Interest
C om m on am ong the self-regulatory in itiatives o f  professional societies and
a s s o c i a t i o n s , 40 trade associations,4 4 1 industry  g ro u p s 4 4 2  and corporations443 as the
foundation for their efforts is a  stated com m itm ent to serve the public in terest through enhanced 
com pliance w ith  laws, regulations and high standards o f  ethical conduct.
2. C odes o f  E thics
Krikorian, quoting Harold Williams speech, Ibid. 
Ronald C. Horn, op. Cit. pp. 9-11.
Jerald A. Jacobs, "Vehicles for Self-Regulation: Codes o f Ethics, Credentialing and Standards." 
Self-Regulation: Conference Proceedings, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, 1982 pp. 83-85.
Conduct and Accountability: A Report to the President Washington, DC: 1986, pp. 42-44.
Kirkorian, op. Cit. p. 3. And see Codes o f Ethics in Corporations and Trade Associations and the Teaching 
o f  Ethics in Graduate Schools o f Business, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, 1979.
-  2 7  -
Codes o f  ethics have a long history  as the  principle m echanism  for organizations' 
self-regulatory efforts. Codes typically  com m it those who adopt them  to obey the law  and to
adhere to ethical standards that m ay be stricter than  the law .444
3. E thics T raining
Training in ethical principles and standards is relatively  new  for corporations,445 but has
enjoyed a longer h isto ry  in som e o f  the "learned professions" (m edicine, law  and theology).446
4. R eporting System s for V iolations o f  the C ode o f  Ethics
W hile m any organizations require that allegations o f  m isconduct be reported to o n e 's  
direct supervisor, an  increasing num ber o f  organizations provide additional channels o f
com m unication to ensure that m atters are brought to the attention o f  senior m anagem ent.4 4 7
5. V oluntary D isclosure
W hen m isconduct involves serious breaches o f  the law  or w here the public in terest or 
safety  is im plicated, as in product tam pering o r com prom ised services, organizations adopt
policies for tim ely reporting to affected parties in o rder to prevent o r lim it harm  448
Codes o f Ethics in Corporations and Trade Associations and the Teaching o f Ethics in Graduate Schools o f 
Business, op. cit.
A 1984 study by Bentley College's Center for Business Ethics found that 35% of responding corporations 
provided training in business ethics. An Ethics Resource Center study in 1988 found that 47% of large 
corporations (50,000 or more employees) provided such training.
E.g., See Teaching Ethics in Medical Colleges and Universities, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, 
1984.
In professional firms, direct access may be made to senior partners or to a code administrator. In 
corporations, communication vehicles range from "open door" and "skip-level" policies that permit 
employees to take concerns directly to higher levels o f management to ethics and compliance officers 
charged with code enforcement responsibility. See Ethics in American Business, Washington, DC: Ethics 
Resource Center, 1995.
The US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations encourage voluntary disclosure o f illegal conduct by 
considering such disclosure as a mitigating factor in determination o f penalties. See US Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual, chapter 8, "Sentencing Organizations."
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6. P rocess o f  C ontinuing Im provem ent for Self-R egulation
W hen violations o f  the code o f  ethics are d iscovered  through internal reporting 
m echanism s or peer review  program s, organizations can use tha t inform ation to strengthen the 
self-regulatory program  through actions such as clarifications o r in terpretations o f  the code o f  
ethics, im provem ent in  the quality  or frequency o f  ethics train ing , or rev isions in com pliance 
protocol, o r o ther  m e c h a n i s m s . 4 4 9
7. P ublic  A ccountability
E xternal com m unication, and som etim es  v e r i f i c a t i o n , 450 o f  a n  organization 's 
self-regulatory initiatives increases the credibility  o f  such efforts and  can strengthen public trust.
A ccounting Self-R egulation and A uditor Independence
T he accounting industry benefits from  a long h isto ry  o f  self-regulation .451 The 
form ation o f  the Independence S tandards B oard (ISB) provides an opportunity  to build  on those 
past efforts, m ain tain  public  confidence and secure tha t confidence for the  future in  auditor 
independence.
See id. The US Sentencing Commission identified seven minimum steps to develop an effective 
compliance program to "prevent and detect" violations of law. The seventh step requires: "After an 
offense has been detected, the organization must have taken all reasonable steps to prevent further similar 
offenses, including necessary modifications to its programs to prevent and detect violations of law. Ibid.
Conduct and Accountability: A Report to the President, op. cit. p. 44.
For an account o f the evolution o f self-regulation by the accounting profession, see Dale L. Fleisher, Paul J. 
Maranti and Gary John Previts, "The First Century o f the CPA," Journal o f Accountancy, October 1996.
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O n M ay 21, 1997, the SEC and the A IC PA  jo in tly  announced the creation  o f the ISB to 
establish  independence standards for the auditors o f  pub lic  com panies. T he IS B 's  operations
will be overseen by the SEC .452
In m y opinion, the contem plated functions o f  the  ISB, taken  together w ith  the existing 
self-regulatory m echanism s w ith in  the A IC PA  and the public accounting  firm s, should satisfy 
the criteria  for an effective program  o f  self-regulation that w ill assure the  independence o f  
accountants w ho provide audit and other attestation services to pub lic  com panies.
1. The Public Interest
A ccounting addresses this criterion d irectly  in  the  Code o f  P rofessional Conduct o f  the
A IC PA , A rticle  II ~  "The Public Interest":
M em bers should accept the obligation  to act in  a  w ay  that 
w ill serve the public interest, honor the pub lic  trust, and 
dem onstrate com m itm ent to  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . 45 3
The Code clarifies this responsibility  and defines the public interest:
The accounting p ro fession 's  public  consists o f  clients, 
credit grantors, governm ents, em ployers, investors, the 
business and financial com m unity , and others w ho re ly  on 
the objectiv ity  and integrity  o f  certified  pub lic  accountants 
to m aintain  the orderly function ing  o f  com m erce. This 
reliance im poses a public in terest responsib ility  on  certified  
public accountants. The public  in terest is defined  as the 
collective w ell-being o f  the  com m unity o f  peop le  and 
institu tions the profession  s e r v e s . 454
2. C odes o f  E thics
"Accounting Today," June 2, 1997. 
AICPA Professional Standards ET § 53. 
Ibid. § 53.01.
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In addition  to the A IC PA  C ode, m any o f  the public accounting firm s have developed 
their ow n codes o f  ethics. M ore significantly , for the narrow er purpose o f  self-regulation o f
auditor independence, firm s have w ritten  policies on independence.455 The scope o f  these 
policies varies, as does the degree to  w hich they  address issues tha t m ight im pair independence. 
The proposed princip les to be prom ulgated by  the ISB w ould  afford the opportunity  for 
im proving firm  policies and developing codes o f  independence that m ight at once be m ore 
com prehensive and still tailored to each firm 's  culture and needs.
3. E thics T raining
T raining rela ted  to the A IC PA  Code is integral to the preparation  for the C PA  exam. 
Training w ith  respect to each firm 's  code o f  ethics, their po lic ies and procedures pertaining to 
auditor independence and related aspects o f  the ir quality control program s is the responsibility  o f  
the firm s and is carried  out on a basis w hich varies from  firm  to firm . N ew  independence codes, 
under the ISB  princip les, should occasion the integration or coordination o f  these efforts w ithin 
each firm.
4. System s for R eporting V iolations o f  the C ode
Firm s encourage a free and open atm osphere for questions o r concerns about 
independence through auditors ' access to the audit partner, as w ell as, i f  necessary, o ther senior 
m em bers o f  the  firm  no t involved in  the audit. A dditionally, firm s s ta ff professional practice 
offices to answ er questions and p rovide advice and counsel on m atters o f  proper conduct and 
independence and provide form al m echanism s for consultation on differences o f  professional 
opinion. SEC PS m em ber firm s also m ust provide a concurring rev iew  o f  the audit report and its
In preparation o f this report, the author has examined independence policies o f several large public 
accounting firms, internal mechanisms developed by the firms to communicate and interpret those policies, 
and other safeguards to ensure compliance with the policies.
financial statem ents by  a partner o ther than the audit partner-in-charge o f  the engagem ent before 
the audit report is issued. That safeguard provides another opportunity  for discovery and
deterrence o f  any threat to auditor  in d e p e n d e n c e .4 5 6
5. V oluntary  D isclosure
A n auditing firm  w ould  have disclosure obligations upon discovery that it had not 
conducted an "independent audit,"  as envisioned by  federal securities laws, and that reliance 
upon its p rev iously  issued report w ould  not be proper. These d isclosure obligations o f  an 
auditing firm  derive not from  a particu lar firm  policy, bu t rather from  the entire set o f  firm -w ide 
policies and procedures designed to  ensure the accuracy o f  each audit report, taken together w ith 
aud ito rs ' professional obligations.
In  particular, i f  an auditing firm  subsequently  d iscovered facts bearing on its 
independence and concluded tha t steps m ust be taken  to prevent reliance upon a previously 
issued audit report (because its independence actually  had  been im paired during the course o f  the 
audit), there w ould  be an  obligation  to  disclose the existence o f  the problem  under A ICPA  
standards. A n auditing firm 's  d isclosure m ay be  m andatory  under the auditing standards and, 
depending upon the precise circum stances, under the federal securities laws. A uditors norm ally 
w ill ask the audit client to disclose the problem  before the audit firm  itse lf w ould or should 
approach a governm ent regulator. W hen an aud ito r's  report can no longer be relied upon, the 
general public  also becom es aw are o f  th is fact through the release o f  rev ised  financial statem ents 
and a new  audit re p o r t .4 5 7
6. P rocess o f  C ontinuous Im provem ent for Self-R egulation
456 AICPA SECPS "Requirements o f Members."
457 AICPA Professional Standards, AU §1561, "Subsequent Discovery o f Facts Existing at the Date o f the 
A uditor's Report."
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Public accounting firm s have in place a process for continuous im provem ent in assuring 
independence. The A IC P A 's  SECPS peer review  program  contributes to such im provem ents on 
a regular basis, and the Q uality  Control Inquiry C om m ittee exam ines alleged audit failures and
evaluates w hether there is a  need for im provem ent in  a firm 's  system  o r quality  c o n t r o l . 8
In  addition, the ISB  and its Independence Issues C om m ittee present an opportunity  for 
stim ulating further im provem ents in the firm s' self-regulation o f  aud ito r independence. A  M ay 
7, 1997 d iscussion paper w ould direct the ISB to "[d]evelop a process, including the IIC , by  
w hich em erging issues affecting independence can be referred  for guidance and resolution" and 
to "[p]rovide a consultative function for practitioners w ho have questions about independence 
standards." A dditionally , the IIC m ission w ould  require that it " [p ]erform  other duties, such as
conducting research, that are assigned to it by  the  B o a r d ."4 59 Identifying and referring 
em erging issues w ould  allow  firm s to update the ir independence codes or safeguard m echanism s, 
thus im proving their self-regulation. The research  responsibilities o f  the IIC should perm it it to 
identify, and share am ong the firm s, best practices in preserving independence. IIC  findings 
could be com m unicated to the profession in  any num ber o f  w ays, including periodic forum s, 
"w ebsite" postings and publications. This inform ation on best p ractices m ight prove to be o f  
great practical value, no t only  in im proving safeguards for auditor independence am ong the 
larger firm s, bu t also in assisting sm all and m id-size firm s w hose resources are no t as great, in 
m ore efficiently  developing and upgrading independence policies and m echanism s by  m odeling 
other firm s' efforts. Such research w ould likely be useful to the ISB  as w ell in its consultative
458 W illiam L. Felix, Jr. and Douglas F. Pravitt, "Quality Control Practices in the SECPS," May 3, 1993. 
M onograph reports survey of member firms commissioned by the AICPA SECPS.
459 May 7, 1997 discussion paper, "Establishment o f the Independence Standards Board" attached to May 13, 
1997 letter from Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, AICPA to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt.
function serving practitioners. M oreover, the em erging issues guidance and resolution process 
should itse lf  be a  force to generate new  best practices tha t cou ld  then  be d issem inated through 
IIC 's  best practices com m unication m edia.
7. Public A ccountability
T he princip le elem ent o f  public accountability for accounting firm s' self-regulatory 
efforts is the  SECPS QCIC "closed-case sum m aries," w hich  exam ine alleged audit failures and 
corrective action  taken. These sum m aries are not released to the  general public, bu t to the Public 
O versight B oard, w hich includes public m em bers, and to the  S E C . 460
W ith  establishm ent o f  the ISB , increased public accountability  could  be effected i f  
auditing firm s' independence policies w ere collected by ISB  and  m ade available to the public.
In  sum m ary, public accounting self-regulatory activ ities and m echanism s to assure 
auditor independence reflect each o f  the criteria for effective self-regulation. In  a num ber o f  
instances, how ever, the ISB principles and consultative functions, together w ith  the potential 
research by  the IIC , could im prove the self-regulation efforts. Specifically, the  ISB principles 
w ould strengthen the independence policies and practices o f  accounting  firm s and m ake possible 
firm -specific independence codes that take cognizance o f  sign ifican t independence issues and the 
IS B 's  guidance in addressing them  (criterion two); independence train ing  could be  strengthened 
by virtue o f  strong, focused independence codes and the I IC 's  research  on best practices could 
stim ulate further im provem ents o f  training (criterion three); the p rocess o f  continual 
im provem ent o f  self-regulation w ould be advanced by IIC  research , and the needs o f  sm all and 
m id-sized firm s could be m ore efficiently  m et (criterion six); and  public accountability  w ould be 
enhanced by  the public filing and transparency o f  firm s' independence codes (criterion seven).
William L. Felix, Jr. and Douglas F. Pravitt, op. cit. pp. 13-14.
P rofessional E th ics and A uditor Independence
K ey features o f  an effective self-regulatory program  to ensure audit independence are 
w ell established by  the policies and safeguards o f  the A IC PA  and public accounting firm s. W ith 
new  initiatives by  the ISB  and IIC, there is opportunity  to enhance certain  aspects o f  the 
program . B ut the p rofession  need not, and in fact does not, rely  solely  on policies and 
m echanism s to p reserve auditor independence. It has a pow erful resource unavailable to 
businesses or industry groups in their self-regulation.
L ike other organization o f  professionals, accounting has the added strength o f  
professional ethics.
P rofessions and P rofessional Ethics
The term  "profession" derives from  Latin and M iddle E nglish  term s w hich  refer 
to the public declaration o r vow  m ade by  one entering a relig ious order. B y the sixteenth
century, law and m edicine had  jo ined  div in ity  as the three "learned  p r o f e s s i o n s . 4 6 1  C om m on 
to these early acknow ledged professions w as the public recognition  o f  the special know ledge, 
skill and pow er possessed  by  the professionals and concom itant priv ileges and responsibilities 
that devolved upon them . C h ief am ong these responsibilities has been  an expectation that 
professionals w ould  ho ld  them selves to a high standard o f  care and ethical conduct. The 
self-discipline that w as expected o f  individual professionals evolved in to  the concept o f  self- 
regulation by the profession , w here those o f  com parable know ledge, skill and pow er w ere 
recognized as m ost com petent to police and regulate the ir peers.
461 Oxford English Dictionary. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. P1426-1428.
In som e areas, the know ledge and skill o f  accountants m ay  be  m atched by  that o f  their 
clients, bu t accountants bring a special value to clients and to the pub lic  w hen they perform  audit 
services. The value o f  those services derives from  the objectivity , in tegrity  and independence o f
the auditors.462
Professional ethics are distinguished from  the self-regulatory  activities o f  a profession. 
Professional ethics m ay be thought o f  in term s o f  the principles, guidelines and rules for 
fulfilling o n e 's  professional responsibilities. A s such, professional ethics are closely associated 
w ith  a p ro fession 's  standards o f  conduct or code o f  ethics. P rom ulgation  and enforcem ent o f  the 
standards are am ong the principle self-regulatory  responsibilities o f  a professional society.
The conduct o f  certified public  accountants is governed b y  "T he Code o f  Professional 
Conduct o f  the A m erican Institute o f  C ertified Public A ccountants." The current Code, as 
adopted in  1988 and am ended in  1992, calls for "an  unsw erving com m itm ent to honorable 
behavior, even at the sacrifice o f  personal advantage" and requires o f  A ICPA  m em bers "an
obligation o f  self-d iscip line above and beyond the requirem ents o f  law  and regulations."4 63 
Personal and Professional Ethics
A risto tle instructed  his ow n son that i f  he w ished to acquire the virtue o f  courage, he 
should find a courageous m an and do the things that m an did. H e understood the essential 
function both  o f  m oral exem plars and o f  practice in  developing the m oral habits that w e call 
virtues and, collectively , character.
The pedagogy o f  m oral developm ent utilizes m oral exem plars and the practice o f  m oral 
behavior. It also involves m aking m oral dem ands and teaching one to m ake m oral dem ands o f
462 Clifford E. Graese, "Honesty and Professional Ethics: Focus on Accounting." In The Ethical Basis of 
Economic Freedom. Ivan Hill, ed. Chapel Hill, NC: American Viewpoint, 1976, pp. 198-199.
463 AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct ET § 51:02 and 51:01.
oneself, to be a certain  k ind o f  person even w hen no one is observing. S tories are com m only 
used to exem plify the functioning and reasoning behind m oral precepts, and rituals and 
cerem onies are used  bo th  to cultivate the m oral affects and to signify their achievem ent.
M orality  and ethics are not the sam e thing; although related, they are d istinguishable. 
M orality  is concerned w ith  personal virtue, specifically  the cultivation, th rough m oral pedagogy, 
o f  a range o f  affective capacities (honor, sham e, indignation, courage, com passion, etc.); the 
developm ent and exercise o f  m oral judgm ent; and, as a consequence o f  personal v irtue and 
m oral judgm ent, m oral action.
E thics has been  called  "the science o f  m orality ." 464  A m ong its c h ie f concerns is the 
princip led  resolution o f  m oral conflicts. M oral conflicts arise w hen the actions required  by  
m oral virtues, obligations or rules are inconsistent. E thics strives to articulate p rincip les on the 
basis o f  w hich such conflicts can be resolved. H ow  w ell m oral principles are articulated and 
understood and the skill w ith  w hich they are used  determ ine their u tility  in  resolving m oral 
conflicts or dilem m as.
The m oral capacities o f  a  professional can be understood as refinem ents or extensions o f  
o n e 's  personal m oral virtues. The com passion o f  a physician  is grounded in  the sam e m oral 
attributes that he o r she possessed  before becom ing a physician. The difference, w hich  is learned 
in the course o f  m edical education and practice, lies in w hat behavior the  com passion o f  a 
physician  m ay perm it o r require o f  the physician, bu t no t o f  one who is no t a m em ber o f  the  
profession.
Sim ilarly, d iscretion and trustw orthiness are m oral virtues achievable by  all. B ut the 
pro tection  o f  client confidences, w hich utilizes and extends these m oral capacities in  the m edical,
464 Oxford English Dictionary, op cit., p. E312.
relig ious, and legal professions, requires d ifferent conduct o f  a  professional than o f  one w ho is 
not. Indeed, the requirem ents differ from  one profession to another.
Personal and professional m orality are distinguishable. E ven  though  personal m orality  
m ay inform  and provide m uch o f  the basis for professional m orality , personal m orality  alone 
m ay be inadequate to ensure professional conduct.
The objective o f  professional education and training is no t only  the im parting o f  special 
know ledge and skills for the  com petent practice o f  the profession, but also the developm ent o f  
the professional character, judgm ent and conduct necessary for the  responsible  practice o f  the 
profession.
In addition to developing  in professionals the m oral attributes requisite o f  the profession, 
educational preparation  and training should also prepare professionals for the analysis and 
reso lu tion  o f  difficult eth ical issues that m ay be encountered in  practice.
A lthough the skills involved in  resolving issues o f  professional ethics are not different in 
k ind  than  those used in  resolving m oral conflicts outside a profession, the principles o f  
professional ethics m ay  be  different and the facts often w ill be not only  d ifferent but m ore 
com plex. Learning the fundam ental ethical principles o f  a p rofession  and their application in 
situations com m on and extraordinary begins in  the classroom , bu t it continues in practice and in 
reflection  on practice. It is thus m ost appropriate that professional ethics be a specific focus o f  
the form al preparatory  train ing  o f  professionals, as w ell as o f  the ir continuing education, w here 
the m ost difficult, novel and em erging issues o f  professional practice  can be  subjected to the 
analysis and consideration o f  o n e 's  peers and m ore experienced professionals, and can contribute 
to a  m ore refined understanding  o f  the principles.
For auditors, their p rofessional ethics involve m ore than  the m astery  o f  the A IC PA  Code 
o f  Professional Conduct. The developm ent o f  professional virtues, o f  professional character, is 
not a course o f  study so m uch as a career-long process o f  refinem ent. A nd, the  test o f  those 
virtues is no t an exam ination that can b e  taken once, bu t a process o f  continual self-exam ination 
to achieve and m aintain a state o f  m ind  —  independence . 4 6 5  
Professional and Ethical Influences on  A udito rs ' Independence
Professional character and the exercise o f  the ethical skills and judgm en t o f  the 
professional auditor do not occur in  a  vacuum . T hey are deployed in the context o f  a  profession 
and in  the practice o f  a public accounting firm.
A uditors, like all professionals, find the ir conduct and decision-m aking inform ed and 
constrained by  professionalism  and ethics. M andatory  obligations and proh ib ited  actions under 
the A IC PA  Code o f  Professional C onduct lim n the boundaries o f  professional conduct. W hen 
confronted by  issues o f  independence, the auditor can tu rn  to Ethics R ules tha t have been 
developed under the conceptual fram ew ork o f  P rinciples to  foster reflection  on  the spirit and 
intent, and not ju s t com pliance w ith  the letter, o f  p roscrip tions and requirem ents. A IC PA  
Interpretations and R ulings provide added guidance in  particu lar situations.
The public accounting firm s have typ ically  developed  statem ents o f  th e ir ow n firm 's  
m ission, values and standards o f  professional conduct and ethics. T hese are m ean t to build  on, 
and in  som e cases m ay be m ore restric tive than, the A IC PA  Code. A dditionally , firm s provide 
form al consultations on differences o f  professional opinion, and they  s ta ff  O ffices o f  
P rofessional P ractice to answ er questions and provide advice and counsel on m atters o f  proper 
conduct and independence.
465 John L. Carey, Professional Ethics o f  Public Accounting, New York: American Institute o f Accountants, 
1946, p. 7.
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O utside the firm , accountants can consult w ith  A IC P A 's O ffice o f  P rofessional Ethics for 
clarification o f  the Code or concerns about proper conduct o r independence.
O n m atters o f  auditor independence, public accounting firm s and the A IC PA  have gone 
to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the p u b lic 's  in terest in  independence is pro tected  and that 
possible individual incentives to sacrifice independence fo r personal benefit are appropriately 
m anaged.
T he A IC PA , through its SEC Practice Section, has established the Peer Review  
Com m ittee and the Q uality Control Inquiry Com m ittee. U nder the Peer R eview  Com m ittee, 
each m em ber firm  is required to have its quality controls and its com pliance w ith  them  review ed
every three years by  auditors from  outside its ow n  f i r m .466 The Q uality C ontrol Inquiry 
Com m ittee exam ines a firm 's  quality  controls w hen there have been  allegations o f  audit failure
in order to determ ine w hether there exist inadequacies in the f irm 's  quality  control  p r o g r a m .467
The A IC PA , in  addition to im posing penalties for v io lations o f  the C ode o f  Professional 
Conduct, m ay  also penalize firm s that fail to take corrective actions as a result o f  peer review  
findings, o r i f  the Q uality Control Inquiry  Com m ittee confirm s v io lations o f  G A A P or GAAS in 
its exam ination o f  the m em ber's  quality  controls.
The public accounting firm s them selves are w ell aw are o f  the  possib ility  tha t the personal 
interests o f  an audit partner m ight diverge from  the f irm 's  in terest in ensuring auditor 
independence. The structure o f  partner com pensation, second  partner review , audit practice 
review , firm  policies on independence, self-inspection and w ritten  attestation o f  com pliance all 
function to reduce the risk  tha t auditor independence m ight be  im paired  in  such a m anner.
466 In the Public Interest, A Specia l  Repo r t  by  t h e  P ublic  O v e r sig h t  B o a rd  of t h e  SEC Pra ctice  
Se c t io n , AICPA, March 5, 1993, pp. 16-18.
467 Ibid. Pp. 18-21.
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A udit team  m em bers are subject to a d ifferen t risk  than  that o f  the audit partner who 
m ight take advantage o f  the reputation o f  the firm  and choose to act for h is ow n benefit and 
com prom ise independence. T he audit team  m em bers, should they be w orking under such a 
partner, m ight feel p ressure from  the partner to com prom ise independence. They m ight perceive 
that failure to go along and to allow  the p a rtn e r 's  directives to  override their ow n professional 
judgm ent could dam age the ir careers in the firm  o r even cost them  their jobs.
A ccounting firm s, sensitive to this possib ility , provide for m em bers o f  the audit team  to 
take differences o f  professional opinion to o ther senior m em bers o f  the firm . A n additional 
safeguard is provided by  the fact that auditors typ ically  w ill no t w ork for ju s t one audit partner, 
and so are less likely to feel trapped in  their position  and m ore w illing  to voice professional 
disagreem ents than m ight an  em ployee w orking in  a d ifferent type o f  com pany w here several 
years o f  o n e 's  career m ight be spent reporting to the  sam e m anager.
The accounting p ro fessio n 's  long attention to independence and the evolution o f  both 
A IC PA  and firm  safeguards seem  to provide adequate opportunity  for advice and counsel on 
questions and professional d ifferences o f  opinion rela ting  to independence, as w ell as safeguards, 
including auditor access to sen ior m anagem ent.
The tw o greatest forces that firm s can deploy to ensure audit independence, how ever, 
m ay be the culture o f  the  firm s them selves and the quality  o f  p rofessionalism  o f  the ir people. 
B oth  are, to be certain, shaped in  part by  the safeguards that have already been  m entioned. But 
bo th  have a vitality  that is nourished  in o ther w ays as w ell.
The professionals w ho enter a public accounting firm  bring  w ith  them  their technical 
skills, bu t also their professional character. H ow  w ell that has been form ed by  professional 
education and experience m ay have m ore influence on auditor independence than  any
m anagem ent system s or safeguards. The culture o f  the firm , the  quality  and integrity  o f  its 
leadership, its trad itions, stories and m oral exem plars can support and strengthen the professional 
character o f  its people and m ake safeguards but the final evidence o f  an independence tha t has 
been internalized.
Independence and the A ppearance o f  Independence
A uditors, like other professionals, do w ell to concern them selves not only w ith  
independence but also w ith  its  appearance.
The A IC PA  C ode o f  P rofessional Conduct A rticle  IV states:
A  m em ber should  m aintain objectiv ity  and be free o f  
conflicts o f  interest in  d ischarging professional 
responsibilities. A  m em ber in  public p ractice  should be 
independent in  fact and appearance w hen  providing 
auditing and o ther attestation  s e r v i c e s . 4 6 8
The desirab ility  o f  appearing to  be independent is self-evident. Since the value o f  
auditing and o ther attestation services lies in the assurance that they  provide investors and the 
public, doubts about the independence o f  the auditor can erode tha t assurance and w eaken public 
confidence. Such doubts, how ever, m igh t arise even w hen independence has not been im paired, 
i f  the circum stances are such as to cause a reasonable person  to believe  that it has been im paired. 
I f  independence  appears  to be im paired, then the dam age to pub lic  trust and confidence m ay 
already be done.
Q uestions concerning poten tial conflicts o f  in terest often touch  upon the "appearance o f  
im propriety." W hatever the m erits o f  an appearance-based standard  in  a  particular professional 
context, concern about the open-ended quality  o f  such a standard typ ically  leads to lim its on its 
application. This is certain ly  true w ith  regard  to the legal profession. In 1969, the A m erican B ar
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A ssociation adopted its M odel Code o f  P rofessional R esponsib ility  and chose to address the 
"appearance o f  im propriety ," no t as an enforceable rule, but ra ther as an ethical consideration to
w hich a law yer should  a s p i r e , that is, law yers should  s trive to avoid  no t only  professional
im propriety  but also the appearance o f  im propriety.470 Indeed, "[t]he 'appearance o f  
im propriety  standard ' in  the A B A  M odel Code o f  Professional R esponsib ility  d id not becom e 
part o f  the 1983 M odel R ules o f  Professional C onduct because m any courts and academ ic
com m entators criticized the standard ."471
N o t only  is it d ifficult to  assess how  particu lar conduct w ill be view ed by  an individual or 
group, b u t even the logically  p rio r question o f  identifying the relevant com m unity o f  observers 
poses a  form idable challenge. W hose opinion should count? E ven  m ore to  the point, w hose 
opin ion  counts so heavily  that society should tolerate the cost o f  "false positives,"  that is, o f  
barring  situations that m ight appear to be ethical problem s bu t in  fact are not?
E ven in  the context o f  governm ent service, w here the need to m aintain  public confidence 
presum ably  is at its peak, com m entators have criticized too great a focus upon appearances and 
noted the need  to appropriately lim it the use o f  appearance-based ethics rules for past and present 
governm ent e m p lo y e e s .4 7 2  Thus, for exam ple, w hen the O ffice o f  G overnm ent E thics (O G E)
AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct ET 55.04.
Peter W. Morgan and Glenn H. Reynolds, The Appearance o f Impropriety, New York: The Free Press, 
1977, p. 12.
ABA Model Code o f Professional Responsibility 1969, EC 9-6.
Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts o f  Interest from  the Administration o f  Justice: Conflicts o f  Interest and 
Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 Geo. L. J. 1, 56 (1990) (citations omitted).
Nolan, op cit., at 57-58.
prom ulgated S tandards o f  E thical C onduct for Em ployees o f  the  E xecutive Branch in 1992, it
explicitly  chose to adopt a "reasonable person" test. A s OGE explained:
The test assum es that conduct w ill be  ju d g ed  by  a 
reasonable person having know ledge o f  the relevant facts 
and does not depend upon the p u b lic 's  actual know ledge. 
W e do not v iew  that test as w eakening the appearance 
standard, bu t rather as appropriate assurance to an 
em ployee that his or her conduct w ill no t be  judged  from  
the perspective o f  the unreasonable, uninform ed o r overly
z e a lo u s .473
The appearance o f  independence ought not be a m andatory  requirem ent for any 
profession, organization or industry, because the appearance o f  any phenom enon is a product no t 
only  o f  the facts, bu t o f  the observer's  in terpretation o f  the facts. A ppearances are inherently 
subjective and ultim ately  beyond the control o f  the professional.
B ut the fundam ental problem  w ith  articulating and enforcing an "appearance" standard is 
not the  subjectiv ity  o f  the observer, bu t the hortatory  nature o f  the principle. It should be view ed 
as essentially  aspirational in  nature, and it should function to increase the sensitivity o f  auditors 
regarding how  their conduct or relationships m ight be m isunderstood. Such professional 
sensitiv ity  can and should be  cultivated, bu t it can no t be m andated or regulated.
The profession, or individual firm s o f  public accountants, m ay  choose to educate 
m em bers about particu lar conduct or relationships that m ay be deem ed to be especially  suspect 
or likely  to be perceived as im pairing independence. In doing  so, the m oral judgm ent o f  
m em bers can be enhanced and the m otivation to refrain  from  certa in  types o f  activity  increased.
P rofessional conduct is not m otivated only  by  regulations or enforceable rules. E thical 
p rinciples, in ternalized by the professional and supported by  the system s and the leadership o f
473 57 FR 35006.
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the firm , are a significant driver o f  professional decision-m aking and conduct. U ntil and unless 
there exists credible objective evidence concerning the appearance o f  a lack o f  auditor 
independence, enforceable appearance-based requirem ents should be abandoned and regulatory 
attention refocused on crafting fundam ental principles o f  independence w hich  can be 
im plem ented by accounting firm s through standards and m echanism s appropriate to their 
experience and issues.
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5) VanBreda, Michael F., The Prediction o f Corporate Earnings, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research 
Press, 1981, in Journal o f Forecasting, 1984.
Working Papers
1) Loan Loss Provisions and Bank Share Prices: How UK Banks Fared During 1987-1991; April 
1995.
2) Further Evidence on the Economic Effects o f Changes in Loan Loss Provisions on Bank 
Stocks; August 1996.
TEACHING AND ADVISING
Graduate School of Management
Elementary Accounting (undergraduate)
Introduction to Financial Accounting (undergraduate and graduate)
Accounting and Financial Reporting
Business Taxation
Corporate Financial Reporting
Evaluation o f Financial Information
Ph.D. Seminar in Financial Accounting Research
Economics o f Taxation
Graduate School o f Management Executive Program 
Graduate School o f Management Working Professional Program
Ph.D. Dissertations
Ferguson, Richard. The Economic Effects o f  the Securities Acts o f 1933 and 1934, Graduate School 
o f Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1977.
Manegold, James G. Time Series Properties o f  the Components o f Earnings. Graduate School of 
Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1982.
Sanvicente, Antonio Z. Corporate Bond Prices in An Option-Pricing Framework, Graduate School 
o f Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1982.
Cerf, Douglas C. FASB Statement No. 87 on Pension Accounting and Disclosures: A Study o f  
Intertemporal Earnings Response Coefficients, Graduate School of Management, University o f 
California at Davis, Chair; 1991.
August 1997
DAVID J. TEECE
Law & Economics Consulting Group
2000 Powell Street, Suite 600
Emeryville, CA 94608
Tel. (510) 653-9800
Fax (510) 653-9898
E-Mail: david_teece@lecg.com
Home: 227 Tunnel Road 
Berkeley, CA 94705 
Tel. (510) 486-0733 
Fax (510) 848-2727
Institute o f Management, Innovation
& Organization (IMIO)
F402 Haas School o f Business #1930
University o f California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1930
Tel. (510) 642-1075
Fax (510) 642-2826
E-Mail: teece@haas.berkeley.edu
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1975. 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1973. 
M.Comm. (Honors I), UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1971. 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1970.
PRESENT POSITION
LAW & ECONOMICS CONSULTING GROUP, INC. 
Principal
WALTER A. HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA, 
1982 - present.
Professor o f Business Administration
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA, 1989 - present. 
Holder, Mitsubishi Bank Chair
INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INNOVATION AND ORGANIZATION (IMIO),
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA, 1994 - present.
Director
CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT (CRM), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, CA, 1983 - 1994.
Director
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
ST. CATHERINE'S COLLEGE, Oxford University, and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
Spring 1989. 
Visiting Fellow
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Graduate School of Business, 1975 - 1982. 
Associate Professor o f Business Economics, 1978 - 1982. 
Assistant Professor of Business Economics, 1975 - 1978.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Department o f Economics, 1978 - 1979. 
Visiting Associate Professor o f Economics
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1971. 
Assistant Lecturer in Economics
EXTERNAL GRANTS AND PROFESSIONAL AWARDS
1973-1974 Penfield Traveling Fellowship in Diplomacy, International Affairs, and
Belles-Lettres
1978 Mellon Foundation Junior Faculty Fellowship
1978-1981 National Science Foundation Grant
June 1982 Esmee Fairbaim Senior Research Fellow, University o f Reading, England
1984-1987 National Science Foundation Grant
1986-1992 Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Grant
1987-1988 Sloan Foundation Grants
1987-1988 Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission Grant
1988-1991 Pew Foundation Grant
1989 Enterprise Oil Fellowship in Energy Economics, St. Catherine's College,
Oxford University
1989-1991 Smith Richardson Foundation Grant
1989-1992 Sasakawa Peace Foundation Grant
1990-1995 Sloan Foundation Grant
1992 Distinguished Visitor, Policy Studies Group, Tokyo
1992- U.S.-Japan Industry Technology Management Training Program
Grant, U.S. Department o f Defense/Air Force Office o f Scientific Research 
(DOD/AFOSR)
1994- Ameritech Foundation Grant - Consortium for Research on
Telecommunications Policy
1994- United States Information Agency Grant
1994- Eurasia Foundation Grant
1997 Distinguished Speakee, Academy of Management Technology and Innovation
Management Division, Boston
AFFILIATIONS 
Prior
Editorial Board, California Management Review. 
Editorial Board, Strategic Management Journal.
- 9 -
Editorial Board, Human Relations.
Co-director, Management of Technology Program, University o f California at Berkeley. 
Co-director, Nomura School of Advanced Management, Nomura-Berkeley Strategic Management 
o f Innovation Program. 
Member, Royal Economic Society.
Present
Co-editor and co-founder, Industrial and Corporate Change (Oxford University Press).
Member, American Economic Association.
Member, American Bar Association.
Member, Licensing Executives Society.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations.
Member, Pacific Council on International Policy.
Member, International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society.
Chairman, Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation.
Director, Consortium for Research on Telecommunications Policy.
Member, The Benjamin Franklin Society
BUSINESS AFFILIATIONS
Member, Board of Directors, The Atlas Funds, 1989- .
Chairman, Board o f Directors, Law and Economics Consulting Group, 1988-.
Member, Board of Directors, Giltronix, Inc., 1985-1990.
Member, Board o f Directors, Innovative Concepts, Inc., 1989-1992.
Member, Board o f Trustees, Atlas Insurance Trust, 1997-.
PUBLICATIONS 
Articles
1) "The Determination o f Residential Section Prices in Some South Island Centres" (with R. E. 
Falvey), New Zealand Economic Papers. 1972.
2) "Time-Cost Tradeoffs: Elasticity Estimates and Determinants for International Technology 
Transfer Projects," Management Science. 23:8 (April 1977), 830-837.
3) "Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost o f Transferring 
Technological Know-How," The Economic Journal. 87 (June 1977), 242-261. Reprinted in E. 
Mansfield and E. Mansfield (eds.), The Economics of Technical Change (London: Edward 
Elgar, 1993). Reprinted in M. Casson (ed.), Multinational Corporations, The International 
Library o f Critical Writings in Economics 1 (England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990), 185- 
204.
4) "Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test o f the Multidivisional 
Hypothesis" (with Henry Armour), The Bell Journal o f Economics. 9:1 (Spring 1978), 106-122. 
Reprinted in J. Barney and W. Ouchi (eds.), Organizational Economics: Toward a New 
Paradigm for Studying and Understanding Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986).
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Andrea Rugiandini, Organizzazione e Mercato (Bologna, Italy: Mulino, 1985), 477-498.
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3) "Horizontal Integration in Energy: Organizational and Technological Considerations," in E. 
Mitchell (ed.), Horizontal Divestiture in the Oil Industry (Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1978), 57-72.
4) "Energy Company Financial Reporting: Conceptual Framework for an Energy Information 
System" (with Paul A. Griffin) in W illiam W. Hogan (ed.), Energy Information: Description. 
Diagnosis, and Design, Chapter 10 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Institute for Energy 
Studies, December 1978), 235-289.
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Industry" (with G. Pisano and M. Russo) in David Mowery (ed.), International Collaborative 
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Furino (ed.), Cooperation and Competition in the Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger, 1988), appendix, 265-330.
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1985
"Leaders and Managers Empower Differently," UA '85 Conference, University 
Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 27-29, and New York, NY, October 30, 
1985.
"Measuring Managerial Competencies: Implications for Management Development," 
HRD '85 Conference, University Associates, New York, NY, October 30, 
November 1,1985.
1986
"Competencies in Managing Lateral Relations," UA '86 Conference, University 
Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 19-21, 1986.
Keynote Speaker, MED Division, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Chicago, 
IL, 1986.
1987
Panel Speaker, "Disseminating Findings From Consultation Projects: Publication in 
Journals," Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, New Orleans, LA, August 
10, 1987.
1988
Panel Speaker, All Academy Symposium, "Publishing Trends," Annual Meeting, 
Academy o f Management, Anaheim, CA, August 6, 1988.
Discussant, Symposium on "Strategic Change Management: OD Interventions Within 
Digital Equipment Corporation, Inc., and General Electric Company," Annual 
Meeting, Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA, August 9, 1988.
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"Understanding and Assessing Organizational Leadership" (with Marshall Sashkin), 
Conference on Psychological Measures and Leadership, Center for Creative 
Leadership and the Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, TX, October 23-26,
1989
Invited Panel Speaker, "Getting Published," Annual Meeting, Academy o f Management, 
Washington, DC, August 12, 1989.
Symposium Speaker (with W. M. Bernstein), "Modeling Organizational M eaning 
Systems," Research in Organizational Change and Development Symposium, 
Annual Meeting, Academy o f Management, Washington, DC, August 15, 1989.
Symposium Speaker, "Academics and the Practice of Consultancy," Annual Meeting, 
Academy of Management, Washington, DC, August 16, 1989.
Keynote Speaker, Annual Meeting, Organization Development Network, San Diego, 
CA, October 8, 1989.
1990
Invited Address, "Changing Corporate Culture to Improve Customer Service," Institute 
o f Personnel Management, London, England, April 24, 1990.
Invited Speaker, "Human Resource Professional Competencies," Annual Meeting, Senior 
Executive Roundtable, Society for Human Resource Management, Atlanta, 
GA, June 26, 1990.
Keynote Speaker, "Empowering Subordinates," Second Annual National Conference, 
Positive Employee Practices Institute, Atlanta, GA, October 23,1990.
1991
Invited speaker, "The SmithKline Beecham Merger," Symposium on Building 
Competitive Organizations for the 21st Century: The CEO Agenda for the 
1990s," Graduate School o f Business Administration, University o f Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, MI, January 23, 1991.
Invited panel speaker, "Working with the Organizations o f the Future," Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Sixth Annual Conference, St. Louis, 
MO, April 28, 1991.
1992
Invited address, "The Changing World of Organization Change." Annual Convention, 
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, August 1992.
1993
Symposium Speaker (with C. A. Coruzzi), "The Many Facets of Empowerment," Annual 
Meeting, Academy of Management, Atlanta, GA, August 9, 1993.
1994
Distinguished Speaker, "Organization Change: What We Know, What W e Need to 
Know," Organization Development and Change Division, Annual Meeting, 
Academy of Management, Dallas, TX, August 15, 1994.
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Invited panel Speaker, "Integrated Organizational Diagnosis: Can We Bring T and 'O' 
Together?" Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Ninth Annual 
Conference, Nashville, TN, April 8, 1994.
1995
Keynote Address, "Organization Development: Then, Now and Tomorrow," Conference 
on Best Practices in Organization Development, sponsored by Bowling Green 
State University in celebration of the 20th anniversary o f the Master o f 
Organization Development Program, Bowling Green, OH, March 9, 1995.
Symposium Speaker, "What If We Took Teamwork Seriously?" Managerial Consulting 
Division, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 
August 1995.
Symposium Speaker (with A. H. Church), "Practitioners' Attitudes About the Field of 
Organization Development," Organization Development and Change Division, 
Annual Meeting, Academy o f Management, Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 
1995.
M. N. Bazigos and W. W. Burke, "Theory Orientations o f Organization Development 
(OD) Practitioners: A Preliminary Exploration." Poster Session, Seventh 
Annual Convention, American Psychological Society, New York, NY, June 
1995.
M. W. Javitch, A. H. Church, J. Waclawski, and W. W. Burke, "Linking 
Personality, Leadership Style, and Client Satisfaction in Professional Service 
Firms." Poster Session, Seventh Annual Convention, American Psychological 
Society, New York, NY, June 1995.
1996
Symposium Speaker, "Guns and Butter: What Would You Advise the Military?" All- 
Academy Symposium, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Cincinatti, 
OH: August, 1996.
Keynote Address: "The Agenda for Organization Development," Organization 
Development Network Special Event, "Restructuring, Reengineering, and 
Downsizing: Crossroads for Society," October 5,1996.
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Gary Edwards
President, Meritas Consulting, Inc.
Gary Edwards is founder and President o f Meritas Consulting where he directs the efforts of lawyers, management 
consultants, trainers, and business ethics professionals to meet the needs o f US and multinational organizations for 
business ethics and legal compliance. Meritas' services include risk assessment, development o f standards of conduct, 
design and delivery of executive and management development and employee training workshops; training o f client 
trainers for corporate wide ethics and compliance roll-outs; establishment o f ethics and compliance offices; and 
evaluation o f existing ethics and compliance o f programs.
Mr. Edwards is frequently called upon by business and government leaders for his advice and expertise on matters 
related to ethics. A popular speaker, he has addressed top management and hundreds o f teams in over 200 corporations 
and dozens o f trade and professional associations. He has appeared on major network news broadcasts by ABC, CBS, 
NBC, PBS, and CNN, and has been widely quoted in major publications, including The Wall Street Journal, The New 
York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and The Economist o f London.
Mr. Edwards has designed corporate ethics programs and conducted ethics training for companies in numerous 
industries, including financial services, healthcare, telecommunications and defense. He has also been called upon to 
assist major companies such as General Dynamics, E.F. Hutton, and Nynex following headline problems they 
encountered with ethics. Further he led the production o f the Ethics at Work series o f award issues in the workplace. 
Ethics at Work has been used for ethics and compliance training by more than 1,000 organizations. In recent years, 
Mr. Edwards has led client consulting engagements internationally in Europe, Latin America, and Asis-Pacific.
At the request o f President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the "Packard Commission"), 
Mr. Edwards wrote the findings and recommendations for defense industry self-governance for the Commissions report 
to the President. Those recommendations were adopted by industry leaders in the "Defense Industry Initiative on 
Business Ethics." Additionally, Mr. Edwards has testified on self-governance initiatives before the Armed Services 
Committee o f the United States House o f Representatives. His activities with government have also included consulting 
for the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Postal Service, and the City o f Chicago.
Prior to founding Meritas, Mr. Edwards served for fifteen years as chief executive o f the Ethics Resource Center in 
Washington, DC. He holds a J.D. degree from the Georgetown University Law Center, and M.A. from Yale University 
where he was a Hooker-Dwight Fellow, and a B.A. from Andrews University. He has also done graduate study in 
philosophy at Johns Hopkins University and Princeton University.
